UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Cheryl D. Uzamere Petitioner,
- and -
David Paul Walker, Tara A. Uzamere, C. Vernon
Mason, Alton Maddox and Colin
Moore
Witnesses,
- against -
As Representatives
and Citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: Goodluck Jonathan, In his Official Capacity as President of Nigeria;
Senator Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; His Excellency, Professor George A. Obiozor, Hon. Mallam Ibrahim Awalu, Hon. C. N Okafor,
Mr. A. O. Babalola, Mrs. M. C. Ekeocha, Mrs. M. N. Obidi, Hon. David Mark, Senator, Hon. Okon I. Udoh, Mr. James T. Medugu,
Hon. Oserheimen Osunbor, Hon. Ike Ekweremadu, Senator, Mr. Felix Y. Pwol and Osato Eugene Uzamere; As Representatives and Citizens of the State of Israel: Benyamin Netanyahu as President
of the State of Israel; various individuals listed below who hold dual citizenship of the United States of America and the
State of Israel; As Representatives and Citizens of the United States:
United States of America; State of New York, City of New York; The Honorable Barack H. Obama, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as President of the United States of America; the Honorable Keith B. Alexander, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Director of the National Security Agency; Rajesh De, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as General Counsel
for the National Security Agency; National Security Agency; Andrew Weissman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
General Counsel for the Federal Bureau of Investigation; James X. Dempsey, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Elisebeth Collins Cook, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as
Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; David Medine, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chairman,
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Rachel L. Brand, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Patricia M. Wald, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board; the Honorable John G. Roberts, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Chief Justice of the United States; the Honorable Antonin Scalia, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the Honorable Anthony Kennedy, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Individually and
in Her Official Capacity as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the Honorable Stephen G. Breyer,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the Honorable Samuel
A. Alito, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the Honorable
Sonia Sotomayor, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States;
the Honorable Elena Kagan, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States; the Honorable William E. Smith, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the
District of Rhode; The Honorable Patricia A. Sullivan, in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the District of Rhode
Island; Nicholas G. Garaufis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York; Dennis Jacobs, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit; Jon O. Newman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Amalya L. Kearse, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Ralph K. Winter, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
John M. Walker, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Joseph M. McLaughlin, Individually in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Pierre N. Leval, Individually in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Guido
Calabresi, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; José
A. Cabranes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Chester
J. Straub, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Rosemary
S. Pooler, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Robert
D. Sack, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Robert
A. Katzmann, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Barrington
D. Parker, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Reena
Raggi, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Richard
C. Wesley, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Peter
W. Hall, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Debra
Ann Livingston, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Gerard E. Lynch, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Denny Chin, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Raymond
J. Lohier, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Susan L. Carney, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Christopher F. Droney, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Carol Bagley Amon, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Chief Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York; Frederic Block, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York; Joseph F. Bianco, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York; Margo K. Brodie, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Brian M. Cogan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge
for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Raymond J. Dearie, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Sandra J. Feuerstein, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Nina Gershon, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. Court for the Eastern District of New York; I. Leo Glasser, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; John Gleeson, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Denis R. Hurley,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Dora
L. Irizarry, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York; Sterling Johnson, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York; Edward R. Korman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York; Kiyo A. Matsumoto, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York; William F. Kuntz, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Roslynn R. Mauskopf, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Allyne R. Ross, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Thomas C. Platt, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Joanna Seybert, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Arthur D. Spatt,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Sandra
L. Townes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York; Eric N. Vitaliano, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York; Jack B. Weinstein, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York; Leonard D. Wexler, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York; Ronnie Abrams, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York; Harold Baer, Individually and Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Deborah A. Batts, Individually and in Her Southern
District of New York; Richard M. Berman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York; Vincent L. Briccetti, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York; Naomi Reice Buchwald, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Andrew L. Carter, Jr., Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; P. Kevin Castel, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Miriam Goldman
Cedarbaum, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York; Denise L. Cote, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York; Paul A. Crotty, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York; George B. Daniels, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York; Kevin T. Duffy, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York; Paul A. Engelmayer, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Katherine B. Forrest, Individually and in Her Official Capacity
as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Jesse M. Furman, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Paul G. Gardephe, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Thomas P. Griesa, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Charles S. Haight,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Alvin
K. Hellerstein, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York; Lewis A. Kaplan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York; Kenneth M. Karas, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York; John F Keenan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York; John G. Koeltl, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Victor Marrero, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge
for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Colleen McMahon, Individually and in Her Official Capacity
as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Alison J. Nathan, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; J. Paul Oetken, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Richard Owen, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Robert P. Patterson,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; William
H. Pauley, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York; Loretta A. Preska, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Chief Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York; Jed S. Rakoff, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York; Edgardo Ramos, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York; Leonard B Sand, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York; Shira A. Scheindlin, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Cathy Seibel, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Louis L. Stanton, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Sidney H. Stein, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Richard J Sullivan, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Laura Taylor Swain,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Robert
W. Sweet, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York; Kimba M. Wood, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York; Steven M. Gold, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chief Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York; Joan M. Azrack, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Lois Bloom, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; E. Thomas Boyle, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Gary R. Brown, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Marilyn
D. Go, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York; Robert M. Levy, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York; Arlene R. Lindsay, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Roanne L. Mann; Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; James Orenstein, Individually and in Her Official
Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Viktor V. Pohorelsky; Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; Cheryl
L. Pollak, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York; Vera M. Scanlon, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York; A. Kathleen Tomlinson, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge
for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; William D. Wall, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York; James L. Cott, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Paul E. Davison,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York; Michael H. Dolinger, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York; Ronald L. Ellis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Kevin N. Fox, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chief
Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; James C. Francis, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Debra Freeman,
Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York; Gabriel W. Gorenstein, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York; Frank Maas, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York; Sarah Netburn, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate
Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Andrew J. Peck, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Henry Pitman, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Lisa
Margaret Smith, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York; Individually and George A. Yanthis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Magistrate Judge for
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Martin R. Goldberg, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; Lawrence E. Kahn, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York; José Linares,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge for the District of New Jersey; Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Nancy B. Firestone,
in Her Official Capacity as Judge for the United States Court of Claims; Christine O.C. Miller, in Her Official Capacity
as Judge for the United States Court of Claims; John P. Wiese, in His Official Capacity as Judge for the United States Court
of Claims; the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee; the Honorable Charles Schumer, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee;
the Honorable Dick Durbin, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable
Sheldon Whitehouse, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Amy
Klobuchar, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Al Franken,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Christopher A. Coons,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Richard Blumenthal, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Mazie Hirono, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Chuck Grassley, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Jeff Sessions, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Lindsey Graham, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member,
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable John Cornyn, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Michael S. Lee, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee; the Honorable Ted Cruz, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee;
the Honorable Jeff Flake, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee; the Honorable
Bob Goodlatte, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner,
Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Howard Coble, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Lamar Smith, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Steve Chabot, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Spencer Bachus, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Darrell Issa, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member,
U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable J. Randy Forbes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S.
House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Steve King, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary
Committee; the Honorable Trent Franks, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee;
the Honorable Louie Gohmert, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable
Jim Jordan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Ted Poe,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Hon. Jason Chaffetz,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Tom Marino, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Hon. Trey Gowdy, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Mark Amodei, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Raul Labrador, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Blake Farenthold, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable George Holding, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member,
U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Doug Collins, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House
Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Ron DeSantis, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary
Committee; the Honorable John Conyers, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee;
the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable
Bobby Scott, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Mel Watt,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Jackson Lee, Individually and in Her
Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Steve Cohen, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Hank Johnson, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Pedro Pierluisi, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member,
U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Judy Chu, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary
Committee; the Honorable Ted Deutch, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee;
the Honorable Luis V. Gutierrez, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the
Honorable Karen Bass, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable
Cedric Richmond, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Suzan
DelBene, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Joe Garcia,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Hakeem Jeffries, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Honorable Dianne Feinstein, Individually and
in Her Official Capacity as Chairperson, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Ron Wyden, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Mark Udall, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Mark Warner, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Martin Heinrich, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Angus King, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Saxby Chambliss, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Richard Burr, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable James E. Risch, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Daniel Coats, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Marco Rubio, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Susan Collins, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Tom Coburn, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Mike Rogers, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Mac Thornberry, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Jeff Miller, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Mike Conaway, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Peter King, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Frank LoBiondo, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Devin Nunes, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Lynn Westmoreland,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Michele
Bachmann, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable
Thomas J Rooney, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
the Honorable Joe Heck, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
the Honorable Mike Pompeo, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
the Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence; the Honorable Mike Thompson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Jan Schakowsky, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence; the Honorable Jim Langevin, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Hon. Adam Schiff, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Hon. Luis Gutierrez, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Hon. Ed Pastor, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence; Hon. Jim Himes, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence; Hon. Terri Sewell, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Member, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence; Mr. Ruslan Agarunov, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman
Hakeem Jeffries; Bertram Berns, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem
Jeffries; Mr. Norman Bobrow, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries;
Mr. Paul Burg, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Ms. Vickie
Fishman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Sander Gerber,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Michael Granoff, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Marvin Israelow, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Alan Levow, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. William Russell-Shapiro, Individually and
in His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Ms. Donna Sternberg, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Marc Spiegel, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Daniel Tenenblatt, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Leslie Topper, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Campaign Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Mr. Craig Weiss, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Campaign
Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; World Alliance for Israel PAC, Individually and in Its Official Capacity as
Campaign-Contributor to Congressman Hakeem Jeffries; Lee Ziff, Individually and in His Official Capacity as President of
the World Alliance for Israel; the Honorable Eric H. Holder, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Attorney General
for the United States; Thomas Perez, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Assistant Attorney General, Disability
Right Section for the U.S. Department of Justice; Michael E. Horowitz, Individual and His in Official Capacity as Inspector
General for the U.S. Department of Justice; the U.S. Department of Justice; the Honorable Robert Swan Mueller, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; George Venizelos, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Assistant Director in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Branch; the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; Mr. Stein, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
“John Doe” #1, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
the Honorable Janet Napolitano, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; John Morton, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Director for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Daniel Ragsdale, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Deputy Director for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Radha Sekar, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Acting Executive Associate Director for the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; James Dinkins, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Executive Associate Director for the U.S.
Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Gary Mead, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Executive Associate Director for the Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Peter
S. Vincent, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Principal Legal Adviser for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;Timothy
Moynihan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; Tamara Kessler, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Acting Officer for the Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties; Rachel McCarthy, Individually and Her Official Capacity as Bar Counsel for the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; Rand Beers, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Under Secretary for the Homeland Security
for National Protection and Programs; Denis P. McGowan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Regional Director,
Federal Protection Service, National Protection and Programs Directorate for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Gayle
Worthy, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as FOIA Officer/Public Liaison for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Ivan K. Fong, Individually and in His Official Capacity as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Charles K. Edwards, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Inspector General of U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Stacia Hylton, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Director of the U.S.
Marshal Service; Gerald Auerbach, Individually and in His Official Capacity as General Counsel for the U.S. Marshals Service;
Charles Dunne, Director, U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York; “John Doe #2”, U.S. Marshals
Service for the Eastern District of New York; “John Doe #3, U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York;
“Jane Doe”, U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York; the U.S. Marshals Service; Kathleen
Sebelius, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; William
B. Schultz, Individually in His Official Capacity as General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Marilyn Tavenner, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Acting
Administrator Chief Operating Officer, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Office; Eric Schneiderman, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as New York State Attorney General, New York State Attorney General's Office; Eric Adams, Individually,
and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; John J. Bonacic, Individually, and in His Official
Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Neil D. Breslin, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as
Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; John A. DeFrancisco, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New
York Senate Judiciary Committee; Martin Malavé Dilan, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York
Senate Judiciary Committee; Adriano Espaillat, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary
Committee; John J. Flanagan, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Charles
J. Fuschillo Jr., Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Kemp Hannon,
Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Ruth Hassell-Thompson, Individually,
and in Her Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Brad Hoylman, Individually, and in His Official
Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Andrew J Lanza, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member,
New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Kenneth P. LaValle, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate
Judiciary Committee; Betty Little, Individually, and in Her Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee;
Michael F. Nozzolio, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Thomas F.
O'Mara, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Bill Perkins, Individually,
and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Michael H. Ranzenhofer, Individually, and in
His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; John L. Sampson, Individually, and in His Official
Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Diane J. Savino, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as
Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee; Malcolm A. Smith, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New
York Senate Judiciary Committee; Toby Ann Stavisky, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate
Judiciary Committee; Lee M. Zeldin, Individually, and in His Official Capacity as Member, New York Senate Judiciary Committee;
Andrew M. Cuomo, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of New York; the State of New York; Jonathan
Lippman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chief Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; John W. McConnell,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Counsel to the Chief Administrative Judge, for the New York State Unified Court
System; Daniel D. Angiolillo, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified
Court System; Second Judicial Department; Cheryl E. Chambers, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Appellate Judge
for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; Jeffrey A. Cohen, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; Mark C. Dillon, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department;
Anita R. Florio, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System;
Second Judicial Department; Steven W. Fisher, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York
State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; L. Priscilla Hall, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as
Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; John M. Leventhal, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department;
Plummer E. Lott, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System;
Second Judicial Department; William F. Mastro, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New
York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; Robert J. Miller, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; A. Gail Prudenti, Individually
and in Her Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department;
Reinaldo E. Rivera, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System;
Second Judicial Department; Sheri S. Roman, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York
State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; Sandra L. Sgroi, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Appellate
Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; Peter B. Skelos, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Appellate Judge for the New York State Unified Court System; Second Judicial Department; Thomas Scuccimarra,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Justice for the New York State Unified Court System; Jeffrey S. Sunshine, Individually
and in His Capacity as Justice, New York State Unified Court System; Nancy Tegtmeier Sunshine, Individually and in her Official
Capacity as Chief Clerk of Court for the New York State Unified Court System; Lara J. Genovesi, Individually and in Her
Official Capacity as Court Attorney for the New York State Unified Court System; Antonio Diaz, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Borough Chief Clerk for the New York State Unified Court System; Arthur M. Schack, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Justice of the New York State Unified Court System; Ronald D. Bratt, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Law Clerk for the New York State Unified Court System; Barbara Guida, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Secretary
for the New York State Court System; Yolanda Jennings, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Part Clerk for the New
York State Unified Court System; Kalisha Evans, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Officer for the New York State
Unified Court System; Eileen A. Rakower, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Justice for the New York State Unified
Court System; Donna Mills, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Justice for the New York State Unified Court System;
Matthew D'Emic, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Justice for the New York State Unified Court System; Michael
Gerstein, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Justice for the New York State Unified Court System; New York State
Unified Court System; Anthony Cutrona, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Justice for the New York State Unified
Court System; New York State Unified Court System; Thomas A. Klonick, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chair
of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct; the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct; Jorge Del Tipico,
Individually and in His Capacity as Chair for the New York State Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Department;
New York State Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Department; Richard M. Gutierrez, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Chair for the Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts; Grievance
Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts; The Honorable Nirav R. Shah, M.D., M.P.H., Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health; New York State Department of Health;
Kristin M. Woodlock, RN, MPA, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Acting Commissioner for the New York State Office
of Mental Health; John Tauriello, Esq. Individually and in His Official Capacity as Deputy Commissioner and Chief Counsel
of the New York State Office of Mental Health; Samuel Gant, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Director of the
Intensive Case Management Program, Kingsboro Psychiatric Facility, New York State Office of Mental Health, Bridget Davis,
Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Intensive Case Worker for the Intensive Case Management Program, New York State
Office of Mental Health; New York State Office of Mental Health; Kristin M. Proud, Individually and in Her Official Capacity
as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; Maria T. Vidal, Individually and in
Her Official Capacity as General Counsel for the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance; Robert Doar,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Administrator and Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration;
Roy A. Esnard, Individually and in His/Her Official Capacity as General Counsel of the New York City Human Resources Administration;
the New York City Human Resources Administration; the New York City Human Resources Administration; Michael Bloomberg, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of New York; the City of New York; Michael Cardozo, Individually and in
His Official Capacity as Corporation Counsel for the City of New York; Charles A. Hynes, Individually and in his Official
Capacity as District Attorney for Kings County; Amy Feinstein, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Chief Assistant
District Attorney, Kings County District Attorney's Office; Kings County District Attorney's Office; Salvatore J. Russo,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as General Counsel for the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; Agnes
Flores, Individually and in Her Former Official Capacity as Psychiatric Nurse for the New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation; Martin Bolton, Individually and in Former His Official Capacity as Psychotherapist for the New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation; Margaret Thomas, Individually and in Her Office Capacity as Licensed Practical Nurse for the New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; Pauline Amo-Adu, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as (unlicensed) Master
Social Worker for the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; Mario Blake, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as Psychiatric Technician; James Oniwe, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Registered Nurse for the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation; Jean Barry, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as Licensed Clinical Social Worker
for the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; Hugette Guilliame Sam, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as
Registered Nurse for the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; Samuel Sarpong, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Program Manager for the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; Dr. Scott Andrew Berger, Individually
and in His Official Capacity as Psychiatrist for the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation; Joseph Visceglia, Individually and in His Official Capacity as City Clerk for the Office of the
City Clerk; Office of the City Clerk, Marriage License Bureau; City of New York; Dr. “John Doe” #4, Psychiatrist,
Brookdale Hospital Medical Center; Brooklyn Hospital Medical Center; Giselle Stolper, President and CEO, Mental Health Association
of New York City; Robert P. Borsody, Esq., Secretary of the Mental Health Association of New York City; Mental Health Association
of New York City; Sean Bolser, Esq., Federal Defender, Federal District of New York; Heidi C. Cesare, Esq, Federal Defenders,
Federal District of New York; Randi L. Chavis, Esq, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Deirdre von Dornum,
Esq, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Tracey E. Gaffey, Esq, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New
York; Michelle A. Gelernt, Esq., Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Lisa Hoyes, Federal Defenders, Federal
District of New York; Len H. Kamdang, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Peter Kirchheimer, Federal Defenders,
Federal District of New York; David A. Lewis, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Douglas G. Morris, Federal
Defenders, Federal District of New York; Michael P. Padden, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; David Patton,
Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Jan A. Rostal, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Michael
K. Schneider, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Chase A. Scolnick, Federal Defenders, Federal District of
New York; Kannan Sundaram, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Michael D. Weil, Federal Defenders, Federal District
of New York; Mildred M. Whalen, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Robert M. Baum, Federal Defenders, Federal
District of New York; Sarah Baumgartel, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Susanne Brody, Federal Defenders,
Federal District of New York; Jennifer Brown, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Martin Cohen, Federal Defenders,
Federal District of New York; Peggy Cross-Goldenberg, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Christopher Flood,
Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Julia Gatto, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Mark Gombiner,
Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Jonathan Marvinny, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Annalisa
Mirón, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; David Patton, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York;
Sabrina Shroff, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Roland Thau, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New
York; Jerrod Thompson-Hicks, Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Philip Weinstein, Federal Defenders, Federal
District of New York; Federal Defenders, Federal District of New York; Leonardo Aldridge, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Mary Beth Anderson, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Michael Arthus, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Adam Axel, Esq., Brooklyn
Defender Service; Betty Baez Melo, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Elyse Bataller Schneider, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Michael F. Baum, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Whitney Z. Bernstein, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Sarah Boyette,
Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Michael Brown, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Joyce Brunwasser, Esq., Brooklyn Defender
Service; Jamie Burke, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Sarah M. Burleson, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Amos Cohen, Esq.,
Brooklyn Defender Service; George Cooke, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Virginia Curry, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Edward Daniels, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Chad Dauman, Esq., Stephen Dean, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Christina
M. Dieckmann, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Sara Feinberg, Esq., Juan Fiol, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Molly Gallivan,
Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Tim Gumkowski, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Amanda Hamann, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Le'Shera Hardy, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Scott Hechinger, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Shannon Heery, Esq., Brooklyn
Defender Service; Nyasa Hickey, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Linda Hoff, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Dorothy Hughes,
Esq., Joseph Indusi, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Amanda Jack, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Joyce Kendrick, Esq.,
Elizabeth Kilstein, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Ashley Kloepfer, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Jared Kneitel, Esq.,
Brooklyn Defender Service; Dara Kristt, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Summer Lacey, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Richard
M. LaFontaine, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Elizabeth Latimer, Esq., Yung-Mi Lee, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Thomas
Leith, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Hela Levi, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Paul Lieberman, Esq., Brooklyn Defender
Service; Jacob Lipsky, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Cary London, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Ruben Loyo, Esq., Brooklyn
Defender Service; Alyssa Mack, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Harvey Mandelcorn, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Marie
Mark, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Ed Mayr, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Cameron Mease, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Becca Miller, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Susan Mitchell, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Jillian Modzeleski, Esq.,
Brooklyn Defender Service; Benjamin Moore, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Lauren Nakamura, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Anders Nelson, Esq., Sarah Nolan, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Hemangi S. Pai, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Sydney
Peck, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Talia Peleg, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Christopher Perks, Esq., Alex Perlin,
Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Guy Raimondi, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Danielle Regis, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service;
Robert Riether, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Alan Rosenberg, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Scott Ruplinger, Esq.,
Brooklyn Defender Service; Laura Saft, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Lisa Salvatore, Esq., Iliana Santiago, Esq., Josh
Saunders, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Lisa Schreibersdorf, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Amanda Scioscia, Esq., Brooklyn
Defender Service; David Secular, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Renee Seman, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Marissa
Sherman, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Joseph P. Sieger, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Debora Silberman, Esq., Brooklyn
Defender Service; Arielle Simon, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Angad Singh, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Shari Stein,
Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Sonia Tate-Cousins, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Sarah Vendzules, Esq., Brooklyn Defender
Service; C. Randall Walker, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Emilie Williams, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Ken Womble,
Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Aminie Woolworth, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Brooklyn Defender Service; Marianne
C. Yang, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Brooklyn Defender Service; Iris Ying, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Benjamin
Zeman, Esq., Brooklyn Defender Service; Lauren Zimmerman, Brooklyn Defender Service, Brooklyn Defenders Service, Inc.; Mortimer
Zuckerman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Editor, Publisher and Owner of the Daily News, LP; Mortimer Zuckerman,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Editor, Publisher and Owner of the Daily News, LP; Scott Shifrel, former Staff
Writer of the Daily News, LP; the Daily News, LP; Rupert Murdoch, New York Post, New York Post; Mark Fass, Staff Writer,
ALM.com; ALM.com; Jazmin M. Quary, Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Executive Director
for NAMI, Inc.; NAMI, Inc.; Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Esq., Roberta Siegal, Individually in Her Official Capacity as Assistant
Vice President of Federation Employment and Guidance Services, Inc.; Dr. Forster, in His Official Capacity as Psychiatrist
of Federation Employment and Guidance Services, Inc.; Clifford Nafus, in His Official Capacity as Rehabilitation Technician
of Federation Employment and Guidance Services, Inc.; Federation Employment and Guidance Services, Inc.; Rabbi Michael J.
Broyde, Esq., Rabbi Michoel Zylberman, Esq., Rabbi Yona Reiss, Esq., Rabbi Shlomo Weissmann, Esq.; Abraham H. Foxman, Individually
and in His Capacity as Executive Director of the Anti-Defamation League, Inc.; Steven M. Freeman, Esq., Anti Defamation League,
Inc.; Steven C. Sheinberg, Esq., Anti-Defamation League, Inc.; Deborah Bensinger, Esq., Anti-Defamation League, Inc.; David
L. Barkey, Esq., Anti-Defamation League, Inc.; Allen E. Kaye, P.C.; Jan Eastman, Esq., Chair, Vermont Professional Responsibility
Program, Office of Bar Counsel; Michael Kennedy, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Bar Counsel for the Vermont
Professional Responsibility Program, Office of Bar Counsel; Vermont Professional Responsibility Program, Office of Bar Counsel;
George Wachtel, Esq.; Jonathan D. Schwartz, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Executive Vice President and General
Counsel for Cablevision, Inc.; Cablevision, Inc.; Ruslan Agarunov, Campaign Contributor, Bertram Berns, Campaign, Norman
Bobrow, Campaign Contributor, Paul Burg, Campaign Contributor; Vickie Fishman, Campaign Contributor; Sander Gerber; Sander
Gerber; Michael Granoff; Campaign Contributor; Sander Gerber, Michael Granoff, Marvin Israelow, Alan Levow, Mr. William
Russell-Shapiro, Marc Spiegel, Donna Sternberg, Mr. Daniel Tenenblatt, Leslie Topper, Craig Weiss, Alan Wildes, World Alliance
for Israel PAC, Lee Ziff, Allen E. Kaye, Esq. Harvey Shapiro, Esq., Law Office of Harvey Shapiro; Jack Gladstein, Esq.,
Law Office of Jack Gladstein and Messinger, Osato Eugene Uzamere, Esq., Uzamere and Associates, PLLC and Senator Ehigie Edobor
Uzamere Respondents
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At
all times hereinafter mentioned, Petitioner Cheryl D. Uzamere, a natural person, and mother of David P. Walker and Tara A.
Uzamere, all of whom are victims of those human rights abuses at the hands of the Defendants, pursuant to the Declaration
of Human Rights of the United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, states the following
under the penalties of perjury:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations Human Rights
Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
1) Petitioner respectfully reminds this honorable Commission that Petitioner and her children, as
citizens of a country with territories that are in agreement with the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations
Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, states:
Article
One
2)
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article Two
3) Everyone
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation
of sovereignty.
Article Three
4) Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of person.
Article Four
5) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude;
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article
Fifth
6)
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article Sixth
7) Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article Seven
8) All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement
to such discrimination.
Article Eight
9) Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.
Article Nine
10) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article Ten
11) Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article Eleven
12) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
13) No one shall be held guilty of any penal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law,
at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the
penal offence was committed.
Article Thirteen
14) Everyone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
15) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country.
Article Fourteen
16) Everyone has the
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
17) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes
or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article Fifteen
18) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
19) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
Article Sixteen
20) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right
to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
21) Marriage shall be
entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
22) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the State.
Article Seventeen
23) Everyone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others.
24) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article Eighteen
25) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom
to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article
Nineteen
26)
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article Twenty
27) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
28) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article Twenty-One
29) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
30)
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
31) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed
in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.
Article Twenty-Two
32) Everyone, as a member
of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation
and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article
Twenty-Three
33)
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment.
34)
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
35) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by
other means of social protection.
36) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
Article Twenty-Four
37) Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic
holidays with pay.
Article Twenty-Five
38) Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old
age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
39) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in
or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article
Twenty-Six
40)
Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary
education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education
shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
41) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
42) Parents have a prior
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
Article Twenty-Seven
43) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts
and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
44) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article
Twenty-Eight
45)
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.
Article Twenty-Nine
46) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is possible.
47) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
48) These rights and
freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article Thirty
49) Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right
to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
U.S. Constitutional Mandates, Federal States and New York State Statutes
50) Article Eight's
mandate that “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law” and Article Ten's mandate that “Everyone is
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of
his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him require that the Petitioner identity Respondents' laws,
rights and obligations that Respondents violated.
First Amendment
51) “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . .or abridging the freedom of speech, . . .and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances ” See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
52) U.S. Supreme Court Case Law
Regarding the Establishment Clause: “In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court decision Everson v. Board of Education
incorporated the Establishment Clause (i.e., made it apply against the states). In the majority decision, JusticeHugo Black
wrote: 'The “establishment of religion”' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion to another . . . in the words of Jefferson, the [First Amendment] clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State' ... That wall must be kept high and impregnable.
We could not approve the slightest breach. In the Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet
(1994), Justice David Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that “government should not prefer one religion to
another, or religion to irreligion.”
53) U.S. Supreme Court Case Law Regarding the Free Speech Clause: In Herndon v. Lowry (1937), the Court
heard the case of African American Communist Party organizer Angelo Herndon, who had been convicted under the Slave Insurrection
Statute for advocating black rule in the southern US. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed Herndon's conviction, upholding
Holmes' "clear and present danger" test for the first time and arguing that the state of Georgia had not demonstrated
that Herndon's actions met this standard (NSLs should be held to this standard).
54) U.S. Supreme Court Case Law Regarding the Petition
Clause: “Today this right encompasses petitions to all three branches of the federal government—the Congress,
the executive and the judiciary—and has been extended to the states through incorporation. According to the Supreme
Court, 'redress of grievances' is to be construed broadly: it includes not solely appeals by the public to the government
for the redressing of a grievance in the traditional sense, but also, petitions on behalf of private interests seeking personal
gain. The right not only protects demands for "a redress of grievances" but also demands for government action.
In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011), the Supreme Court stated regarding the Free Speech Clause and the Petition
Clause: It is not necessary to say that the two Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowledge
that the rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground. . .Both speech and petition are integral to the
democratic process, although not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas,
hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public
exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond
the political sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally
concerned with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance. The right of assembly was originally
distinguished from the right to petition. In United States v. Cruikshank the Supreme Court held that 'the right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected
with the powers or duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under protection
of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part
of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.'
Justice Morrison Waite's opinion for the Court carefully distinguished the right to peaceably assemble as a secondary right,
while the right to petition was labeled to be a primary right.1
Fifth Amendment
55) “No person shall be . . .deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .” Correctional Services Corporation, v. John E. Malesko
534 U. S. __ (2001), page 5.
Sixth Amendment
56) “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” See Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965)
57)
U.S. Supreme Court Case Law regarding the Notice Clause: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” In the case United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1881).”
58) U.S. Supreme Court
Case Law regarding the Assistance of Counsel Clause: “The Sixth Amendment is a part of what is called our Bill of
Rights. In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, in which this Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to the assistance
of counsel is obligatory upon the States, we did so on the ground that 'a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental
and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 372 U. S. at 342. And last
Term in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, in holding that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination
was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, we reiterated the holding of Gideon that the Sixth Amendment's right-to-counsel
guarantee is 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,' and thus was made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 378 U. S., at 6. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52. We hold today that the Sixth
Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory
on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Fourteenth
Amendment
59) “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property , without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See Tennessee V. Lane (02-1667)
541 U.S. 509 (2004) 315 F.3d 680, affirmed.
FEDERAL STATUTES
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
60) Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12131, 12132, prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, including those with mental illness. Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. §794, provides that no person with a disability, including those with mental illness, shall: “solely
by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
61) In the decision regarding Disability Advocates,
Inc. vs. Paterson, et al, Defendant Garaufis stated that “The Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581 (1999), that “[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability,”
observing that “institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable of or unworthy of participating in community life.”
527 U.S. at 597, 600. The “integration mandate” of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §791 et seq., as expressed in federal regulations
and Olmstead, requires that when a state provides services to individuals with disabilities, it must do so “in
the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.” The “most integrated setting,” according to the
federal regulations, is “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons
to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. §35.130(d); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A.
62) Further, Title II of the Americans With Disabilities
Act requires that “a public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” See 28 C.F.R. §35.130(d).
63) In the landmark decision
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court held that these provisions of law are violated when
a state places people with mental illness in “unjustified isolation,” and that a person with mental illness
may sue the state for failing to place him or her “in the most integrated setting appropriate to [his or her] needs.”
64) Respondent Garaufis
stated in the aforementioned decision that Title II of the ADA applies to “any State or local government” and
“any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.”
42 U.S.C. §12131(1). Accordingly, all governmental entities are subject to Title II of the Americans With Disabilities
Act.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, §601
Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs
65) “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” Fogg v. Gonzales, Nos. 05-5439, 05-5440 says the following:
“In the case Correctional Services Corporation, v. John E. Malesko, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “In
30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action
against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who
lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officers unconstitutional conduct.” However, in the
same case, the Court said: “Most recently, in FDIC v. Meyer, we unanimously declined an invitation to extend
Bivens to permit suit against a federal agency, even though . . .Congress had waived sovereign immunity [and] was otherwise
amenable to suit. 510 U. S., at 484, 486. Our opinion emphasized that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer,
not the agency. Id., at 485 (emphasis in original) (citing Carlson v. Green, supra, at 21). We reasoned that if
given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a federal agency instead of an individual who could assert qualified immunity as
an affirmative defense. To the extent aggrieved parties had less incentive to bring a damages claim against individuals,
the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost. 510 U.S. at 485. Accordingly, to allow a Bivens
claim against federal agencies would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather than its extension. 510
U. S., at 485.”
42 USC §1983 – Civil Action
for Deprivation of Rights
42 USC §1985 - Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil
Rights
66)
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. .
.If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness
in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified,
or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such
juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of
his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing,
or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the
equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right
of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws. . .the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”
See Haddle V. Garrison et al, 525 U.S. 121 (1998).
67) Federal courts recognize blacklisting as a cause of action. In the lawsuit Castillo v. Spiliada
Maritime Corporation MV, 937 F. 2d 240, the United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that “.
. .Plaintiffs have offered substantial evidence that they were coerced into agreeing to the settlements with threats that
charges would be filed against them with the POEA and that they would be blacklisted. As the threats of blacklisting endangered
the possibility of future employment in their established trade, Plaintiffs reasonably could have been intimidated into
settling.” In the lawsuit Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998), the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that “As both Duckworth and the Secretary of Labor
persuasively argue, the achievement of these objectives would be frustrated by adopting Pratt & Whitney's interpretation.
That interpretation would permit an employer to evade the Act by blacklisting employees who have used leave in the past or
by refusing to hire prospective employees if the employer suspects they might take advantage of the Act.” The United
States Court of Appeal's use of the term “leave” refers to medical leave. The United States Court of Appeals
use of the term “Act” refers to the Family and Medical Act of 1993. In the case Davis v. Paul, et al,
505 F.2d 1180, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit stated that “Few things are as fundamental
to our legal system as the presumption of innocence until overcome by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a fair
trial. The dissemination of the flier in the case at bar is in the face of the presumption of innocence, disregards the
Due Process Clause and is based on evidence that is not probative of guilt. Condemning a man to a suspect class without a
trial and on a wholly impermissible standard, as in the case at bar, offends the very essence of the Due Process Clause,
i.e., protection of the individual against arbitrary action. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 559,
76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 351-352, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring.)
As said by Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 144-145, 71 S.Ct. 624, 634 (1951): 'Our basic law, however, wisely withheld authority for resort to executive. . .condemnations
and blacklists as a substitute for imposition of legal types of penalties by courts following trial and conviction in accordance
with procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights.'” The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's, (EEOC)
Office of Legal Counsel the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 overlap,
and that where employees are concerned, “ADA Title II covers all public employers without regard to the number of employees.”
By this action, Plaintiff seeks to put an end to New York State's practice of blacklisting the Plaintiff by refusing to
provide her with outpatient psychiatric care and accommodations required to be provided by the New York State Unified Court
System as its courts are covered under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities, and by ending the corporate defendants'
use of the media to encourage members of the not-for-profit psychiatric outpatient community to blacklist the Plaintiff by
publicly denigrating her because of symptoms of her mental illness that were publicized by government and corporate defendants.
Commission of RICO Crimes
68) “Racketeering activity” means (A) any
act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or
dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which
is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with
identification documents), Section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant) . . .”
69) “State”
means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession
of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof;
70) “Enterprise”
includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity;
71) “Pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
72) Commission of RICO Crimes – “It shall
be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”
73) Civil Remedies for RICO Crimes – “The
district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter
by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct
or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person,
including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.”
74) “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of Section
1962. The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally
convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which
the conviction becomes final.”
Campaign Contributions
and The Hobbs Act and Conspiracy
to Deprive Plaintiff and Gentile Constituents
of Honest Services
U.S. Supreme Court Mandate
75) “This is not
to say that it is impossible for an elected official to commit extortion in the course of financing an election campaign.
Political contributions are of course vulnerable if induced by the use of force, violence, or fear. The receipt of such
contributions is also vulnerable under the Act as having been taken under color of official right, but only if the payments
are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.
In such situations the official asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of the promise or undertaking.
This is the receipt of money by an elected official under color of official right within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.”
McCormick v. United States, 500 US 257.
76) “The requirement of a quid pro quo means that without pretense of any entitlement to
the payment, a public official violates §1951 if he intends the payor to believe that absent payment the official is
likely to abuse his office and his trust to the detriment and injury of the prospective payor or to give the prospective
payor less favorable treatment if the quid pro quo is not satisfied. The official and the payor need not state the
quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods. The
inducement from the official is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends
it to be so and the payor so interprets it.” Evan v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 504 U.S. 255, 119 L.Ed.2d
57.
18 USC § 1951 - Interference with Commerce by Threats or
Violence
77)
“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”
78) “The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”
When Is a Campaign
Contribution a Bribe?2
79) “The
Supreme Court’s guidance on the issue is thin. In 1991, it ruled that a campaign contribution could be a bribe if
prosecutors proved a quid pro quo — that the contribution was “made in return for an explicit promise
or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.” In a subsequent case, Justice Anthony
Kennedy said the quid pro quo need not be expressly stated.”
Hobbs
Act—Under Color of Official Right
80) Some courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official have de
jure power to perform any official act paid for as long as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto
power to perform the requested act. See United States v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably
believed state senator had the ability to impact a local business); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir.
1985); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d
491, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (public official can extort money for permit beyond control of his office, so long as victim has
a reasonable belief that he could affect issuance); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978);
United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United
States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price,
507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974).
81) Some courts have held that private persons who are not themselves public officials can be convicted
under this provision if they caused public officials to perform official acts in return for payments to the non-public official.
United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (court upheld conviction
of head of local Republican Party under color of official right where defendant could be said to have caused, under 18 U.S.C.
§2(b), public officials to induce a third party to pay out money); see United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d
1561, 1572-73 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (private attorney's conviction of Hobbs Act violation upheld
due to complicity with state senator); United States v. Marcy, 777 F.Supp. 1398, 1399-400 (N.D.Ill. 1991); United
States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862
(1978). But see United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 829-32 (7th Cir. 1991) (“we believe that, as a general
matter and with caveats as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on an 'official rights' theory inappropriate
under the literal and historical meanings of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual 'control' that citizen purports to
maintain over governmental activity”).
82) “The Supreme Court has held that, when an allegedly corrupt payment masquerades as a campaign
contribution, and when there is no evidence that the corpus of the “contribution” inured to the personal benefit
of the public officer in question or was a product of force or duress, the Hobbs Act requires proof of a quid pro quo
agreement between the contributor and the public officer. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). However,
the Court has also held that proof that a quid pro quo agreement existed in a corruption case brought under the
Hobbs Act may be proven circumstantially. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). This interpretation of the
dimensions of the Hobbs Act in corruption scenarios is consistent with the parameters of the facts needed to prove the federal
crimes of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. §201.” See United States v. Brewster, 50-6 F.2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1972), 9 U.S.A.M. §§85.101 through 85.105, supra.
Fraud
Upon the Court
83) “Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is
engaged in fraud upon the court. In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated
“Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties
or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. . . It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or
influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions
of the court have been directly corrupted.”
84) Fraud upon the court has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to embrace that species
of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that
the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for
adjudication.” Kenner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice,
2d ed., p.512, ¶60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in
essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
85) Fraud upon the court makes void the orders and judgments of that court.
Right to Privacy
86) The Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy which
is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Pp. 381 U. S. 481-486. The foregoing cases suggest that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 516-522 (dissenting opinion). Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment, in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 630, as protection against all governmental invasions
"of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643, 367 U. S. 656, to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other
right carefully an particularly reserved to the people." See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962
Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 216 (1960). . .NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U. S. 288, 377 U.S. 307. Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
87) According to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996's Wrongful Disclosure
of Individually Identifiable Health Information, it says that: “(a) Offense – A person who knowingly and in violation
of this part -- (1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; (2) obtains individually identifiable health information
relating to an individual; or (3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person, shall be punished
as provided in subsection (b). (b) Penalties – A person described in subsection (a) shall -- (1) be fined not more
than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; (2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined
not more than $100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and (3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell,
transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,
be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” See United States of America v. Huping
Zhou, 2:08-cr-01356-AJW-1.
National
Security Letters
88)
“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant
Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director, may: (1)
request the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity if
the Director (or his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the
request is made that the name, address, length of service, and toll billing records sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation
of a United States person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution
of the United States; and (2) request the name, address, and length of service of a person or entity if the Director (or
his designee) certifies in writing to the wire or electronic communication service provider to which the request is made
that the information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the
basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” in the stipulation
and order regarding the case Doe et al. v. Holder, et al it says: “3) Plaintiff John Doe is hereby permitted
to identify himself and his company as the recipient of the NSL that has been the subject of this litigation. Plaintiffs
ACLU and ACLU Foundation may publicly disclose this information as well. In addition, the Government acknowledges that plaintiffs
may discuss matters and information that have been filed without redaction on the public docket in this case; 4) Plaintiffs
are also permitted to publicly discuss plaintiff Doe's personal background, background about his company, the services Doe
generally provided to his clients, and his type of clientele generally, including (a) the information that is redacted in
the public filing of the Third Declaration of John Doe, dated August 21, 2009, Paragraph 1; (b) the information that is
redacted in the public filing of the Second Declaration of John Doe, dated September 8, 2006, Paragraph 4; and (c) the information
that is redacted in the public filing of the Second Declaration of John Doe, dated September 8, 2006, Paragraph 37. . . 6)
Nothing in this Stipulation shall affect plaintiff Doe's right and plaintiffs ACLU and ACLU Foundation's right, if any,
to petition in the future under 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b) ('or an order modifying or setting aside the nondisclosure requirement
imposed in connection with the NSL served on plaintiff Doe.” Doe, et al v. Holder, et al, 04 Civ. 2614 (VM)
“Justice Must Satisfy The Appearance of Justice”
89) Courts have repeatedly
held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or
prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) “is
directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.”) (“Section 455(a)
of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather
to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”
90) In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456
F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice,
but that he believes that he has received justice."
91)
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”,
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954).
Rights of Crime Victims
92) It has been the
Plaintiff's sad experience that the judicial defendants' complicity with regard to implementation of the horrible Talmudic
doctrine Law of the Moser has developed in them a delusion that has made them both arrogant and stupid, as
though U.S. law is written in Greek or Chinese, and the Plaintiff lacks the ability to either research it, or that if she
researches it, she cannot understand it. To force the defendants to divest themselves of said delusion, Plaintiff has chosen
to copy and paste federal criminal law as it pertains to crime victims. The Plaintiff demands that defendants recognize that
the following is in English, and Plaintiff is not a dumb schvartze. Plaintiff can read English – legalese included.
93) A crime victim
has the following rights:
a) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely
notice of any public court proceeding or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
b) The right not to
be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines
that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
c) The right to be
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
d) The reasonable right
to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.
e) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
f) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable
delay.
g)
The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.
94) 18 USC §3771 contains
other rights specific to crime victims; Plaintiff trusts, however, that defendants are sufficiently convinced on Plaintiff's
level of intelligence that she does not have waste either ink or paper cutting and pasting the law. If even after this,
the defendants are arrogantly unconvinced, the defendants can visit http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3771 after they facilitate the arrest of corrupt, lying, racist, racketeering Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye,
Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein for their act of fraud and aggravated identity theft by filing their fraudulent affirmations
that criminally hold “Godwin Uzamere” to be Plaintiff's husband and the father of Plaintiff's daughter without
presenting USCIS-issued identification cards or passports for both Ehigie Edobor Uzamere and “Godwin Uzamere.”
Continuing Violations Doctrine
95) This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant
to Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, DBA Amtrak, 232 F.3d 1008 (November 8, 2000) with regard
to the continuing violations doctrine, in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated in its decision that “the continuing
violations doctrine. . .allows courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time barred "as long as the untimely
incidents represent an ongoing unlawful. . .practice. . .The district court's reliance on Galloway was mistaken. This court
has never adopted a strict notice requirement as the litmus test for application of the continuing violation doctrine; in
fact, in Fiedler v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000), we explicitly rejected such an approach from the Fifth Circuit.
See id. at 987 n.10. Fiedler examined Berry v. Board of Sup'rs of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983), a case
which involved equal pay based upon gender discrimination, where the Fifth Circuit created a multi-factor test for determining
whether discrete acts of harassment are closely related enough to satisfy the continuing violation theory. The Berry court's
final factor, "perhaps of most importance," asked whether the harassing act "should trigger an employee's
awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights.” Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. We rejected the Berry analysis,
holding that test was not “applicable in determining the continuation of a hostile environment.” Fiedler,
218 F.3d at 987 n.10.
96)
In tort law, if a defendant commits a series of illegal acts against another person, or, in criminal law, if someone commits
a continuing crime (which can be charged as a single offense), the period of limitation begins to run from the last act
in the series. In the case of Treanor v. MCI Telecommunications, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained
that the continuing violations doctrine "tolls the statute of limitations in situations where a continuing pattern
forms due to [illegal] acts occurring over a period of time, as long as at least one incident . . . occurred within the limitations
period. In the case Douglas v. California Department of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812, Dossey Douglas was denied
employment by the California Youth Authority because a vision test indicated that he was color-blind. Douglas brought suit
against CYA for its failure to hire him under Title I of the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment to CYA on
the ground that Douglas' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Douglas argued on appeal that his claims
are timely under the continuing violations doctrine because the CYA's discriminatory policy was on-going. The U.S. Court
of Appeals stated the following: “Applying the continuing violations doctrine to these facts, we are guided by two
earlier Ninth Circuit decisions. In Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), amended 742
F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984), we considered a class action suit against a cannery operator involving allegations of discrimination
on the basis of race in hiring and promotions. The plaintiffs argued that their claims were saved from the time bar by the
fact that the discriminatory hiring and promotion polices continued until the plaintiffs brought suit. Id. at 1443. We required
the plaintiffs to demonstrate that because of the discriminatory policy, they were either discriminated against or “exposed
to discrimination” during the limitations period. Id. Almost a decade later, we again addressed the issue whether
a case was timely under a continuing violations theory based on an alleged systemic discrimination in hiring. EEOC v.
Local 350, Plumbers and Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1993). The EEOC filed an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act suit on behalf of union members who were excluded from hiring lists on the ground that they received pension benefits.
Id. at 643. We noted that the union's policy that excluded retirees from the hiring lists applied to the class members as
early as 1984, five years earlier. Id. at 644. We found that the action was not barred by the relevant statute of limitations,
because the discriminatory policy prohibiting retirees from joining the hiring lists continued. Id. (“Here, Local
350's allegedly discriminatory policy was in effect when [the plaintiff] first encountered [the policy] in 1984 and remains
in force today. Thus, under the continuing violations doctrine, relief for [the plaintiff] is not barred.”). Although
we did not cite Domingo in our analysis in Local 350, the two decisions are consistent. In Local 350, the plaintiffs, as
union members, continued to be “exposed” to the discriminatory hiring policies of the union.” The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finally decided that “. . .With respect to the ADA claim. . .We REVERSE the
district court's grant of summary judgment on both the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims because we conclude that the claims
were timely filed under the continuing violations doctrine.” The continuing violations doctrine cannot be applied
to past fact pattern, even if the court adjudicated said fact pattern, if the past fact pattern is used to explain a course
of conduct that includes a fact pattern that is newly introduced and had never been seen and adjudicated by any court.
Code of Conduct for Judges and Attorneys
Federal Code of Conduct for
Judges
97)
A judge should take appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood that a judge’s
conduct contravened this Code or a lawyer violated applicable rules of professional conduct.
98) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in
a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
in which . . . the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person related to either within the third degree of relationship,
or the spouse of such a person is . . .a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.
Code of Conduct for New York State Judges
99) A judge who receives
information indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a substantial violation of this Part shall
take appropriate action.
100) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed
a substantial violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility shall take appropriate action.
New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility
101) A lawyer possessing knowledge,
(1) not protected as a confidence or secret, or (2) not gained in the lawyer's capacity as a member of a bona fide lawyer
assistance or similar program or committee, of a violation of DR 1-102 [1200.3] that raises a substantial question as to
another lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority
empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.
102) A lawyer possessing knowledge or evidence, not protected as a confidence or secret, concerning another
lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered
to investigate or act upon the conduct of lawyers or judges.
103) A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely
to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
H.R. 40
Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act
(as it concerns the African Holocaust/The Maafa)
104) Commonly known as the “African Reparations Bill”, it was promulgated by African-American
Congressman John Conyers “To acknowledge the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery in
the United States and the 13 American colonies between 1619 and 1865 and to establish a commission to examine the institution
of slavery, subsequently de jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against African-Americans,
and the impact of these forces on living African-Americans, to make recommendations to the Congress on appropriate remedies,
and for other purposes.”
Implied Cause of Action
105) “For the
reasons set forth below, I am of the opinion that federal courts do have the power to award damages for violation of 'constitutionally
protected interests' and I agree with the Court that a traditional judicial remedy such as damages is appropriate to the
vindication of the personal interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.” See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999; 29 L. Ed. 2D 619; 1971 U.S. Lexis 23; at Correctional
Services Corporation, v. John E. Malesko, it says: “In the decade following Bivens, we recognized an implied
damages remedy under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), and
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). In both
Davis and Carlson, we applied the core holding of Bivens, recognizing in limited circumstances a claim for money damages
against federal officers who abuse their constitutional authority. In Davis, we inferred a new right of action chiefly
because the plaintiff lacked any other remedy for the alleged constitutional deprivation. 442 U. S., at 245 (For Davis,
as for Bivens, it is damages or nothing). In Carlson, we inferred a right of action against individual
prison officials where the plaintiff's only alternative was a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States.
446 U. S., at 18. 23. We reasoned that the threat of suit against the United States was insufficient to deter the unconstitutional
acts of individuals. Id., at 21. (Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective
deterrent than the FTCA remedy). We also found it crystal clear that Congress intended the FTCA and Bivens to serve
as parallel and complementary sources of liability. 446 U.S., at 19.20...In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we
have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged
to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for
harms caused by an individual officers unconstitutional conduct.”
Issues
With Regard to Claims of Sovereign Immunity
106) The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution says that “The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” This means that generally, a sovereign
state cannot commit a legal wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution. This legal doctrine, however, is
refuted when a state engages in conduct that violates U.S. Constitutional law – especially the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
107) In the U.S. Supreme Court case United States vs. Georgia, et al, quoting verbatim:
“Goodman, petitioner in No. 04–1236, is a paraplegic who sued respondent state
defendants and others, challenging the conditions of his confinement in a Georgia prison under, inter alia, 42 U. S. C.
§1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. As relevant here, the Federal District Court dismissed
the §1983 claims because Goodman’s allegations were vague, and granted respondents' summary judgment on the Title
II money damages claims because they were barred by state sovereign immunity. The United States, petitioner in No. 04–1203,
intervened on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment as to the Title II claims, but reversed
the §1983 ruling, finding that Goodman had alleged facts sufficient to support a limited number of Eighth Amendment
claims against state agents and should be permitted to amend his complaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide the
validity of Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity.”
108) Justice Scalia,
giving the opinion of the Court, stated the following:
“We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State for money
damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 337, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II).
Title II of the ADA provides
that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.” §12132 (2000 ed.). A “ ‘qualified individual with a disability’ ”
is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). The Act defines “ ‘public entity’ ” to include
“any State or local government” and “any department, agency, … or other instrumentality of a State,”
§12131(1). We have previously held that this term includes state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public
entities that violate §12132. See 42 U.S.C. §12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a). . .
Once Goodman’s complaint is amended, the lower courts will be best situated
to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated
Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct
violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign
immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the suit
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
109) In United States
vs. Georgia, et al, The U.S. Supreme Court held that a state abrogates sovereign immunity when it violates both Title
II, ADA and the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision stated:
“Goodman, petitioner in No. 04-1236, is a paraplegic who sued respondent state defendants
and others, challenging the conditions of his confinement in a Georgia prison under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §1983 and
Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990. As relevant here, the Federal District Court dismissed the §1983
claims because Goodman's allegations were vague, and granted respondents summary judgment on the Title II money damages
claims because they were barred by state sovereign immunity. The United States, petitioner in No. 04-1203, intervened on
appeal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment as to the Title II claims, but reversed the §1983
ruling, finding that Goodman had alleged facts sufficient to support a limited number of Eighth Amendment claims against
state agents and should be permitted to amend his complaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide the validity of Title
II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
Held: Insofar as Title
II creates a private cause of action for damages against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. Pp. 5-8.
Because
this Court assumes that the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that Goodman had alleged actual Eighth Amendment violations
for purposes of §1983, and because respondents do not dispute Goodman's claim that this same conduct violated Title
II, Goodman's Title II money damages claims were evidently based, at least in part, on conduct that independently violated
§1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one doubts that §5 grants Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's
provisions by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions. This includes the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the States. Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit erred in dismissing those of Goodman's claims based on conduct that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
110) Petitioner holds that,
based on the above, government Respondents' violation of Plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process,
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law as an African American citizen who is mentally disabled is an
abrogation of their sovereign immunity, such that Petitioner's action rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for all defendants who are natural persons. Respondents who are natural
person are either attorneys or represented by attorneys; it should not be difficult for Respondents to understand the concept
of abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Change of Venue and Improper
Venue
111)
Federal Rules for Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6): Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b) for Lack of Jurisdiction,
Improper Venue, Insufficient Service of Process, or Failure to State a Claim. “Relief in any pleading must be asserted
in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal jurisdiction; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service
of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
112) Federal Rules for Civil Procedure Rule 41(b):
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order,
a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal
under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.”
113) 28 USC §1404(a) says:
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties
have consented.”
114)
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) says the following with reference to change to another
venue: “Section 1404(a) is sufficiently broad to control the forum-selection issue. The statute is intended to place
discretion in the district courts to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration
of convenience and fairness. A motion to transfer under §1404(a) calls on the district court to weigh in the balance
a number of case-specific factors, and the presence of a forum-selection clause will figure centrally in the calculus. A
forum-selection clause should receive neither dispositive consideration nor no consideration, but rather the consideration
for which Congress provided in §1404(a). Section 1404(a) must be applied, since it represents a valid exercise of Congress'
authority under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In this case, the District Court should determine
in the first instance the appropriate effect under federal law of the parties' forum-selection clause on respondent's §1404(a)
motion.” (emphasis added).
115) In the case Ralls Corporation V. Terna Energy USA Holding Corporation, Civil Action No.
13-0117 (ABJ), the court rendered the following decision: “Defendant Terna Energy USA Holding Corporation (“Terna”)
moves to dismiss plaintiff Ralls Corporation's (“Ralls”) complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper
venue, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs, the record in this case, and
the applicable law, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. It
does not reach the question of subject matter jurisdiction. (emphasis added).
Purpose of Petitioner's Action
116) By this action, Petitioner seeks to put an end to Defendants' commission of misprision of felony,
18 USC §4; fraud, 18 USC §1001; identity theft, 18 USC §1028; aggravated identity fraud, 18 USC §1028A;
deprivation of rights under color of law (including being kidnapped, unlawfully imprisoned and blacklisted), 18 USC §242/42
USC §1985; extortion, 18 USC §872§, blackmail, 18 USC §873; violation of Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act; violation of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973; violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VI, §601; violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment; violation of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment; violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments; violation of the Notice Clause of the Sixth Amendment; violation of the Assistance of Counsel
Clause of the Sixth Amendment; violation of Plaintiff's right of privacy with regard to the illegal dissemination of her
psychiatric records, Plaintiff marriage history, Plaintiff married name, and the non-content information associated with
Plaintiff's internet and telephone accounts; violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, intentional
misuse of national security letters (NSLs) and violation of the Hobbs Act.
117) Furthermore, Petitioner's also seeks to expose that Defendant U.S. Department of Homeland Security
has had knowledge of the correct identity, and has been in possession of the identification documents for Defendant Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere for well over thirty (30) years. Respondent the United States of America, along with the rest of the Respondents,
owed Petitioner and her children the duty to use the aforementioned documentation regarding Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's
identity to protect Petitioner and her children from being victims of fraud, immigration fraud, aggravated identity theft
and victims of Petitioner's inability to obtain spousal and children support based on Petitioner and her daughter having
the legal right to bear Petitioner Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's correct name. However, rather than comply with the law, the Respondents,
in particular, the Jewish Defendants, engaged in a course of conduct that violated Petitioner rights and the rights of her
daughter, Tara, for the sole purpose of preventing Petitioner from filing complaints against hateful, racist, dishonest,
Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein. Respondents' criminal conduct deprived them
then, and continues to deprive Petitioner and her family of the right to bear Defendant Ehigie Edobor Uzamere correct African
name, and continues to condemn Plaintiff and her family to the same deprivation of the knowledge of African bloodline indicators
that racist Jews and racist white Christians forced upon Petitioner African ancestors.
Jurisdiction and Venue
118) This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, federal question, which
states that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”
119) This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343, Civil Rights and elective
franchise, which states that “(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation
of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned
in section 1985 of Title 42; (2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs
mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent; (3) To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. . .”
120) Declaratory and injunctive relief are sought against all Defendants under 28 U.S.C. §2201(a),
Creation of remedy, which states that “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction. . .any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”
121) Venue has its basis in 28 USC §1404(a)(c),
that states:
“For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.
. . A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place within the division in which it is pending.”
122) 28 USC §455(b)(5)(i)
says:
“He shall
also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party.”
123) Petitioner states that based on 28 USC §455(b)(5)(i), all of the judges employed by the Eastern
District of New York, the Southern District of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are defendants
in Plaintiff's lawsuit, based on Defendants' commission of 18 USC §4, misprision of felony, and their criminal participation
in a religiously- oriented racket, run by a majority-Jewish judiciary, that enforces the Talmudic doctrine Law of the
Moser by not prosecuting Jews who violate civil or criminal law.
124) 28 USC §455(b)(1) says:
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
. .”
125) Petitioner states that based on 28 USC §455 (b)(1), no judge employed by the for the Northern
District of New York and the for the Western District of New York can render a decision of Petitioner’s lawsuit because
Petitioner cannot appeal her lawsuit to judges against whom she has filed this lawsuit. Petitioner has deliberately cut
off the federal judiciary in the entire State of New York because it is corrupt. Plaintiff's reliance on 28 USC §1404(a)
has its entire basis on Jew-biased corruption.
Facts
126) Petitioner prays
that this Court rapidly facilitates Petitioner emergency motion for expedited judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant
to Fed. R. Evid. Rule 201 and for on conversion to Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
Rule 56, based on Petitioner presentation of the following irrefutable facts:
127) In December, 1977, approximately two (2) years
before the Petitioner met Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, Nosayaba (John) Uzamere and his wife Ethel Uzamere, while residing
at 382 Amboy Street, Brooklyn, New York, 11212, and having telep (Respondent Uzamere's brother and sister-in-law, not his
father and stepmother) filed for IR2 residence for Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. The IR2 visa for Defendant Uzamere
was approved on January 28, 1980.
128) On November 20, 1979, the Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere visited Defendant City of
New York's City Clerk's marriage department and filled out the marriage affidavit form with the fictitious name “Godwin
Ehigie Uzamere” and the fictitious birthday “June 1, 1955” without providing his current passport to verify
his age and identity. Respondent City Clerk Joseph Visceglia verified the identification Petitioner presented to him; however,
at the clandestine behest of Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, Respondent Visceglia, made
no attempt to obtain Defendant Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's passport. While Defendant Ehigie Edobor Uzamere wrote the fictitious
name “Godwin Ehigie Uzamere” on the marriage affidavit form, he inadvertently signed the form with his real name
Ehigie Godwin Uzamere.
129)
On November 21, 1979, the Petitioner unwittingly entered into a “green card” marriage with Respondent Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere under the fictitious named “Godwin Ehigie Uzamere, and under the fictitious birthday “June 1,
1955”. On or after November 30, 1979, Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere and Respondents Allen E. Kaye and Harvey Shapiro,
Esq. engaged in an act of aggravated identity theft and immigration fraud by giving the Petitioner form I-130 to sign so
as to sponsor the Respondent for IR1 residence under the fictitious name “Godwin Ehigie Uzamere” and fictitious
birthday “June 1, 1955” without requiring their client to produce his current passport.
130) In December, 1979, Respondent
Uzamere left for Nigeria, abandoning the Petitioner and leaving her poor and pregnant with his daughter Tara A. Uzamere.
On January 28, 1980, Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere entered the port of New York as a lawful permanent resident. The aforementioned
attorneys exacerbated their act of aggravated identity theft by refusing to require Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere to
produce his passport to establish proof of his identity, and by engaging in willful blindness by pretending not to have knowledge
of the existence of Senator Uzamere's passport or of knowledge that Senator Uzamere previously applied under his correct
name as an unmarried beneficiary under 21 years of age. At the time of Petitioner's signing the fraudulent I-130 relative
sponsorship form, Petitioner did not know that Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere had applied and been found eligible for permanent
residence under his real name via sponsorship by Nosayaba Uzamere and Ethel Uzamere. See report prepared by Respondent Rachel
McCarthy, Bar Counsel, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service attached as Exhibit A.
131) On or around October
1, 2003, Jack Gladstein engaged in an act of racketeering, and aggravated identity theft by mailing to the Petitioner correspondence
falsely holding Petitioner's ex-husband out to be “Godwin Uzamere” even though the only correct identification
that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service holds is for Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, not “Godwin Uzamere.”
132) On or September
25, 2008, after Petitioner had engaged in a series of leaving angry telephone calls on Respondent McCarthy's voice mail
based on Petitioner's perception that Respondent McCarthy had engaged in racketeering designed to nullify Petitioner's complaint
against Respondent Kaye and Respondent Shapiro, Respondent McCarthy engaged in an act of racketeering and fraud3 by engaging the U.S. Attorney's Office for Vermont to say that “In
or about September 2008, in the District of Vermont, the Respondent, Cheryl Uzamere, impeded, intimidated, and interfered
with a federal employee, namely an employee of the United States Customs and Immigration Service, while that person was
engaged in and on account of that person's performance of official duties.” Petitioner emphatically states that she
has never been to Vermont, Respondent McCarthy's state of resident, so that it was impossible for Petitioner to have engaged
in any form of simple assault against Respondent McCarthy. See documentation regarding USA v. Uzamere, 1:08-cr-114-1
attached as Exhibit B.
133) On or around October 8, 2008, Respondent Eugene Uzamere, engaged in an act of racketeering, aggravated
identity theft, violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act by hand-delivering a fraudulent affirmation and a fraudulent, unauthenticated, unnotarized counter-affidavit from Nigeria,
4, 5 which
stated that “The Petitioner who has openly professed her mental illness is also delusional and outlandish in her claims”;
and “I have before now, ignored the Petitioner's outburst but her claim to be married to my cousin who was not in the
United States at the time of our marriage is a new twist to this sad tale. . .Her obsession with his destruction has taken
her mental ailment to a new level which should not be encouraged” in defiance of the administrative decision rendered
by the INS regarding Petitioner's ex-husband's identity. Respondent Osato Uzamere also gave Respondent Sunshine a copy of
a Nigerian passport bearing the number A05588053, but no name; and a copy of a social security card receipt with the number
129-64-1205, with the name and address “Godwin E. Uzamere, 239 Clifton Avenue, Apt. 3, Brooklyn, New York, 11216.”
The unnamed passport copies and the social security receipt were notarized by “Kate Ezomo, Principal Registrar, Commissioner
for Oaths”, in Nigeria. Justice Sunshine refused to commission a diplomatic or consular officer for the purpose of
determining the genuineness of the fraudulent foreign document that was presented to him by attorney Osato Uzamere on behalf
of his uncle, Petitioner's ex-husband Nigerian senator Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. From then until the present, Justice Sunshine
has never made any attempt to arrest Osato Uzamere for committing perjury. See fraudulent affirmation and fraudulent foreign
counter-affidavit Exhibit C. During the same month, Respondent McCarthy and Respondent Cowles gave
Petitioner's criminal attorney Beth Mann a copy of the I-130 immigration sponsorship form that Petitioner signed on November
30, 1979 and a report explaining the two (2) immigration files having birthdays “June 1, 1955” and December 31,
1960 and explaining “IR2 fraudulently obtained because he was married at the time” and “Compare fingerprints
between the two files.”
134) On or around January 6, 2009, Petitioner received a notice from Respondent McCarthy in which she said
that “This office has completed its review of the complaint of professional misconduct that you filed against Allen
E. Kaye, Esquire. The matter is confidential at this stage in accordance with the Rules and Procedures of Professional Conduct
for Practitioners (“Rules”), except for necessary disclosures in the course of conducting a preliminary inquiry.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry of complaints
of criminal, unethical, or unprofessional conduct in matters before USCIS. In your June 9, 2008 complaint, you allege that
Alan E. Kaye “colluded with my husband, the now Senator Ehigie Edobor Uzamere to submit a marriage certificate with
the fictitious name "Godwin Uzamere: in order to avoid paying child support. and three years later, in order to hide
the 2nd marriage that my husband contracted in the United States.” The acts that you allege constitute a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Practitioner occurred in the course of representation by an attorney associated
with Mr. Kaye in connection with an immediate relative filed by you with the Immigration and Naturalization (“INS”)
in 1979. The New York Departmental Disciplinary Committee, Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Judicial Department considered
these allegations in 2003 and determined that no further action was warranted. After a careful and thorough review of your
complaint I do not find clear and convincing evidence of an ethical violation of the Rules on the part of Mr. Kaye. No further
action will be taken with regard to your complaint.” Respondent McCarthy's statement “occurred in the course
of representation by an attorney associated with Mr. Kaye” makes direct reference to Respondent Harvey Shapiro. See
correspondence from Respondent McCarthy dated January 6, 2009 attached as Exhibit A.
135) On January 12,
2009, Respondent Sunshine engaged in misprision of felony, racketeering, aggravated identity theft and fraud upon the court
by rendering a decision in which he stated that “Moreover, the opposition submitted by Respondent raises a genuine
issue as to whether or not Petitioner and Respondent were married in the first instance”, in defiance of INS' administrative
decision that recognized the names “Godwin E. Uzamere” and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere as belonging to Ehigie Edobor
Uzamere, and that Ehigie Edobor Uzamere was married to the Petitioner. Respondent Sunshine made no attempt to obey commission
a consular officer of the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria to verify the authenticity of the unauthenticated counter-affidavit
from Nigeria purporting to be from “Godwin Uzamere.” See Page 9 of Justice Sunshine's decision and order dated
January 12, 2009 is attached as Exhibit D.
136) On January 20, 2009, the Petitioner e-mailed a complaint to former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Robin
Renee Sanders in which she said that “While I was in court on January 13, 2008, my husband's attorney, Eugene O. Uzamere
asked Judge Sunshine if Senator Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, my real husband, along with some Nigerian pretending to be my real
husband can be allowed to video-conference their appearance in court. As it is apparent that the level of corruption in
my divorce action has reached an all-time new low, it appears that Judge Sunshine will allow this silliness. This would
give Eugene the opportunity of paying some poor Nigerian a pittance to engage in identity fraud that would reach a New York
State Court. In the likely event that Judge Sunshine allows this silliness, is there some way that your office can ensure
that the unknown Nigerian who engages in this video-conference first signs some kind of affidavit that is notarized by your
office? That way, your office can check that person's identification to ensure that if he attempts to say that he is my
husband, his identification will prove otherwise.” Although Petitioner had the presence of mind to ask former U.S.
Ambassador Robin Renee Sanders to require anyone posing as Petitioner's husband to produce identification, Respondent Sunshine
did not require Respondent Osato E. Uzamere to produce any type of U.S. Embassy-authenticated, color-photograph-bearing government
identification of his client, and the only forms of identification that Respondent Osato E. Uzamere produced was a copy of
a passport bearing no one's name and social security number 129-64-1205, the fictitious number associated with the fictitious
name “Godwin Uzamere.” See e-mail to former Ambassador Robin Renee Sanders and response from the U.S. Embassy
in Nigeria attached as Exhibit E. See fraudulent passport cover and fraudulent social security
number attached as Exhibit C.
137) On May 12, 2009, Respondent Sunshine rendered his decision recognizing the identity of Petitioner's
ex-husband as Ehigie Edobor Uzamere by stating that “Today at 10:35 am. Respondent was declared in default for failure
to appear at the hearing. Accordingly, Respondent's motion to dismiss this action upon the grounds that he is not the husband
of the Petitioner is denied in its entirety. The Respondent is the husband in conformity with the parties marriage on November
21, 1979. Petitioner is directed to serve a copy of this decision and order and serve and file a note of issue, forthwith,
with proof of mailing by regular international mail and overnight international mail for a trial on all issues within this
matrimonial action to be held before this court on July 7, 2009. at 9:30 a.m. This shall constitute the decision and order
of the court.” See Respondent Sunshine's decision attached as Exhibit F.
138) On July 7, 2009, the Petitioner
filed an action for fraud against her ex-husband and against Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
From the year 2009 to 2011, Petitioner also attempted to engage the judicial assistance of Respondent New York State Unified
Court System for the Second Judicial Department with regard to the following appellate cases: 1) Uzamere v Daily News,
L.P., 2011 NY Slip Op 52421(U) [34 Misc 3d 1203(A)], Decided on November 10, 2011, Supreme Court, New York County, Rakower,
J; 2) Uzamere v Uzamere, 2011 NY Slip Op 08583 [89 AD3d 1013], November 22, 2011, Appellate Division, Second Department;
3) Uzamere v Uzamere, 2009 NY Slip Op 09214 [68 AD3d 855], December 8, 2009, Appellate Division, Second Department;
4) Uzamere v Uzamere, Motion No: 2010-07636, Slip Opinion No: 2010 NY Slip Op 83241(U), Decided on September 23,
2010, Appellate Division, Second Department, Motion Decision; 5) Uzamere v Uzamere, Motion No: 2010-07636, Slip
Opinion No: 2011 NY Slip Op 65346(U), Decided on February 28, 2011, Appellate Division, Second Department, Motion Decision;
6) Uzamere v Uzamere, Motion No: 2010-07636, Slip Opinion No: 2011 NY Slip Op 69114(U), Decided on April 6, 2011,
Appellate Division, Second Department, Motion Decision; and 7) Uzamere v Uzamere, Motion No: 2010-07636, Slip Opinion
No: 2011 NY Slip Op 69622(U), Decided on April 11, 2011, Appellate Division, Second Department, Motion Decision. The following
appellate judges presided over the aforementioned cases: Daniel D. Angiolillo; Cheryl E. Chambers; Jeffrey A. Cohen; Mark
C. Dillon; Anita R. Florio; Steven W. Fisher; L. Priscilla Hall; John M. Leventhal; Plummer E. Lott; William F. Mastro; Robert
J. Miller; A. Gail Prudenti; Reinaldo E. Rivera; Sheri S. Roman; Sandra L. Sgroi and Peter B. Skelos. Petitioner alleges
that just as in the trial courts, Petitioner provided the appellate courts with the Daily News article and the fraudulent
affirmations in which Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein Osato E. Uzamere perjured themselves and
stated that “Godwin Uzamere” was Petitioner's husband. The appellate judges, just as every judge with whom Petitioner
presented the aforementioned testimony as done, ignored Petitioner's cries for justice, engaged in fraud upon the court and
disobeyed 18 USC §4, misprision of felony, the Code of Conduct for Judges and the Code of Lawyers Professional Responsibility
with regard to report a judge an attorney who engages in acts of wrongdoing. Petitioner also filed various complaints with
the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct against Respondents Michael Gerstein, Jeffrey S. Sunshine and Arthur Schack;
the Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Department against Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Osato E. Uzamere;
and the New York State Grievance Committee for the Second Judicial Department against Jack Gladstein. Petitioner produced
the Daily News article, the fraudulent, unauthenticated, unnotarized, foreign counter-affidavit from Respondent Osato E.
Uzamere, and the fraudulent affirmation from Respondents corrupt attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein
and Osato E. Uzamere that are proof of their act of 18 USC §1028A, aggravated identity theft and New York State Penal
Law Section 210.15, perjury in the first degree, and proof of the true identity of Ehigie Edobor Uzamere the Petitioner
obtained from Respondent Rachel McCarthy (who can be reached at (802) 660-5043; fax (802) 660-5067). No member of the New
York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, the New York State Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial
Department or the New York State Grievance Committee for the Second Judicial Department ever reported the aforementioned
attorneys for their commission of 18 USC §1028A, aggravated identity theft or New York State Penal Law Section 210.15,
perjury in the first degree.
139) On or near October 28, 2009, Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein, engaged
in racketeering and aggravated identity theft by submitting fraudulent affirmations to the court holding “Godwin Uzamere”
to be the Petitioner's husband based on the fraudulent I-130 immigration sponsorship form that Petitioner's ex-husband filed
with Respondents Kaye and Shapiro. See fraudulent affirmations of Respondents Kaye, Shapiro and Gladstein attached as Exhibit
G.
140)
On November 3, 2009, Respondents Jeffrey S. Sunshine, Arthur M. Schack, Michael Gerstein, Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro
and Jack Gladstein engaged in an act prohibited by the New York Lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility in that, after
filing the fraudulent affirmations, they planned and implemented Petitioner's false arrest for the sole purpose of obtaining
an advantage in the action for fraud that Petitioner filed against Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
Petitioner stayed in jail for 33 days. Because Petitioner was remanded and was not able to leave, Petitioner was coerced
into accepting the plea as mentally unfit, and employees of Respondent New York State Office of Court Administration/Unified
Court System intentionally avoided appearing before court to explain their false charge against the Petitioner. Charges against
Petitioner were dismissed. See correspondence from Rikers Island, attached as Exhibit H.
141) On November 5,
2009, Respondents Judge Gerstein, Justice Sunshine and Justice Schack, on their own and/or by courthouse employees that
were under said Respondents' care, control and supervision at the time of the incident, engaged in an act of racketeering/obstruction
of justice by illegally commenting on6 and providing nonpublic information regarding Petitioner's cases Kings County Criminal Court Case Docket
No. 2009KN087992, Kings County Supreme Court Index No. 18012-2009 and Kings County Supreme Index No. 26332-2007 to Daily
News staff writer Scott Shifrel in violation of 22 NYCRR §100.3(B)(8)(11); that said nonpublic information was provided
to the Daily News, by staff writer Scott Shifrel, who did knowingly, fraudulently and with malice aforethought engage in
an act of racketeering/obstruction of justice by publishing the newspaper article that illegally disclosed Petitioner's
nonpublic information that was acquired by Respondent Judge Gerstein, Justice Sunshine and Justice Schack during their adjudication
of Petitioner's cases including Petitioner's photo; Petitioner's name; Petitioner's age; Petitioner's mental illness; Petitioner's
psychiatric diagnosis; symptoms of Petitioner's mental illness; the courts where Petitioner's cases were adjudicated; the
town where Petitioner's lives and the name of the hospital that treated Petitioner; that Daily News staff writer Scott Shifrel,
on behalf the Respondents, engaged in an act of racketeering/obstruction by charging Petitioner with the halachic/Jewish
religious crime of anti-Semitism by saying “Cheryl Uzamere, 50, known around courthouse circles for her anti-Semitic
screeds, was declared mentally unfit and taken to Bellevue Hospital for observation”; and, that “...she's a smart
person and she really know how to use the system, said one courthouse source...she comes in here and files all these papers
and threatens people. Uzamere was in a Criminal Court holding cell when she started stripping and screaming about her “senator”
husband in Nigeria loud enough to be heard in the courtroom. The senator, however, is a cousin of her actual ex-husband,
Godwin Uzamere, according to an affidavit he filed in Supreme Court. . .”; and that “the senator, however, is
a cousin of her actual ex-husband, Godwin Uzamere, according to affidavit filed in Supreme Court”; and “Her obsession
with his destruction has taken her mental ailment to a new level which should not be encouraged, Godwin Uzamere said. .
.” Scott Shifrel, at the behest of Mortimer Zuckerman and and Respondents Judge Gerstein, Justice Sunshine and Justice
Schack, on their own and/or by courthouse employees that were under said Respondents' care, control and supervision at the
time of the incident, engaged in an act of racketeering/obstruction of justice by engaging in aggravated identity theft;
said act of identity theft accomplished by publicly holding in the Respondent Daily News that false identity of Petitioner's
ex-husband as “Godwin Uzamere. On the following day, the company ALM.com, by its website Law.com, published an article
entitled N.Y. Arrested for Threatening Judge; that said nonpublic information was provided to the Law.com, by staff
writer Mark Fass who did knowingly, fraudulently and with malice aforethought, publish the internet article that illegally
disclosed Petitioner's nonpublic information that was acquired by the Respondent judges during their adjudication of Petitioner's
cases, leaving out Jews Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's, Scott Shifrel's and Mortimer Zuckerman's commission
of misprision of felony, fraud, identity theft and aggravated identity theft. Around that same period of time, Respondent
Jazmin M. Quary, a paralegal (not an attorney), fraudulently and with malice aforethought, committed misprision of felony,
fraud, identity theft and aggravated identity theft by conspiring with, at the very least, corrupt Jewish attorney Allen
E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and other Respondents to give the impression of being a legal expert, disparagingly
criticizing Petitioner's lawsuit Uzamere v. Bush, 08:CV-891 at her website; by stating the following:
“In Uzamere v. Bush, et al., Cheryl D. Uzamere alleged that her “American”
husband Ehigie Edobor a.k.a. "Goodwin" Uzamere was a ringleader in a green card scam marriage. After filing her
complaint with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Office in 1980 Mrs. Uzamere pursued her allegations in the
Federal Court system.
She claims that her husband, Mr. Uzamere tricked her into
signing his immigration paperwork and ultimately abandoned her and their daughter. She claims that she had no idea his name
was fictitious, that he was not a United States citizen and that he had obtained entrance into the United States illegally.
She claims that Mr. Uzamere, a Nigerian Senator, and his immigration attorneys created this scheme to outsmart someone that
had no knowledge of the law or his true origin.
I was beginning to feel sorry
for the woman, but then the case took a unusual turn: The funny part of this case is that in addition to suing the husband
and his attorneys she is also going after New York State (yes, the entire state), New York State Grievance Committee for
the 2nd and 11th Departments, City of New York (yes, the entire city), New York City Police Department, New York City Human
Resources Administration/Department of Social Services, Google Corporation (yes, the entire Google) and YouTube Corporation
(same here), Condoleeza Rice (what did she do?), Michael Chertoff, Julie Myers, The United States Of America, United States
Department of State, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Department of Citizenship and Immigration
Services, United States Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Why?
Because she thinks that they should have known that he was lying. She believes that they should have discovered the fraud
and uncovered the truth. See the remainder of the complaint here. There is no surprise
that Mrs. Uzamere's complaint was dismissed for not stating a claim as to the Federal government Respondents and for having
a frivolous cause. But it sure was entertaining!”7
Petitioner alleges that as Respondent Quary has publicly held herself out to be
a legal expert, she knew that corrupt Jewish Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein had engaged in fraud, identity
fraud and aggravated identity theft, and that Respondent Quary was illegally influenced to publicly disseminate Petitioner's
attempts to obtain justice as “funny” and “entertaining”, while holding out corrupt Jewish Allen
E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein as not having engaged in any wrongdoing, and being victims, and holding out Petitioner's
Verified Complaint as being even more false based on the word of a “legal expert” who could not have any racism
toward the Petitioner because like the Petitioner, she is African American. While Respondent Quary held out the ridiculousness
of Petitioner's lawsuit, she made no attempt to negatively critique corrupt Jewish Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's and
Jack Gladstein's commission of fraud, identity fraud and aggravated identity theft, and their refusal to check Petitioner's
ex-husband's passport to verify their client's identity. See negative internet articles concerning Petitioner and Petitioner's
Verified Complaint Docket No. 08-CV-891, attached as Exhibit K1. During the time that Petitioner
was unlawfully imprisoned, Petitioner explained to her attorneys Timothy Gumkowski and Joyce Kendrick that the Respondents
had engaged in aggravated identity theft with reference to Petitioner's ex-husband's identity. Respondent Kendrick told
Petitioner to let it go.
142) On November 30, 2009, twenty-five (25) days after Respondent Daily News, LP published its article
regarding the Petitioner, Respondent Federation Employment and Guidance Service terminated its mental health services to
the Petitioner. In its discharge summary it stated that “given client's history of anti-Semitic remarks treatment at
an FEGS facility is inappropriate for her.” FEGS' discharge summary is attached as Exhibit J1.
143) On December 7,
2009, the Petitioner was placed with Respondent New York State Office of Mental Health's Kingsboro Psychiatric Facility.
144) On December 24,
2009, Petitioner was seen by Respondent New York State Unified Court System judicial employee the Honorable Anthony Cutrona
of Kings County Supreme Court's Mental Hygiene Court.
145) On January 15, 2010, Respondent Schack engaged in an act of racketeering, obstruction of justice,
violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act by ordering
Respondent New York State Office of Mental Health's psychiatrist Dr. Marie Bauduy of the Kingsboro Psychiatric Facility
not to produce the Petitioner for court. In his decision dated January 25, 2010, Justice Schack stated that “The Court
is concerned that Petitioner UZAMERE is unfit to proceed. . .Therefore, the instant matter is adjourned to Friday, March
19, 2010. . .” See interim decision of Respondent Schack attached as Exhibit I.
146) During the beginning
of February, 2010, Petitioner was discharged by Kingsboro Psychiatric Facility.
147) On or near February 23, 2010, while the Petitioner
was in her apartment faxing letters of complaint to various governmental agencies, Respondents Sunshine, New York State
Office of Mental Health and Brookdale University Hospital Medical Center engaged in an act of racketeering/obstruction of
justice, insofar as they contacted a social worker from Respondent Brookdale University Hospital Medical Center, who then
arranged for Petitioner to be kidnapped and hospitalized by Respondent New York State Office of Mental Health's Kingsboro
Psychiatric Center. Respondent Brookdale University Hospital Medical Center caused one of its employees to contact Respondent
City of New York's agencies, the New York City Housing Authority's Louis H. Pink Houses, the New York City Police Department
and the New York City Fire Department. An employee of the New York City Housing Authority opened the Petitioner's apartment
door, and Petitioner was taken out of her apartment by force and hospitalized by Respondent New York State Office of Mental
Health's Kingsboro Psychiatric Center. During Petitioner's last week as an inpatient, Kingsboro social worker Laurie Velcimé
informed the Petitioner that she was engaged in aftercare preparation, including locating an outpatient mental health program.
The Petitioner advised Ms. Velcimé that she was interested in attending New York Psychotherapy and Counseling Center
(NYPCC) on Hendrix Street, located close to where the Petitioner lives. After Ms. Velcimé performed a search of NYPCC
and other outpatient mental health care providers, she informed the Petitioner that not only had NYPCC refused to accept
Petitioner as a client, but that virtually all the not-for-profit outpatient mental health facilities that Ms. Velcimé
contacted rejected her request to provide Petitioner with outpatient psychiatric services.
148) On July 13, 2010, Justice Arthur M. Schack engaged
in an act of racketeering, obstruction of justice and aggravated identity theft by rendering a decision, holding that “Godwin
Uzamere” is Petitioner's husband and that ORDERED, that the instant complaint is dismissed with prejudice; and it
is further ORDERED, that Petitioner CHERYL UZAMERE is hereby enjoined from commencing any future actions in the New York
State Unified Court System against SENATOR EHIGIE EDOBOR UZAMERE a/k/a "GODWIN E. UZAMERE," ALLEN E. KAYE, P.C.,
ALLEN E. KAYE, ESQ., HARVEY SHAPIRO, ESQ., BERNARD J. ROSTANSKI and JACK GLADSTEIN, ESQ., without the prior approval of the
appropriate Administrative Justice or Judge; and it is further ORDERED, that any violation of the above injunction by CHERYL
UZAMERE will subject CHERYL UZAMERE to costs, sanctions and contempt proceedings. This constitutes the decision and order
of the Court.” See Respondent Schack's decision dated July 13, 2010 attached as Exhibit J.
“One theme that we have considered over the years is whether attorneys get preferential treatment in legal
malpractice litigation. Are motions to dismiss granted on too little evidence? Do the attorneys get the benefit of the doubt?
Is the fact that legal malpractice law is written mostly by attorneys, is decided upon by attorneys and affects attorneys
sometimes dispositive of the outcome?Well, all that aside, sometimes the client just can't help themselves. Here is an example
from today's NYLJ: Uzamere v. Uzamere; KINGS COUNTY; Justice Schack. . .”
149) Shortly thereafter,
Respondent Lawline.com published the same article, even going so far as to compare Jewish Respondent Kaye's, Respondent Shapiro's
and Respondent Gladstein's monstrous act of aggravated identity theft, including the deprivation of Petitioner's and her
laughter Tara's right to bear the African/Nigerian name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere nothing more than Petitioner's
delusion that it was an act of legal malpractice, and not a crime.
150) On August 16, 2010, Petitioner filed lawsuit 2010-cv-555 with the U.S. Court of Claims, and that
said lawsuit assigned to Respondent judge Christine O.C. Miller. Petitioner alleges that she provided Respondent Miller with
irrefutable evidence of Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's and Jack Gladstein's commission of aggravated identity theft,
and that Respondent Miller disobeyed 18 USC §4 by failing to file a criminal complaint against the aforementioned Jew
attorneys. The decision rendered on this case was an act of racketeering because it was an act of obstruction of justice.
It was also a clear act of fraud upon the court, designed to: 1) advance the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser;
2) trick Petitioner into believing that a civil res judicata determination was a permanent and final determination
to nullify and render harmless any legal consequences based on corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's
and Jack Gladstein's criminal commission of aggravated identity theft. The decision of this case is null and void. Petitioner
will no longer tolerate any more of the corrupt, racist, racketeering, justice-obstructing shenanigans of the Jewish Respondents.
151) On August 30,
2010, Petitioner filed lawsuit 2010-cv-585 with the U.S. Court of Claims, and that said lawsuit assigned to Respondents Nancy
B. Firestone and John P. Wiese of the U.S. Court of Claims. Petitioner alleges that she provided Respondents Firestone and
Wiese with irrefutable evidence of Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's and Jack Gladstein's commission of aggravated identity
theft, and that Respondents Firestone and Wiese disobeyed 18 USC §4 by failing to file a criminal complaint against
the aforementioned Jew attorneys. The decision rendered on this case was an act of racketeering because it was an act of
obstruction of justice. It was also a clear act of fraud upon the court, designed to: 1) advance the Talmudic doctrine
Law of the Moser; 3) trick Petitioner into believing that a res judicata determination – a purely
civil adjudicative function – was a permanent and final determination to nullify and render harmless corrupt Jewish
attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's, and Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of
aggravated identity theft – a wrongful act for which the correct criminal adjudicative function of double jeopardy
was never attached because the crime was never tried. The decision of this case is null and void. Petitioner will no longer
tolerate any more of the corrupt, racist, racketeering, justice-obstructing shenanigans of the Jewish Respondents.
152) On September 1,
2010, Petitioner filed lawsuit 2010-cv-591 with the U.S. Court of Claims, and that said lawsuit was assigned to Respondent
judge Christine O.C. Miller of the U.S. Court of Claims. Petitioner alleges that she provided Respondent Miller with irrefutable
evidence of Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's and Jack Gladstein's commission of aggravated identity theft, and that Respondent
Miller disobeyed 18 USC §4 by failing to file a criminal complaint against the aforementioned Jew attorneys. The decision
rendered on this case was an act of racketeering because it was an act of obstruction of justice. It was also a clear act
of fraud upon the court, designed to: 1) advance the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser; 2) trick Petitioner into
believing that a res judicata determination – a purely civil adjudicative function – was a permanent
and final determination to nullify and render harmless corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack
Gladstein's, and Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of aggravated identity theft – a wrongful act
for which the correct criminal adjudicative function of double jeopardy was never attached because the crime was never tried.
The decision of this case is null and void. Petitioner will no longer tolerate any more of the corrupt, racist, racketeering,
justice-obstructing shenanigans of the Jewish Respondents.
153) On or around January 11, 2011, Petitioner filed a lawsuit against Respondent State of New York with
the New York State Court of Claims. As part of Petitioner's testimony, Petitioner provided Respondent Scuccimarra with the
fraudulent affirmations that corrupt, Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein used to commit aggravated
identity theft with regard to Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's identity. Respondent Scuccimarra never made any attempt
to address the aforementioned Jewish attorneys' commission of a federal felony.
154) On or around January 19, 2011, Petitioner filed
a lawsuit against Respondent Gerstein, Respondent Sunshine and Respondent Schack with Respondent the New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct. As part of Petitioner's testimony, Petitioner provided Respondent Klonick with the fraudulent affirmations
that corrupt, Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein used to commit aggravated identity theft
with regard to Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's identity. Respondent Klonick never made any attempt to address the aforementioned
Jewish attorneys' commission of a federal felony.
155) On or around April 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a lawsuit against Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey
Shapiro and Jack Gladstein with Respondents the New York State Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial
Department and the New York Grievance Committee for the Second Judicial Department. As part of Petitioner's testimony, Petitioner
provided Respondents Del Tipico and Gutierrez with the fraudulent affirmations that Respondents Kaye, Shapiro and Gladstein
used to commit aggravated identity theft at the behest of their client, Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. Respondents Del
Tipico and Gutierrez never made any attempt to address the aforementioned Jewish attorneys commission of a federal felony.
156) In
June, 2011, Petitioner filed the Uzamere v. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831 with the for the Eastern District of New
York.
157)
On or around June 22, 2011, Respondent Garaufis rendered in decision for Petitioner's civil rights action which said the
following:
“Petitioner's most recent Complaint—one of at least five she has filed
with this court—is 89-pages long and is accompanied by 589 pages of exhibits. Petitioner has also sent at least 60
pages of faxes directly to chambers, purporting to be in connection with her most recent action. The substance of Petitioners
Complaint—if one can be discerned—concerns, among other things, her divorce from Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; a defamation
claim filed against the Daily News; a Departmental Disciplinary Committee complaint filed against the attorney representing
the Daily News; and other state court actions, including a state court action against the attorneys who represented her
former husband. (Compi. at 27-45.) Petitioner has a long, tired history of vexatious litigation in this court. See Uzamere
v. State of New York, No. 09-cv-2703 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009).”
Respondent Garaufis' judicial commentary on Petitioner's lawsuit was biased. It did not address
the acts of fraud, identity theft or aggravated theft perpetrated by corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro
and Jack Gladstein that Petitioner proved in her civil rights action Nor did Respondent Garaufis' address Petitioner's contentions
regarding the Court's discrimination against Petitioner based on her having a mental illness. Respondent Garaufis' judicial
commentary did not address most of the issues Petitioner discussed in her civil rights action (“. . .a unanimous
Supreme Court has admonished that pro se in forma pauperis complaints must be read with tolerance: Dismissal
is impermissible unless the court can say “with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which
we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears 'beyond doubt that the Petitioner
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,
78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), reaffirmed in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292.) The commentary condemned
the Verified Complaint's number of pages and the numbers of complaints Petitioner filed with the Court (But a complaint
filed in forma pauperis is not subject to dismissal simply because the Petitioner is litigious. The number of complaints
a poor person files does not alone justify peremptory dismissal. In each instance, the substance of the impoverished person's
claim is the appropriate measure. Crisafi v. Holland, et al, 655 F2d 1305) Respondent Garaufis admits that he
has difficulty in understanding the substance of Petitioner's complaint based on his statement: “Petitioner's most
recent Complaint—one of at least five she has filed with this court—is 89-pages long and is accompanied by 589
pages of exhibits. . .The substance of Petitioner's Complaint – if one can be discerned. . .” Respondent Garaufis'
displayed even more mean-spirited bias with regard to all of Petitioner's actions when he said in his statement: “Petitioner
has a long, tired history of vexatious litigation in this court. Respondent Garaufis engaged in an act of racketeering,
obstruction of justice and criminal facilitation of aggravated identity theft by rendering an FRCP-lacking, memorandum-lacking
decision regarding Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-CV-2831 for the sole purpose of: 1) advancing the Talmudic doctrine
Law of the Moser; 2) not filing a criminal complaint against corrupt, dishonest, lying, racketeering, racist Jewish
immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein for their fraudulent commission of 3) trick Petitioner
into believing that a res judicata determination – a purely civil adjudicative function – was a permanent
and final determination to nullify and render harmless corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack
Gladstein's, and Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of aggravated identity theft – a wrongful act
for which the correct criminal adjudicative function of double jeopardy was never attached because the crime was never tried;
and, 4) Respondent Bloom's commission of misprision of felony racketeering, obstruction of justice, criminal facilitation
of aggravated identity theft and fraud upon the court as well.
158) On or around June 25, 2011, less than thirty (30) after Petitioner submitted her lawsuit to the court,
Respondent Garaufis engaged in an act of racketeering, obstruction of justice and criminal facilitation of aggravated identity
theft of at the behest of Respondent Judge Garaufis three (3) marshals from the U.S. Marshals Service for Respondent the
Eastern District of New York banged on Petitioner's apartment door, embarrassing Petitioner within earshot of her neighbors.
When the U.S. Marshal for the Eastern District of New York identified themselves, Petitioner asked them if she had committed
a crime. The marshals stalled for a few seconds, and then said that Petitioner had not committed any crimes. When Petitioner
asked the U.S. Marshals why they were there, the U.S. Marshal that banged on Petitioner's door said “I'm gonna annoy
you like you annoyed Judge Garaufis.” When Petitioner told them that she would not open the door, the one banging
on the door said “then I'm gonna keep bangin”, and for another 1.5 minutes continued to bang on Petitioner's
door. He also asked Petitioner “is your daughter Tara home?”, to find out if Petitioner was home alone. Within
minutes of Petitioner telling them that her daughter Tara was there, they left. Later on, between the end of June and the
beginning of July, 2011, under the leadership of President Barack H. Obama;8
Andrew Weissman, General Counsel for Respondent Federal Bureau of Investigation, James X. Dempsey, Respondent, Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Elisebeth Collins Cook, Respondent, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; David Medine,
Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Rachel L. Brand, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and
Patricia M. Wald, Respondent, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Keith B. Alexander, General, National Security
Agency; Rajesh De, General Counsel, National Security Agency; Eric H. Holder; U.S. Attorney General, Patrick Leahy, Senator
Judiciary Chairman, Hon. Goodlatte, Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary Chairman, Mike Rogers, House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, U.S. Marshals Service Director Charles Dunne, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Protection Service,
Threat Assessment Branch employee Denis P. McGowan, FBI Assistant Director in Charge, George Venizelos, their subordinates,
U.S. Department of Justice; Charles Schumer,9 Senate Judiciary
Committee; Dianne Feinstein,10 Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Chairperson; Senator Saxby Chambliss,11 and at the direct behest of Respondent Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis, Petitioner alleges that a national security
letter (or national security letters) was/were given to Cablevision, Inc. to obtain non-content information regarding Petitioner's
telephone calls to governmental agencies and outpatient psychiatric care providers for the sole purpose of associating the
non-content information with false reports that Petitioner had made threatening telephone calls to government employees.
159) On July 4, 2011,
Petitioner filed her appeal for the lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al.
160) From July 6, 2011, the date in which Petitioner
is alleged to have committed 18 USC §115 against Respondent Garaufis, other federal judges and employees of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services call center, no federal law enforcement
agency made any attempt to arrest the Petitioner for the aforementioned offenses. According to Respondent Catherine O'Hagan
Wolfe, the judges who rendered decisions on Petitioner's appeal for her lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-2713-cv
were not indicated on the decision because others unknown to Petitioner told Respondent O'Hagan Wolfe that Petitioner threatened
Respondent Garaufis, other federal judges and Respondent Sunshine.
161) On or around July 7, 2011, Respondents psychiatric nurse Agnes Flores and psychologist Martin Bolton,
employees of Respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation came to Petitioner's apartment, speaking about Petitioner's
psychiatric issues in the hallway and shaming Petitioner within earshot of her neighbors. Respondents Flores and Bolton
said that Respondent U.S. Marshal Service12 told them that Petitioner contacted Respondent Mental Health Association's LifeNet psychiatric helpline and
made threats of bodily harm against Respondent Garaufis. Petitioner told them that had she done such a thing that the U.S.
Marshal Service would have arrested her when they visited her and given her an attorney, which would have forced Petitioner's
attorney to examine Petitioner's civil claims. Also, at the behest of Respondent Garaufis, Petitioner alleges that Respondent
O'Hagan Wolfe returned Petitioner's appellate brief, all of Petitioner's motions, Appendix A and Appendix B that Petitioner
served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 4, 2012. Respondent O'Hagan Wolfe did not include any
correspondence explaining why Petitioner's appellate documents were returned. See copies of UPS envelopes for Petitioner's
appellate documents, Uzamere vs. State of New York, et al 09-cv-2703/09-3197-cv and Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et
al, 11-2831-cv and 11-2713-cv attached as Exhibit K13 and Exhibit L.
162) Petitioner alleges that this is the first time that an accuser was correct about the non-content
information of a phone call she made (but not about the content). At the time the accusation was made, Petitioner was not
able to tell how Respondents Flores and Bolton discovered the non-content information of her phone call to LifeNet.
163) Petitioner alleges
that Respondents Agnes Flores and Martin Bolton do not possess the psychic ability to read Petitioner's thoughts and tell
whom she called. Petitioner alleges that Respondents Agnes Flores and Martin Bolton received non-content information regarding
phone call to LifeNet from an NSL that Respondent Garaufis signed off, or that Respondents Flores and Bolton received non-NSL,
non-content information from an unauthorized source.
164) Some days later while in the month of July 2011, Petitioner received another visit from Respondents
Flores and Bolton. Because Petitioner was afraid that someone would enter her apartment and place Petitioner in a psychiatric
hospital against her will, so Petitioner hid in her closet so she would not appear to be home. Thereafter, Petitioner received
a call from Respondent Davis, but Petitioner did not answer her cellphone.
165) A day or so later, someone knocked on Petitioner's door but did not announce themselves. Again Petitioner
hid in her closet to feign that she was not home. When Petitioner went to the door, there was a notice from Woodhull Hospital's
psychiatric unit with an appoint to appear at their psychiatric outpatient clinic.
166) On July 16, 2011, in terror of forced hospitalization
at the behest of Respondent Garaufis, the U.S. Marshal Service and psychiatric facilities over which the New York State Office
of Mental Health and the New York State Department of Health have oversight, Petitioner faxed a copy of a complaint to U.S.
Attorney Preetinder Bharara. However, Respondent Davis called Petitioner again, frightening Petitioner by making Petitioner
believe that Petitioner would be forcibly hospitalized because Respondent U.S. Marshal Service told her that Petitioner had
threatened judges and others at the (federal) Medicaid office, something that Petitioner did not do. Petitioner took the
liberty of recording the conversation14, 15 in its entirety. Petitioner uploaded the conversation http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/federallawsuit.html.
167) Petitioner alleges that by the end of June/beginning of July 2011, Petitioner alleges that Respondent
Garaufis authorized a national security letter that was sent to Movant's telephone company and internet service provider,
Cablevision, giving Respondents Garaufis, the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation the ability to obtain non-content information regarding Petitioner's daughter, Tara A. Uzamere and
Movant's psychiatric care providers for the sole purpose of contacting them to give them false criminal/psychiatric reports
concerning the Movant, in violation of 18 USC §2709 and 18 USC §3511. Petitioner alleges this based on her belief
that the aforementioned Respondents are not psychic but were able to obtain non-contact information regarding Movant's telephone
calls to her daughter, Tara A. Uzamere and to psychiatric care providers from sources other than the Petitioner. Please refer
to http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/federallawsuit.html; and http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/uzamere_v_obama.html. See letter from Cablevision to Petitioner, letter from the U.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY to Respondent Judge
Victor Marrero, Memorandum of Law from Respondent Marrero and Stipulation and Order of Dismissal of Action between U.S.
Attorney's Office, SDNY and the American Civil Liberties Union, attached as Exhibit L1.
168) In the month of
August, 2011 Respondent Davis contacted Respondent Sarpong for the purpose of forcing Petitioner to go to Respondent Brookdale
Hospital Medical Center, where Petitioner was unlawfully imprisoned as an inpatient for threatening Respondent Garaufis and
other judges with bodily harm, and threatening CMS workers with death, something that Petitioner never did. Petitioner stayed
a few days as an inpatient with Respondent Brookdale because Respondent Dr. “John Doe” and other employees of
Respondent Brookdale Hospital Medical Center were told by Respondent Sarpong that Petitioner threatened Judge Garaufis,
other judges and CMS call center workers with death and with bodily harm. Thereafter, Brookdale Hospital Medical Center terminated
its outpatient psychiatric services to the Petitioner and transferred Petitioner to the East New York Diagnostic and Treatment
Center's Assertive Community Treatment Team in order Petitioner illegally monitor along with Respondent Denis P. McGowan
of Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
169) On or around August 18, 2011, Respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation's East New
York Diagnostic and Treatment Center's Assertive Community Treatment Team received correspondence from U.S. Department of
Homeland Security on its original letterhead bearing the name “Denis P. McGowan, Chief, Threat Management Branch.”
The letter stated: “On July 06, 2011, Federal Protective Service (FPS) was notified of a telephonic threat made by
CHERYL UZAMERE to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid call center. The threat consisted of HER stating: since SHE did
not get the job, SHE was going to “COME DOWN THERE AND KILL EVERYBODY. Since FPS has investigated UZAMERE multiple
times for similar behavior, we are well aware of HER mental health history. Based on that information, a referral was made
to LifeNet for mental health intervention on July 07 2011. Subsequently, UZAMERE's Intensive Case Manager (ICM) Bridgett
Davis of the New York State Office of Mental Health has advised that UZAMERE's treatment has been transferred to the Assertive
Community Treatment (ACT) program. We were informed that CHERYL D. UZAMERE is being treated as a patient by your program
and we would like to keep you abreast of this situation as it evolves. We also request that we be notified as HER status
changes in particular any change from in-patient to out-patient treatment and in the case of the latter any refusal of treatment.
In addition, please notify FPS of any relapses or deterioration of HER condition that may pose a risk to life or property.”
See letter from Denis P. McGowan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security attached as Exhibit M.
170) This is the second
time that a Respondent was correct about the non-content information of a phone call made by the Petitioner (but not correct
about the content). At the time the accusation was made, Petitioner was not able to tell how Respondent McGowan knew
that Petitioner called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services call center. Further to this, Respondent McGowan became
a regional director (someone with power to issue NSLs) shortly after he revealed the non-content information regarding Petitioner's
phone call to CMS in the letter that he sent to Samuel Sarpong.
171) Petitioner alleges that Respondent McGowan does not possess the psychic ability to read Petitioner's
thoughts and tell whom Petitioner called. Petitioner further alleges that Respondent McGowan received non-content information
regarding Petitioner's phone call to CMS from an NSL that he authorized, and Judge Garaufis signed off, or that he received
non-NSL, non-content information from an unauthorized source.
172) On February 26, 2012, Respondent HHC's ACT Team where Respondent Sarpong is employed prepared a psychiatric
treatment plan. Under the title “Alerts”, the treatment plan states “. . . H/O threats to judges and Center
for Medicaid and Medicare, patient is being monitored by Homeland Security.” Under the title “Discharge Plan”,
it says “Patient is not being considered for discharge at this time, she was transferred to the program 6 months ago
after she made a threat to the Medicare and Medicaid call center and is being monitored by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.” Under the title “Patient/Family Statement”, it says that “She reported not being aware
of being monitored by Homeland Security. . .” (see Petitioner's psychiatric treatment plan from the East New York Diagnostic
and Treatment Center's Assertive Community Treatment Team, attached as Exhibit M).
173) From June 6, 2012,
Petitioner sent a number of e-mails to employees Mike J. Fitzpatrick, Katrina Gay, David Levy and Sue Medford of the organization
National Alliance for the Mental Ill (NAMI) regarding Respondent Daily News use of the term “wacko” to publicly
malign the Petitioner. None of the employees that Petitioner contacted made any attempt to speak with the Petitioner.
174) On November 26,
2012, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Hakeem Jeffries regarding the act of fraud of Respondent Denis P. McGowan. Included in
the e-mail was Petitioner's impending lawsuit against various federal employees, the correspondence from Respondent McGowan
and psychiatric treatment plans of Respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporations that reflect Respondent McGowan's
fraudulent statement that Petitioner threatened judges with bodily harm and employees of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services call center with murder. Petitioner received an e-mail from Respondent Jeffries stating that “In order to
best serve you, I have opened a South Brooklyn office in Coney Island and a Central Brooklyn office in Fort Greene. You
are cordially invited to join me, my staff, and your fellow neighbors at an Open House to learn more about what we can do
for you. As far as Petitioner knows, neither Respondent Jeffries, nor any of his staff made any attempt to contact Respondent
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Respondent Federal Bureau of Investigation or U.S. Marshals Service.
175) On November 28,
2012, based on information and belief, Respondents Raggi, Carney and Kahn of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
engaged in an act of racketeering, obstruction of justice and criminal facilitation of aggravated identity theft by rendering
an FRAP-lacking decision regarding Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-2713-cv for the sole purpose of advancing the Talmudic
doctrine Law of the Moser by not filing a criminal complaint against corrupt, dishonest, lying, racketeering, racist
Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein for their fraudulent commission of aggravated
identity theft, and their own commission of racketeering, obstruction of justice, criminal facilitation of aggravated identity,
for their own commission of obstruction of justice by tricking Petitioner into believing that a res judicata determination
– a purely civil adjudicative function – was a permanent and final determination to nullify and render harmless
corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's, Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission
of aggravated identity theft – a wrongful act for which the correct criminal adjudicative function of double jeopardy
was never attached because the crime was never tried. Petitioner was told the names of Respondent judges Raggi, Carney and
Kahn by an unknown employee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Respondent O'Hagan Wolfe also engaged in
an act of racketeering, obstruction of justice and criminal facilitation of aggravated identity theft for the sole purpose
of advancing the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser by not filing a criminal complaint against corrupt, dishonest,
lying, racketeering, racist Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein for their criminal
commission of aggravated identity theft. Petitioner's alleges that Respondent O'Hagan Wolfe left out the names of the judges
who rendered their illegal decision on Petitioner's decision based on Respondents' delusion that Petitioner would either
not figure out the judges' identity and would therefore be unable to sue them.
176) Soon thereafter, the Petitioner called Respondent
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court for U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and asked why the appellate judges'
names were not indicated on the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision. Respondent O'Hagan Wolfe indicated that the judges' names
were left out because Petitioner had threatened federal judges, something that Petitioner never did.
177) During the month of December,
2012, Petitioner sent several e-mails containing a copy of the lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831 that Petitioner
filed, as well as those lawsuits that Petitioner will file with the of the Eastern District of New York, along with proof
of Petitioner's ex-husband's identity and the fraudulent affirmations that corrupt Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E.
Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein filed with the New York State Supreme Court to First Lady Michele Obama, and to all
the Respondents. See one of several e-mails Petitioner sent the Respondents attached as Exhibit N.
178) On or around January
30, 2013, Petitioner received a letter from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The letter stated: "Our
records show that you placed calls to 1-800-MEDICARE on the dates and times listed below (all times Central). We can confirm
that none of these calls contained threatening comments: June 14, 2010, 10:38 AM; June 1,2011, 7:39 AM; July 8, 2011, 12:56
PM; May 18, 2012, 11:17 AM, 1:29 PM, 3:51 PM; July 2, 2012, 10:47 AM; July 10, 2012, 2:24 PM; July 17, 2012, 1:09 PM; July
18, 2012, 11:14 AM; July 19, 2012, 5:02 PM; July 23, 2012, 2:51 PM; July 24, 2012, 5:21 PM, 5:43 PM, 5:47 PM, 6:05 PM, 9:56
PM; July 26, 2012, 9:39 PM; July 27, 2012, 5:48 PM; September 9, 2012, 4:39 PM; October 18, 2012, 2:26 PM; November 16,
2012 7:38 PM; November 26, 2012, 1:46 PM; December 12, 2012, 11:13 AM; December 13, 2012, 4:29 AM, 5:05 PM, 5:09 PM. See
letters from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services attached as Exhibit S.
179) On March 7, 2013,
Petitioner contacted the New York State Court of Appeals to inform Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of Petitioner's plans to
include him in her lawsuit. Later on, Petitioner received an e-mail from Richard Reed that said: “This is further to
the telephone conversation that you had with the Clerk's Office of the New York State Court of Appeals this morning regarding
your proposed federal complaint. Please be advised that the matter has been turned over to Counsel's Office for the Office
of Court Administration. They will contact you in due course.” See e-mail from Richard Reed attached as Exhibit
U. Towards the end of the same day, Petitioner received a telephone call from Respondent Michael J. Broyde
and attempted to tell him of what Petitioner called a contradiction in term with regard to being both a rabbi and a U.S.
attorney. Petitioner informed the rabbi-attorneys of her plans to file her Verified Complaint against them, and consistent
with Petitioner's stated plans, e-mailed her Verified Complaint and the exhibits to rabbi-attorneys Michael J. Broyde, Esq.,
Rabbi Michoel Zylberman, Esq., Rabbi Yona Reiss, Esq., Rabbi Shlomo Weissmann, Esq.
180) On March 9, 2013, Petitioner e-mailed Abraham
H. Foxman, Steven M. Freeman, Esq., Steven C. Sheinberg, Esq., Deborah Bensinger, Esq. and David L. Barkey, Esq. of the Anti-Defamation
League, Inc. to advise them how Jewish Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro, Esq., Jack Gladstein, Esq., Mortimer
Zuckerman and Scott Shifrel employed their Talmud-fostered racial hatred and hatred of mentally ill goyim to rationalize
their commission of 18 USC §1028A, aggravated identity theft; their false accusation that Petitioner harassed Respondent
Sunshine; their false accusation that Petitioner made threats of violence; their violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment
insofar as the aforesaid Respondents never had any intention of confronting the Petitioner; and the Respondents' continued
violation of 18 USC §4, misprision of felony, insofar as none of the Respondents have ever made any attempt to file
any criminal complaint against Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro, Esq., Jack Gladstein, Esq., Mortimer Zuckerman and Scott
Shifrel in spite of Petitioner's irrefutable criminal accusations.
181) On March 15, 2013, Petitioner sent a a copy of her lawsuit and a her complaint regarding Respondent
McCarthy to Respondent the Professional Responsibility Program. Petitioner explained in her e-mail that Respondent McCarthy
violated 18 USC §4, misprision of felony based on Respondent's McCarthy's having knowledge of the actual commission
of a Allen E. Kaye's and Harvey Shapiro's aggravated identity theft and her continued refusal to it make known; and her refusal
to obey Vermont’s Rules of Professional Conduct's Rule 3.4, Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, which requires
attorneys not to: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal
a document or other material having potential evidentiary value; b) not to counsel or assist another person to do any such
act; and, c) not to falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law. See letters from Vermont's Rules of Professional Conduct, attached as Exhibit V.
182) On March 24, 2013,
Petitioner called Respondent FBI New York Office and asked one of its agents if the FBI office would refuse to take Petitioner's
complaints if the person against whom Petitioner complained was Jewish, as Petitioner alleges was done to her in the past.
True to past behavior, someone hung up the phone. When Petitioner called back, the person on the phone said that Petitioner
had posed the question to Mr. Stein, hurting his feelings. Petitioner was then called anti-Semitic, and then subjected to
having the telephone hung up. Petitioner took her three (3) phones and engaged in a blitz phone call session, allowing all
of her phones to ring at the same time. When "John Doe" #1 finally answered the phone, Petitioner got into an argument
with Respondent “John Doe” #1 with regard to Petitioner's right to file a criminal complaint against Jews who
had violated federal law. Respondent “John Doe” #1 blackmailed Petitioner by telling her that he would call
Petitioner's daughter, mentioning Petitioner's daughter's name (something that generally precedes a threat of psychiatric
hospitalization), and then would come to Petitioner's apartment; however, when asked if Petitioner had committed a crime
and whether Petitioner would be assigned an attorney, "John Doe" #1 said that Petitioner would have to obtain an
attorney on her own. As it turned out, "John Doe" #1 never came to Petitioner's apartment, and never contacted
Petitioner's daughter. During Petitioner's conversation with "John Doe" #1, Petitioner told the employee that she
was recording the conversation. Petitioner recorded the conversation and uploaded it to http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/uzamere_v_obama.html (this site, at the link that says FBIconversation - click here). The following day, Petitioner contacted the FBI and spoke with a woman (who sounded black). Petitioner
told the woman that an FBI employee would not allow her to file any complaints if the subject of the complaint is Jewish.
Petitioner also told the woman that she recorded the conversation and uploaded it to her website. The woman asked Petitioner
how Petitioner knew whether the person with whom Petitioner spoke was an employee of the FBI. Petitioner told the woman she
was right, and that the person with whom Petitioner spoke could have been Bozo the Clown. Subsequently, an employee of the
FBI called Petitioner's psychiatric treatment facility and reported that Petitioner had an argument with an FBI employee;
that said argument was indicative that Petitioner has psychiatric issues that warrant hospitalization. On March 28, 2013,
the day of Petitioner's treatment appointment, Petitioner was asked by her psychiatrist, Dr. Beaudouin if she had had an
argument with anyone. Later, Petitioner was interviewed simultaneously by Dr. Beaudouin and Ms. Fletcher in an attempt to
find reasons to hospitalize the Petitioner. It was so obvious that Petitioner asked if they planned to hospitalize her.
Petitioner's psychiatrist and therapist said no; however, Petitioner's psychiatrist and therapist never disclosed to Petitioner
that they had been contacted by Respondent FBI and requested to act as agents of the police. Petitioner had committed no
crime and has been treatment compliant such that Petitioner felt double-teamed by Dr. Beaudouin and Ms. Fletcher with their
bombardment of questions that were geared, not to help Petitioner, but as an investigative tool of the FBI to determine
whether Petitioner had any argument with the FBI. Petitioner alleges that her treatment facility is now being used surreptitiously
to ensure that if Petitioner files a complaint with the FBI against any Jew, that the FBI will contact her psychiatric treatment
facility and tell them to hospitalize Petitioner. Furthermore, Petitioner also alleges that at the continued behest of Respondent
Garaufis, “John Doe” #1 of Respondent Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York Office illegally obtained information
regarding Petitioner's outpatient psychiatric care provider from Respondents' network of as yet unknown informants from
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Office, and/or from the New York State
Office of Mental Health, and/or from the New York State Department of Health and/or from the New York State Office of Temporary
and Disability Assistance and/or from the New York City Health and Hospital's Corporation, and/or from the New York City
Human Resources Administration.
183) On March 25, 2013 Petitioner sent a reply back to Vermont's Professional Responsibility Program with
copies of the attorneys' fraudulent affirmations that hold Godwin Uzamere to be Petitioner's husband.
184) On April 9, 2013, Petitioner
e-mailed a formal complaint to Respondent Jeffries containing the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services confirming that
Petitioner did not threaten anyone during any of the phone calls Petitioner made to the CMS call center. Petitioner sent
a copy of the formal complaint to the following e-mail addresses: newyork@fbi.gov; stuart.f.delery@usdoj.gov; tristram.coffin@usdoj.gov; Preet.Bharara@usdoj.gov; loretta.lynch@usdoj.gov; eric.schneiderman@ag.ny.gov; mcardozo@law.nyc.gov; peter_kirchheimer@fd.org; david_patton@fd.org; Lschreib@bds.org; michael.brown@oandb.com; robert.roarke@wilsonelser.com; mdesroches@mhaofnyc.org; mleish@nydailynews.com; RonH@nami.org; support@lawline.com; ALB@Bluestonelawfirm.com; yreiss@yu.edu; mbroyde@emory.edu; sweissmann@bethdin.org; mzylberman@bethdin.org; sfreeman@adl.org; ssheinberg@adl.org; dbensinger@adl.org; dbarkey@adl.org; akaye@kayevisalaw.com; ckawalsky@harveyshapiro.com; gladmessattys@aol.com; info@uzalaw.com ehigieuzamere@yahoo.com; AskDOJ@usdoj.gov; internal.affairs@usdoj.gov; Preet.Bharara@usdoj.gov; info@jeffriesforcongress.com; ogc@dhs; ivan.fong@dhs.gov; William.Schultz@hhs.gov; Suzan_Orlove@schumer.senate.gov; DOJOIG.NewYorkComplaints@usdoj.gov; kathleen.sebelius@hhs.gov. Respondent Jeffries made no attempt to send a written response to Petitioner's requesting assistance as
a crime victim with irrefutable of the crime.
185) During the month of May, 2013, Petitioner's made several phone calls and spoke with Patrick Boyle,
Respondent Jeffries with reference to the crimes that were committed against Petitioner by various members of the Jewish
community, explaining her belief that the reason her complaint is continually ignored is because of the Talmud doctrine
Law of the Moser, that prohibits Jews from reporting the crimes of fellow Jews to the secular/Gentile authorities.
On one of the last occasions in which Petitioner spoke with Patrick Boyle, he demanded that Petitioner never call back,
without giving Petitioner a reason in writing or any explanation as to why Petitioner was being blacklisted.
186) In May, 2013,
Petitioner performed an internet research and discovered the following contributors to Respondent Jeffries' congressional
campaign: Mr. Ruslan Agarunov, Bertram Berns, Mr. Norman Bobrow, Mr. Paul Burg, Ms. Vickie Fishman, Mr. Sander Gerber, Mr.
Michael Granoff, Mr. Marvin Israelow, Mr. Alan Levow, Mr. William Russell-Shapiro, Ms. Donna Sternberg, Mr. Marc Spiegel,
Mr. Daniel Tenenblatt, Leslie Topper, Mr. Craig Weiss, World Alliance for Israel PAC, Lee Ziff, President of the World Alliance
for Israel. Based on the number of Jews who contributed money to Respondent Jeffries' campaign, including the World Alliance
for Israel, combined with Respondent Jeffries' refusal to provide Petitioner with a written why neither he nor anyone else
in his office can contact the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate Petitioner's complaint or cause it to be investigated,
and Patrick Boyle's demand that Petitioner not call the office against even though Petitioner is a constituent, Petitioner
alleges that Respondent Jeffries and his staff understand that campaign contributions from Jewish contributors are quid
pro quo and will only be provided if Respondent Jeffries and his staff espouse and promulgate Jewish/Talmudic culture, including
the Talmudic doctrine Law of The Moser, that prohibits Jews from reporting the crimes of fellow Jews to the secular/Gentile
authorities, an never participate in the criminal investigation, arrest, indictment, trial, conviction, sentencing and imprisoning
anyone who is Jewish.16 From at least 2012 through and including the present time, in the Eighth Congressional District and elsewhere,
Respondent Jeffries, Patrick Boyle, other members of Congressman Jeffries congressional staff and campaign contributors
who are Jewish, and others known and unknown, unlawfully willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed
together and with each other to receive bribes masking as campaign contributions from a number of Jewish individuals, in
exchange for advancing the Jewish religion, including the Talmudic doctrine, Law of the Moser, which prevents Jews
(and Jew slaves) from reporting the crimes of fellow Jews to the secular/Gentile authorities in order to make sure that no
Gentile's criminal complaint in which the Respondent is Jewish would ever come to legal fruition in any court of law; that
in furtherance of the conspiracy, Respondent Jeffries and his staff ignored Petitioner's request to investigate and/or cause
to be investigated Petitioner's criminal complaint by the appropriate law enforcement agency, and to effect the illegal
objects thereof, the following over acts, among others, were committed in the Eighth Congressional District in Brooklyn,
New York and elsewhere: 1) Respondent Jeffries ignored Petitioner's complaint; 2) Petitioner refused to respond to the Petitioner
in writing as to whether he would forward Petitioner request to the appropriate federal law enforcement agency; 3) more
than one of Respondent told Petitioner not to call back or would become irritated over the phone when Petitioner would call;
and 4) Respondent Boyle blackmailed Petitioner not to call their office anymore, even though Petitioner is a constituent
and voted for Respondent Jeffries.
187) On and before May, 2013, while refusing to accept from the Petitioner irrefutable proof of Jews Allen
E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's, Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of misprision of felony,
fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity theft, racketeering, obstruction of justice and extortion/blackmail, Respondent
Barack H. Obama, Andrew Weissman, General Counsel for Respondent Federal Bureau of Investigation, James X. Dempsey, Respondent,
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Elisebeth Collins Cook, Respondent, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board;
David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Rachel L. Brand, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board; and Patricia M. Wald, Respondent, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Keith B. Alexander, General, National
Security Agency; Rajesh De, General Counsel, National Security Agency; Eric H. Holder; U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice; Charles Schumer, Senate Judiciary Committee; Dianne Feinstein, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairperson;
Senator Saxby Chambliss, Patrick Leahy, Senator Judiciary Chairman, Hon. Goodlatte, Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary Chairman,
Mike Rogers, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Marshals Service Director Charles Dunne, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, Federal Protection Service, Threat Assessment Branch employee Denis P. McGowan, FBI Assistant Director
in Charge, George Venizelos and Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis engaged in overseeing a criminal, unconstitutional system of
government that specifically discriminated against the law-abiding, psychiatric-treatment-compliant, mentally disabled Gentile/Schvartze/African
American Petitioner by allowing Respondent Judge Garaufis and other Jews to fraudulently use the PATRIOT Act to spy on non-criminal,
constitutionally-protected telephone calls regarding Petitioner's HIPAA-protected mental health and other HIPAA-protected
issues; that said telephone calls were spied on at the behest of Respondent Judge Garaufis and other Jews, not based on
the belief that the Petitioner had violated the law, but to enslave the Petitioner by extorting/blackmailing her; by using
Petitioner's confidential, non-content information regarding Petitioner's telephone calls to her outpatient psychiatric
care provider that maybe embarrassing or shameful if publicly disseminated; to fraudulently accuse the Petitioner of the
commission of a crime and to associate the fraudulent criminal allegation with Petitioner's confidential non-content information;
to frighten the Petitioner by publicizing embarrassing or shameful information associated with Petitioner's psychiatric
non-content information for the sole purpose of forcing the Petitioner not to petition the government for a redress of grievances
with regard to Petitioner's First Amendment right to report the activities of lawbreaking Jews to the secular/Gentile law
enforcement authorities; that those Jews' violation of Petitioner's and other Gentiles' right to privacy is based on the
Talmudic doctrine for Jews to enslave Gentiles, with an emphasis on the enslavement of people who are dark-skinned or considered
by Jews to be Africans, Cushites, Hamites and Canaanites. See Exhibit Q. In the meantime, Respondents
Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Mortimer Zuckerman and Scott Shifrel, who engaged in illegally obtaining
and publicly disseminating information regarding the crime (for which Petitioner was falsely accused, for which Respondents
never had any intention of confronting Petitioner in any court of laws and that was eventually dismissed), Petitioner's
mental illness and her marriage and who are still engaging in misprision of felony, fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity
theft, racketeering, obstruction of justice and extortion/blackmail have never been investigated for the continued commission
of their crimes.
188)
On or near August 7, 2013, Petitioner alleges that Respondents federal Judge John Bates, federal Judge John William E. Smith
and federal Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan conspired with Respondent Jew billionaire Mortimer Zuckerman, speaking
on behalf of Jew Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Jeffrey S. Sunshine and Arthur M. Schack; that
the goal of said conspiracy is: 1) for Respondents federal Judge John Bates, federal Judge Judge William E. Smith and Magistrate
Judge Patricia A. Sullivan to engage in misprision of felony by not reporting the crimes that Petitioner's exhibits proved
occurred; 2) by Respondent Smith and Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan committing the requisite affirmative acts of
not uploading Petitioner's exhibits to PACER's Electronic Court Filing System, the court's more efficient electronic filing
system, by not filing Petitioner's subpoena duces tecum with Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security to leave no
doubt regarding the identity of Petitioner's ex-ex-husband and the father of Tara A. Uzamere, the child of the marriage;
3) to allow the aforementioned Jew Respondents to leave their criminally fraudulent statements on the internet regarding
Petitioner's ex-husband's identity to be unchallenged; 4) to deprive Petitioner of her First Amendment right to proceed without
government's encroachment of the Jewish religion; 5) to deprive Petitioner of her right to freedom of speech; 6) to deprive
Petitioner of her right to petition PACER.gov, a government agency, with a redress of grievances by uploading her exhibits;
7) by relying on the U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the legal doctrine “void for vagueness” by explaining
what makes Petitioner's exhibits are too voluminous, by giving Petitioner the opportunity to learn what Respondent Smith
means by “too voluminous” so that Petitioner could make repairs on said exhibits and upload them to PACER.gov;
and, 8) to intentionally misuse the doctrine res judicata to adjudge that new claims that have never been
adjudicated or even seen by any judge can still be considered adjudicated based on past claims that were seen but were
illegally ignored or were arbitrarily, maliciously and capriciously adjudicated . On August 26, 2013, Respondent Sullivan
stated in her fraudulent Report and Recommendation to dismiss Petitioner's Amended Verified Complaint: “. . .it is
inconceivable that venue over this matter could ever be proper in this District”, without considering Petitioner's
stipulation to change venue pursuant to 28 USC §1404(a), and in violation of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that “A
forum-selection clause should receive neither dispositive consideration nor no consideration, but rather the consideration
for which Congress provided in §1404(a) in the case Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22
(1988), ignoring Petitioner's attempt to stipulate a change of venue pursuant to 28 USC §1404(a); that according to
the federal district court case Ralls Corporation V. Terna Energy USA Holding Corporation, that “upon
consideration of the parties' briefs, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. It does not reach the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
(emphasis added); that Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Sullivan engaged in the Hobbs Acts by either accepting bribes or allowing
herself to be extorted/blackmailed by Jewish billionaire Mortimer Zuckerman not to file any criminal complaint against Jewish
attorneys anyone Jewish, in violation of 18 USC §4, misprision of felony; the Respondent Sullivan misapplied the res
judicata principle to situations in which Petitioner clearly established the continuing violations doctrine; and finally,
that Respondent Sullivan's Report and Recommendation is proof of ongoing crimes and civil torts for which Petitioner can
again apply the continuing violations doctrine. See the following: 1) Daily News article criminally holding Petitioner to
be mentally unfit and that “Godwin Uzamere” is Petitioner's husband; 2) page two (2) of Respondent Garaufis'
Order regarding Petitioner's civil rights lawsuit, Cheryl D. Uzamere v. Andrew M. Cuomo, et al., Case No. 1:2011-cv-2831,
enumerating 589 that were uploaded to PACER.gov, attached as Uzamere vs. Cuomo, Memorandum and Order page two (2); 3) lawsuit
Viacom International Inc., et al. v. Youtube, Inc, et al, Case No. 1:07-CV-2103 (LLS) that explains the conditions
associated with what makes exhibits “voluminous”, PACER Monitor statements describing Petitioner's exhibits
as “too voluminous” but being vague as to why the 245 pages of exhibits are considered too voluminous, attached
as Exhibit R. Petitioner also alleges that every single Respondent named and enumerated in
Petitioner’s list of Respondents because acutely familiar with the Petitioner’s plight; knew that Petitioner
was being abused and new who was involved in violating Petitioner civil rights; however instead of report their crimes, committed
18 USC §4 misprision of felony by not reporting the wrong act to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.
Factual Analysis
189) Based on federal criminal laws that pertain to
RICO and racketeering, Petitioner specifically identifies Respondents, especially the government-employed Jewish Respondents
as the racketeering-influenced corrupt organization whose goal was and still continues to be the enforcement of the halachic
doctrine Law of the Moser, in order to ensure that Petitioner is prohibited from reporting the Jewish Respondents
crimes to the secular/Gentile law enforcement authorities. Since 1979, this RICO has done business with the Petitioner and
her children with dirty hands.17
190) The Respondents
reentered their legal relationship with the Petitioner and her children with dirty hands. Respondents' failed relationship
with the Petitioner and her children as providers of honest, unbiased government-funded services has existed since 1979,
and as a direct result of Respondents State of New York, City of New York, Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro, Esq. and
Ehigie Edobor Uzamere act of aggravated identity and theft and immigration fraud have never provided Petitioner and her daughter
Tara with monies that Petitioner is still owed from Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. Because of the acts of aggravated
identity theft that were facilitated by Respondents the State of New and the City of New York, and committed by Allen E.
Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro., and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere Petitioner was subjected to a worsening of her preexisting mental
illness and a distancing from normal society. Because of the acts of aggravated identity theft that was facilitated by Respondents
State of New York and City of New York, and committed by Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro, Esq., and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere,
Petitioner's children were forced to remain in Respondent State of New York's foster care system for nearly all of their
lives. David P. Walker, the older child, suffers from dysthymia and bulimia. Tara A. Uzamere, child of the marriage, is mentally
high functioning, but she lacks the maternal and paternal care and companionship from which she and her brother were deprived
all of their lives. Petitioner suffers from constant shame from never having been a good parent to her children, who, in
spite of Petitioner's failure as a parent, are amazingly well-behaved and believers of Jehovah God. The racketeering-influenced
corrupt organizations Respondents the United States of America, State of New York, City of New York and those Jews having
both positions of power and money, pay bribes to unsuspecting, greedy Gentile Americans who do not realize that their acceptance
of bribes from Jews makes, not just those who accepted the bribes, but all Gentile Americans slaves to the Jews forever
without the ability to enforce their Constitutional rights. Petitioner emphatically states that the force that unifies the
more powerful Jewish Respondents is Judaism, with its emphasis on the Babylonian Talmud. The Babylonian Talmud provides the
religious rationalization for the Jewish Respondents to enslave both the Petitioner and the Gentile Respondents to engage
in conduct which is not in the constitutional interests of the Gentile Respondents – like the doctrine Law of the
Moser, that now requires Gentile slaves to obey their Jewish master counterparts and keep silent regarding the crimes
committed by other Jews. Understandably, those corrupt Jewish Respondents who engage in bribing governmental employees feel
a sense of entitlement based both on Jews having paid money for services, and for the Jewish religion that teaches that Gentiles
are meant to be enslaved by Jews. In the article entitled Come and Hear, under the subtitle “Coexistence?”, it
says: “What does the future hold? Can the Jews ever co-exist with the rest of humanity? The answer is “yes”
provided the rest of humanity accepts the role designed for them by Jewish leadership. If Gentiles do not accept enslavement,
there will be conflict.” In the subtitle US vs. Talmud Law, it says: “. . .Talmud law insists on unequal justice
under law. Talmudic law holds there is one law for Jews, and one for Gentiles. This is not inconsistent with the Old Testament
in which LORD God decrees that Jews should not enslave other Jews: Gentiles are the proper slaves of Jews. See newspaper
article from Crains, sealed complaint regarding USA vs. Kruger, et al and articles entitled Come and Hear, attached as Exhibit
T.
191)
Respondent United States of America, by its employee Respondent McCarthy, Bar Counsel for Respondent U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, provided Petitioner with a report detailing the two Uzamere18 files A35 201 224 and A24 027 764, going so far as to indicate that Respondent
Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, having obtained a visa as an unmarried student under 21 years of age and having been sponsored by
his brother and sister-in-law, fraudulently applied for permanent residence as Petitioner's husband “Godwin E. Uzamere”,
and over the age of 21. Respondent McCarthy referenced the fingerprints in the two files which Petitioner understood to
mean were the same. Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security's employee T. Diane Diane Cejka, former Director of
the FOIA/PA Division, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service in Lee Summit, Missouri provided the Petitioner with even
more irrefutable documentation, including the two (2) immigration number A35 201 224 and A24 027 764 to establish that Petitioner's
ex-husband filed for residence under two (2) different immigration numbers.
192) Years later, after several attempts by Respondent
judges Jewish judges Michael Gerstein, Jeffrey S. Sunshine, Arthur M. Schack and Nicholas G. Garaufis and the powerful, racist
Jewish criminal newspaper publisher and editor Mortimer Zuckerman to prevent Petitioner from filing criminal complaints against
corrupt Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein by publicly declaring Petitioner's
incredible based on her status of having mentally ill with violent tendencies have all but blown up in their faces, Respondent
Garaufis has embarked on yet another equally unoriginal course of conduct – by saying “I didn't do it!”
Petitioner has responded to that stunt by filing a criminal complaint against Mortimer Zuckerman, Scott Shifrel and the
Daily News, LP for their commission of aggravated identity theft.
193) Respondent Garaufis' game plan now is to stop Petitioner's reliance on the continuing criminal violations
doctrine in its tracks. Respondent Garaufis has attempted to do this by being willfully blind of his extortionate psychiatric/criminal
“shakedown” of the Petitioner, and instead, to say that Petitioner's mental illness (lacking the threat of violence
this time) caused her to falsely claim that Respondents Garaufis; “John Doe” #1 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
LifeNet of the Mental Health Association of New York City; “John Doe” #2 of the U.S. Marshals Service for Eastern
District of New York; “John Doe” #3 of the U.S. Marshals Service for Eastern District of New York; “Jane
Doe” of the U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York; Bridget Davis of the New York State Office
of Mental Health; “Dr. John Doe” of Brookdale Hospital and Medical Center; Samuel Sarpong of the East New York
Diagnostic and Treatment Center, Assertive Community and Treatment Team; and Dr. Scott A. Berger of the East New York Diagnostic
and Treatment Center, Assertive Community and Treatment Team never said that Petitioner threatened any federal employee.
Respondent Garaufis' attempt is lacking in commonsense because Petitioner, who was within the State of New York at the time
of the telephone call, availed herself of New York State's one-party law with regard to recording in-person or in-telephone
conversations, by giving herself permission to record the conversation with Respondent Bridget Davis, who was also within
the State of New York at the time of the recording. Petitioner subsequently uploaded the recorded telephone call to http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/federallawsuit.html and noted, among other things, that Respondent Davis said that Petitioner threatened others, that there were
others federal agencies that thought Petitioner was a danger to others. Petitioner gave herself permission to record her
conversation with “John Doe” #1 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, during the aforesaid conversation,
extorted Petitioner not to file any complaint against anyone Jewish or she would call Petitioner's daughter, visit Petitioner's
apartment and (by inference) report Petitioner's argument to her psychiatric care providers, which he did. Petitioner also
gave herself permission to record the conversation and upload it to her web page http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/uzamere_v_obama.html. In addition, the same falsified criminal allegations that are contained in the telephone conversation that Petitioner
uploaded to her web page is written down in Respondent McGowan's correspondence dated August 18, 2011 and Respondent New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation psychiatric treatment plan dated February 26, 2012. And in spite of several years
of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of Respondent Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman's judicial subordinates, no subordinate
judge, starting from Respondent Lippman, has ever allowed Petitioner to file any complaint that makes reference to the aggravated
identity theft that was committed by corrupt Jews Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Mortimer Zuckerman, Scott
Shifrel and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere and Osato Eugene Uzamere.
194) Respondent McCarthy made no attempt to warn immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro,
Jack Gladstein and Osato E. Uzamere to stop holding out “Godwin E. Uzamere and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere as two (2) different
people even after Petitioner warned Respondent McCarthy that Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and
the Daily News were still holding out “Godwin Uzamere” as a real person, and even after Petitioner provided Respondents
Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and Osato E. Uzamere proof that Ehigie Edobor Uzamere and “Godwin E.
Uzamere” are the same the person. In addition, no employee of Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security ever
made any attempt to investigate and then arrest Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein for their commission
of aggravated identity theft. Worse still, in spite of black letter law that requires federal judges and attorneys to report
the commission of wrongdoing by fellow judges and attorneys, not one of the Respondents, upon receiving irrefutable proof
of corrupt immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's and Osato E. Uzamere's commission of
aggravated identity theft, filed a complaint with any law enforcement agency. Petitioner's Verified Complaint speaks to,
not only separate criminal acts of the Respondents, but of a pattern of behavior that is indicative of an anti-U.S. Constitution,
pro-Talmud, pro-Jew, anti-Gentile, anti-schvartze bias that permeates every court in New York's Second Circuit and the New
York State Unified Court System. Respondent judges, in violation of 18 USC §4, misprision of felony and the code of
conduct for federal and New York State judges that require judges to report the crimes of attorneys to pertinent law enforcement
agencies, Petitioner's complaints regarding the commission of aggravated identity theft go ignored, as well as Petitioner's
complaints regarding those acts of fraud with regard to the false criminal accusation made against Petitioner by Respondent
Judge Garaufis, Respondent “John Doe” #1 of the U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York, and/or
“John Doe” #2, of the U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York, and/or “Jane Doe”
#3 of the U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York, and Respondent Denis P. McGowan of Respondent the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and Respondent Bridget Davis of Respondent the New York State Office of Mental Health,
and Respondents Samuel Sarpong and Dr. Scott A. Berger of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. The aforementioned
Respondents accused Petitioner of committing 18 USC §115, threatening a federal employee, something that Petitioner
never did. On or around January 30, 2013, Petitioner received correspondence from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services' Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The correspondence indicated all the telephone calls that Petitioner
made to the call center, and that Petitioner made no threatening telephone calls. However, where Petitioner's innocence is
concerned, it does not matter. Petitioner holds that there is a specific hierarchy where the Respondents are concerned.
Petitioner strongly alleges that the Gentile Respondents' most important responsibility is not enforcement of the U.S. Constitution,
but their ability to worship the Jewish community as their gods, to serve the Jews as their obedient slaves, and to ensure
that any judicial decision that is rendered is rendered, not according to the U.S. Constitution, but according to what makes
the Jewish community happy. See correspondence from CMS attached as Exhibit S.
195) Petitioner has had difficulty
in explaining, well enough for this Court to understand, that there is a pervasive attitude that fosters and encourages
the courts' bestowing on Jews certain understood, but not mentioned, favors associated with being white and Jewish. This
clandestinely understood right, known as “white skin privilege”, was openly requested by members of the website
http://www.jewishdefense.org. The site stated: “Contact Stewart Judge: No White Skin Privilege For Lynne” and: “Click Here For Printer Friendly Suggested Letter To Judge Koeltl
Asking Him Not To Treat Lynne Stewart Differently Than Her Co-Respondents.” Combine these racist statements with Jewish
doctrines about black-skinned people in the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate 108b, and footnote 34; Midrash Rabbah, page 293;
Legends of the Jews, Vol. 1, page 169, Artsot Ha-Hayyim, pages 52a and 52b, and the Respondents' continued commission of
18 USC §4, misprision of felony with regard to their recalcitrance by not reporting Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's, Osato Eugene
Uzamere's, Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of aggravated
identity theft, Petitioner has a justiciable reason not to trust Judge Koeltl or any other judge in the eastern district,
southern district or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See internet article regarding Lynne Stewart attached
as Exhibit W.
196) Petitioner restates and realleges that Respondents committed the following offenses and constitutional
torts: misprision of felony, 18 USC §4; fraud, 18 USC §1001; identity theft, 18 USC §1028; aggravated identity
fraud, 18 USC §1028A; deprivation of rights under color of law (including being kidnapped, unlawfully imprisoned and
blacklisted), 18 USC §242/42 USC §1985; extortion, 18 USC §872§, blackmail, 18 USC §873; violation
of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act; violation of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973; violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, §601; violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; violation of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment; violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; violation of the Notice Clause of the Sixth Amendment; violation of
the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment; violation of Petitioner's right of privacy with regard to the illegal
dissemination of her psychiatric records, Petitioner marriage history, Petitioner married name, and the non-content information
associated with Petitioner's internet and telephone accounts; violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, intentional misuse of national security letters (NSLs) or some manner in which Respondents obtained non-content
information illegally.
197) Petitioner alleges that although all the Respondents actively participated in preventing Petitioner
from filing complaints against Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein, the heart of the conspiracy are the
following persons: Respondent Garaufis, (authorized NSLs/unauthorized telephone investigations that were used to rationalize
dismissal of Petitioner's civil rights action Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831 and 11-2713-cv; Petitioner's psychiatric
hospitalization in Brookdale Hospital based on threats that Petitioner never made); “John Doe” #1 of Respondent
FBI (threatened psychiatric hospitalization after Petitioner insisted on filing complaint against Jews who violated Petitioner's
rights, conversation uploaded to http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/uzamere_v_obama.html; “John Doe” #2,
“John Doe #3” and “Jane Doe” of Respondent U.S. Marshals Service (conversation in which Bridget Davis
stated that the Marshals said that Petitioner threatened the (federal) Medicaid Office, uploaded to http://www.thecrimesofsenatoruzamere.net/federallawsuit); Denis P. McGowan of Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security (sent secret letter to Samuel Sarpong
in which Petitioner was accused of threatening employees of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' call center);
Dr. Scott A. Berger of Respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation; New York State Judge Michael Gerstein;
New York State Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine and New York State Justice Arthur M. Schack, Allen E. Kaye, Esq., Harvey Shapiro,
Esq., Jack Gladstein, Mortimer Zuckerman of the Daily News, LP and Scott Shifrel of the Daily News, LP. In spite of the
aforesaid Respondents' accusation/diagnosis that I threatened Respondent Garaufis, other judges and employees of CMS, none
of the Respondents made any attempt to bring their allegations to trial, thereby providing Petitioner with the opportunity
to confront her accusers and prove her innocence.
198) Respondents' engaged in the misprision of Respondents Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's,
NYS Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine, NYS Justice Arthur M. Schack, Mortimer Zuckerman and federal Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis'
act of identity theft of the name “Mrs. Ehigie Edobor Uzamere,” so that the child of the marriage Tara A. Uzamere
was subsequently deprived of her right by consanguinity to bear her father, Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's name; that
Petitioner and child of the marriage Tara A. Uzamere and David P. Walker, stepson of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere were
deprived of the legal, social and financial benefits of bearing the proud African/Nigerian/Edo/Bini name of Respondent Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere; that Respondents continue to engage in misprision of felony to hide Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's misuse
of the social security numbers 099-20-2291, the fictitious social security number under which the entity “Godwin Ehigie
Uzamere” was searched by the New York City Department of Social Services' Bureau of Child Support Enforcement; 053-64-7854,
the number under which Ehigie Edobor Uzamere owes a student loan (this may be George Uzamere's social security number); and
129-64-1205, the number under which “Godwin Ehigie Uzamere” actually filled out a filled out an application for
a social card is prima facie evidence that governmental agencies viewed “Godwin Uzamere” and “Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere” as two different persons.
199) Petitioner asks this Court to do something that this Court has probably never done before: to review
the facts regarding the Jewish Respondents wholistically. This means rendering a judgment, not just based on what they've
done, but based on what they intend to do because of their religion. The Petitioner asks this Court not to be tricked by
the fraudulent statement that the Jewish Respondents and other Jews who have committed crimes other Gentiles have different
intentions. This is a boldfaced lie. The criminal acts of the Jewish Respondents and the crimes committed against Gentiles
by other Jews may be different but there is one mind. The intention is always the same because the mindset is the same:
preventing anti-Semitism in order to save the Jewish nation at all cost, and to prevent anti-Semitism by enslaving Gentiles
at all costs.
200)
In Petitioner's Appellate Affidavit in Support of Judicial Recusal of Respondent Garaufis for the lawsuit Uzamere v. Cuomo,
et al, 1:2011-2713-cv, Petitioner stated the following:
“I allege that Judge Garaufis'
bias is an act of malice; however, I allege that Judge Garaufis' act of malice is secondary to the terror and rage that
he and many of Israel's adult children continue to suffer as a result of the Roman government's/Catholic Church's 2,000-year
holocaust to eradicate the memory of the Jewish Nation from the planet Earth, starting with the destruction of Jerusalem's
2nd temple in 70 C.E., where 1,100,000 innocent Jews were slaughtered and 97,000 were taken captive, and culminating with
the slaughter of 6,000,000+ innocent Jews in Catholic-controlled Nazi Germany. I allege that based on Judge Garaufis' various
knee-jerk reactions to my lawsuit, like so many of the adult children of European Jews, he is terrified that yet another
goy is going to hurt him and the Jewish Respondents. I make this allegation, not to challenge the learning and experience
of psychoanalytical and psychiatric professionals, but because I am suffering something akin to post traumatic stress disorder,
so I understand and sympathize with Judge Garaufis and European Jews' terror and rage at being oppressed again by non-Jews.
While I sympathize with the terrors that Israel's children suffered and continue to suffer
at the hands of unscrupulous non-Jews, this Court, in it wisdom, must not allow Judge Garaufis' legitimate fear of anti-Semitism
to be used as a rationalization to excuse the tortious and criminal conduct of the Respondents, or to continue to hurt me
or my children. Respondent law firm Allen E. Kaye, PC mounted an unprovoked attack on me and my children on November 30,
1979 by facilitating my ex-husband's commission of immigration fraud and identity fraud, preventing us from obtaining money
from my ex-husband to live. I had to put my children in foster care. In 2008, a year after I filed my divorce from my-husband,
Respondent law firm Uzamere and Associates, PLLC, its owner being a blood relative of my ex-husband, was then enlisted to
discredit my story as the rantings of an insane woman. In 2009, the following year, Respondent law firms Allen E. Kaye,
PC, the Law Offices of Harvey Shapiro and Gladstein and Messinger, knowing my ex-husband's true identity, submitted fraudulent
affirmations falsely holding my ex-husband out to be “Godwin Uzamere” even after the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service and the New York State Unified Court Systems' Second Judicial Department held that Senator Ehigie Edobor Uzamere
was my husband and is the father of our daughter, Tara. Judge Garaufis' attempts to come to the rescue of fellow Jewish Respondents
to save them from the machinations of an anti-Semitic litigant are more than misplaced. They are now malicious. I am not
Hitler, and if Respondent Allen E. Kaye, PC had not engaged in its original criminal act by tricking me for the the sole
purpose of helping his client get a green card, thereby denying me and my daughter the right to be identified by my ex-husband's
and Tara's father African name and to receive money from him for our care, I would not be litigating against the Jewish
Respondents. My litigation against the Respondents has no basis in anti-Semitism. The Respondents broke the law. Judge Garaufis'
use of the term “frivolous and malicious” is truthful – but his use of the term does not have its basis
in the Federal Rules of Civil Practice. I allege that it is in Judge Garaufis' culture's rule that Jews must defend themselves
from the anti-Semitic machinations of non-Jews at all costs – even if it means violating the legal rights of a non-Jew.
Judge Garaufis' decision is therefore an act of bias that has its basis in my ethnicity as a member of the goyim.”
201) In the criminal
case of People of the State of New Jersey vs. Jesse K. Timmendequas, during the death penalty phase, an “August
1995 videotape – made during an interview at their mother's South Carolina trailer – came as the defense sought
to show that the childhood years of Jesse Timmendequas were so horrific that he should not be sentenced to death for the
sexual assault and murder of 7-year-old Megan Kanka. New Jersey's state court abolished the death penalty in 2007, converted
to a life sentence with no possibility of parole and uphold his life sentence for kidnapping Megan Kanka. The court did not
render its decision based on mercy because Mr. Timmendequas was sexually victimized by in father when he was young boy.
See http://articles.philly.com/1997-06-11/news/25526762_1_sexual-assault-jesse-james-sexual-abuse. See also “. . .Begin Viewed Jews As The Master Race”, http://rense.com/general45/master.htm, Exhibit W1.
202) This Court must now must differentiate between the complaints of a person who is being victimized
now between the complaints of a bully whose forebears were crime victims but he himself is not. If this Court treats the
Respondents wholistically, it will see a pattern of behavior indicative of a predator who has thrown moral, social and legal
convention to the wind and preys on Gentiles with impunity. Examples of such predatory behavior by members of the Jewish
community include the following:
The lawsuit Stephen Unterberg
v. Jimmy Carter, Case 1:11-cv-00720-TPG; said the following on page 2: “. . .In truth, however, the book is filled
with demonstrable falsehoods, omissions, and knowing misrepresentations intended to promote carter's agenda of anti-Israel
propaganda. . .According to John Turley's article entitled “A Basis for Damages or Sanctions? Jimmy Carter Sued Over
His Book on Palestine, he says: “Former President Jimmy Carter has been named in a disturbing and clearly frivolous
lawsuit over over his representations on the Israeli-Palestinian Apartheid.” The five Petitioners are seeking $5 million,
but, in my view, should be held by Rule 11 sanctions in filing a vexatious and frivolous lawsuit. See http://jonathanturley.org/2011/02/16/jimmy-carter-sued-over-his-book-on-palestine/
203) There is a major similarity
between the illegal acts committed by the Respondents and by the Jews in those aforementioned acts. That similarity is intent.
In the case of all the individuals, their intent is: 1) to allow the unconstitutional encroachment of the Jewish religion;
2) to devalue and dehumanize Gentiles as a means to rationalize Jews' illegal acts; 3) to rely on the Talmudic doctrine
Law of the Moser to ensure that Jews do not report the illegal acts of lawbreaking Jews to the secular (Gentile)
authorities, and to ensure that those Gentiles who attempt to report the illegal acts of lawbreaking Jews are stopped by
fellow Jews; and 4) to hold uncooperative Gentiles out as anti-Semites deserving of a social death or as close to a real
death as possible. The Jew-controlled New York State judiciary will never allow C. Vernon Mason and Alton Maddox to retain
their law licenses, even in front of the glaring acts of crimes of sexual dysfunction by Jews Sol Wachtler, Eliot Spitzer
and Andrew Wiener, who, as the Court considers Petitioner's lawsuit, is running for Mayor of New York and electronically
sending out photos of his penis while he is sitting on the toilet at the same time. There is the lawsuit that members of
the Jewish community filed against a former U.S. President for having what amount to be an opposing opinion about Israel.
There is the case of brave Rabbi Nuchum Rosenberg's who has suffered mightily because his legal stance against the Talmudic
doctrine Law of the Moser, at the expense of vision in his left eye, being shot in his head by a BB gun, and being
shunned by members of his community for reporting acts of child abuse to the secular authorities. Lastly, also mentioned
are various halachic doctrines that hold Gentiles out to be worthless, not on equal standing with Jews legally, socially
or in any way that allows Gentiles to be considered “men.”
204) The sum total of Petitioner's living in an atmosphere where predatory Jews make fraudulent reference
to real acts of anti-Semitism that took place in the past in order to hide their illegal predation of Petitioner and her
children, based on the encroachment of racist Jewish religious doctrines Curse of Dark Skin and Law of the
Moser, has caused thirty-four (34) years of deprivation of Petitioner and her family's constitutional, civil, marital,
parental, social and financial rights. The Respondents' have staunchly refused to overtly acknowledge the legal relationship
between Petitioner, her children, and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, and have instead, referred to the same, tired, old
excuse of anti-Semitism to hide their crimes and to continue to prey on Petitioner and her children. For thirty-four (34)
years, Petitioner and her children were condemned to the same Jewish religious generational curse that condemned millions
of enslaved Africans to the permanent loss of their parents' proper African names, languages and customs associated with
those names, and the wealth and social status that would have passed on to African children had they been able to bear their
African forefathers' names. Because of the Respondents' determination to stop Petitioner from reporting the original crimes
that were perpetrated by those Respondents who helped Petitioner's ex-husband commit fraud and aggravated identity theft,
Petitioner and her children are now victims in a hateful, racist environment that forgives and gives second chances to lawbreaking
Jews, forever condemns the descendants of African slaves for being dark-skinned, and like the murderous pedophile Jesse
Timmendaguas, use past incidents of anti-Semitism to rationalize their abusive, hateful, predatory behavior towards Gentiles.
205) By reason of the foregoing
irrefutable allegations, Petitioner asserts that there exists a justiciable controversy with respect to which Petitioner
is entitled to the relief prayed for herein.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Five
206) Petitioner, her children, and African American attorneys C. Vernon Mason, Alton Maddox and Colin
Moore were subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment at the hands of the Respondents.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Six
207) Petitioner's, her children's
and African American attorneys C. Vernon's, Alton Maddox's and Colin Moore's right to recognition as persons before
the law was violated by the Petitioner.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Seven
208) Petitioner's, her children's and African American attorneys C. Vernon Mason's, Alton Maddox's
and Colin Moore's right to equal protection before the law was violated by the Petitioner; Petitioner's right not to
be was publicly discriminated against as a “wacko” because she has bipolar disorder, and Petitioner's right
to equal protection of the law was violated by the Respondents.
FOURTH
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Eight
209) Petitioner and African American attorneys C. Vernon, Alton Maddox and Colin Moore were deprived
of the right of obtaining an effective remedy by Respondents' competent national tribunals for acts Petitioner was falsely
accused of violating the law by the Respondents.
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Nine
210) Petitioner was subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention by the Respondents.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Ten
211) Petitioner's right to full equality to a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him was violated by the Respondents.
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR
RELIEF
Article Eleven
212) Petitioner's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty after being charged with various penal
offences was violated by the Petitioner. Petitioner's right not to be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence under national or international law was violated by the Respondents.
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article
Twelve
213) Petitioner
and African American attorneys C. Vernon, Alton Maddox and Colin Moore were subjected to arbitrary interference
with their privacy, their families and her home by the Respondents. Petitioner and African American attorneys
C. Vernon, Alton Maddox and Colin Moore were subjected to attacks upon her honour and reputation. Petitioner's right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attack was violated by the Respondents.
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Article Thirteen
214) Petitioner's right to freedom
of movement within Respondents State of New York and City of New York was violated by the Respondents. Petitioner's family's
right, as a natural and fundamental group unit of American society, being entitled to protection by society and the State,
was violated by the Respondents.
Article Twenty-One
215) Petitioner's right to equal access to public service
in his country was violated by the Respondents.
SPECIFIC UNITED STATES,
NEW YORK STATE AND NEW YORK CITY LAWS
THAT WERE VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENTS
First Amendment Mandate – Separation of Church and State
216) Petitioner repeats and realleges
the above paragraphs.
217)
With regard to all natural Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official capacities.
218) Petitioner is an American
citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.
219)
Petitioner is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12131(2).
220) Petitioner, her children and African American
attorneys C. Vernon, Alton Maddox and Colin Moore are descendant victims of the African Holocaust in which Africans,
whose sale was brokered by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the correct paternal name of her
African male forebears; and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the right from now to eternity
to have borne and to bear the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, as does Tara A. Uzamere, the adult child of the marriage
between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere and blood heir with the legal right to bear, and for her progeny
to bear the correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.
221) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family the
duty to report crimes that Petitioner's exhibits proved occurred.
222) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family the duty to uploading Petitioner's exhibits to PACER's
Electronic Court Filing System, the court's more efficient electronic filing system.
223) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family the duty of filing Petitioner's subpoena duces tecum
with Respondent U.S. Department of Homeland Security so as to leave no doubt regarding the identity of Petitioner's ex-ex-husband
and the father of Tara A. Uzamere, the child of the marriage.
224) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family the duty to challenge the Respondents criminally fraudulent
statements in paper and on the internet regarding Petitioner's ex-husband's identity;
225) Respondents owed Petitioner, her family and African
American attorneys C. Vernon, Alton Maddox and Colin Moore the First Amendment right to proceed without government's
encroachment of the Jewish religion to rationalize hiding their crimes.
226) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family their rights to freedom of speech by allowing Petitioner
to upload her exhibits on PACER.gov.
227) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family the right to to petition the government for a redress
of grievances PACER.gov, with by allowing Petitioner to upload her exhibits to PACER.gov.
228) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family their
Fifth Amendment right to due process by explaining the criteria of the term “too voluminous to upload” to give
Petitioner the chance to learn what was wrong with her exhibits, make the need changes and then be given a chance to upload
her exhibits; and,
229)
Respondents owed Petitioner and her family their Fifth Amendment right to due process by relying on the U.S. Supreme Court
legal doctrine “void for vagueness” by explaining what makes Petitioner's exhibits are too voluminous, by giving
Petitioner the opportunity to learn what Respondent Smith means by “too voluminous” so that Petitioner could
make repairs on said exhibits and upload them to PACER.gov.
230) Respondents owed Petitioner and her family the duty, pursuant to 5 USC §3331, to support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to bear true faith and allegiance
to the same; to take said obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and to well and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which Respondents entered. This requires the Respondents to establish a clear separation
of church and state, and to distance themselves from the Talmudic Law of the Moser in their application and enforcement
of the law. Respondents owed Petitioner and her children the duty to give themselves over to the transparency of U.S. law,
and not the secrecy of the Talmudic Law of the Moser.
231) Respondents failed in their duty to meet their legal obligations as detailed by the First Amendment
mandate regarding the separation of church and state. Respondents, at the behest of Respondent Garaufis and other Jewish
judiciary Respondents have conspired to force the tenets of the Talmud and other Jewish religious dogma on the Petitioner
based on the Talmud's viewpoint of the Petitioner's as a gentile/non-Jewish, African-American/schvartze slave to prevent
Petitioner from filing civil and criminal complaints against corrupt immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro
and Jack Gladstein.
232)
Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the Respondents, who, at the
clandestine behest of Respondents Judge Garaufis, Judge Schack, Judge Sunshine and Judge Gerstein, have continued the same
government-wide hostile environment that Petitioner complained about in her prior lawsuits, Uzamere vs. Uzamere
(Petitioner's divorce action) and Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv. Petitioner has been forced by
Respondent Garaufis to obey the Talmud, Tractate Abodah Zarah, folio 26b, Tractate Sanhedrin, folio 108b and footnote 34;
Jewish doctrine Law of the Moser, the doctrine that prohibits anyone from reporting the crimes of Jews to secular,
Gentile authorities; and the Curse of Black Skin, the doctrine that requires people of dark-skinned African descent
to be obedient to Jews and white people because dark-skinned Africans are meant to be slaves. In Petitioner's prior lawsuit
Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al Case Nos. 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv, Petitioner provided Respondent Garaufis with proof that
employees of Respondent New York State conspired with Respondent Shifrel of Respondent Daily News, LP , to defame the Petitioner
as an “anti-Semitic wacko”, to illegally publicize Petitioner's psychiatric and marital information to give
their false publicized statement regarding Petitioner's ex-husband being “Godwin Uzamere” believability. Respondent
Garaufis violated Petitioner's rights in the same manner by relying on the Talmud, Tractate Abodah Zarah, folio 26b and
the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser, not the U.S. Constitution to prevent the Petitioner from reporting the
commission of aggravated identity theft by corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
233) The courts of Respondent
United States of America recognize excessive entanglement of religion as an injury. In the case Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court ruled that government may not “excessively entangle” with religion. The
case involved two Pennsylvania laws: one permitting the state to “purchase” services in secular fields from religious
schools, and the other permitting the state to pay a percentage of the salaries of private school teachers, including teachers
in religious institutions. The Supreme Court found that the government was “excessively entangled” with religion,
and invalidated the statutes in question.
234) Petitioner submits that Respondents' violation of the First Amendment's Mandate to keep church and
government separate also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1985, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, such that Petitioner's Verified
Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural persons. Petitioner understands the U.S.
Supreme Court's application of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal to extend Bivens to agencies.
Respondents Violated The Americans With Disabilities Act Mandate
235) Petitioner repeats and realleges
the above paragraphs.
236)
With regard to all natural Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official capacities.
237) Petitioner is an American
citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.
238)
Petitioner is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12131(2).
239) Petitioner is a descendant victim of the African
Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the
correct paternal name of her African male forebears; and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the
right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; and that the aforesaid
right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.,
and for her progeny to bear the correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.
240) Respondents owed Petitioner
the duty, pursuant to Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, to prohibit the practice of disability discrimination.
As public entities, Respondents owed Petitioner the duty to comply with Title II regulations by the U.S. Department of Justice.
These regulations cover access to all programs and services offered by the entity. Access includes physical access described
in the ADA Standards for Accessible Design and programmatic access that might be obstructed by discriminatory policies or
procedures of the entity.
241)
Respondents failed in their duty to meet the obligations as detailed in Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act.
Respondents continue to discriminate against Petitioner based on Petitioner's status of having a mental illness because
Petitioner will not stop filing complaints against corrupt Jews immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack
Gladstein.
242)
The courts of Respondent the United States of America recognize discrimination based on disability as an injury. The Supreme
Court held in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), that “[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly regarded
as discrimination based on disability,” observing that “institutional placement of persons who can handle and
benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable of or unworthy
of participating in community life.” 527 U.S. at 597, 600.
243) Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because Petitioner is still under attack by all
the Respondents,who, at the clandestine behest of Respondent Garaufis, Judge Schack, Judge Sunshine and Judge Gerstein,
have continued the same government-wide hostile environment that Petitioner complained about in her prior lawsuit, Uzamere
vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv. Respondents continue to discriminate against Petitioner by using Petitioner's
status of having a mental illness to falsely and to publicly hold out that judicial Respondents will not allow Petitioner
to file criminal and civil complaints against corrupt Jewish Respondents corrupt immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey
Shapiro and Jack Gladstein because Petitioner's complaints are unintelligible based on her status of having a mental illness.19, 20, Respondents New York State, New York State Office of Mental Health, New York City, New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation, Brookdale Hospital Medical Center and their employees intentionally misdiagnosed Petitioner as
psychotic21 and violent so as to deprive Petitioner of her right to due process and equal protection under the law.
Respondents accused Petitioner of the commission of 18 USC §115, threatening a federal employee and discriminated against
the Petitioner by using her status of having a mental illness as an excuse to deprive her of the right to defend herself
in criminal court against said criminal charges. Proof of Respondent New York State's and New York City's continued conspiracy
to attack the Petitioner based on her status of having a mental illness is at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-11-05/local/17938323_1_supreme-court-judge-criminal-court; and http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202435221996&slreturn=20120729115138; see Daily News article dated November 5, 2009 in which staff writer Scott Shifrel publicly defames Petitioner
as a “wacko.”
244)
Petitioner submits that Respondents' violation of the Title II, Americans With Disabilities Mandate to integrate Petitioner
also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 USC §1985, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises
to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural persons. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application
of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal to extend Bivens to agencies.
Respondents Violated Sixth Amendment Mandate
245) Petitioner repeats and realleges the above paragraphs.
246) With regard to all natural Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their
official capacities.
247)
Petitioner is an American citizen with a serious, persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.
248) Petitioner is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12131(2).
249) Petitioner is a descendant
victim of the African Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost
the ability to bear the correct paternal name of her African male forebears; and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor
Uzamere, now retains the right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere;
and that the aforesaid right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent
Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, and for her progeny to bear the correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere.
250)
On or around June 22, 2011, Respondent Garaufis rendered in decision for Petitioner's civil rights action which said the
following:
“Petitioner's
most recent Complaint—one of at least five she has filed with this court—is 89-pages long and is accompanied
by 589 pages of exhibits. Petitioner has also sent at least 60 pages of faxes directly to chambers, purporting to be in
connection with her most recent action. The substance of Petitioners Complaint—if one can be discerned—concerns,
among other things, her divorce from Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; a defamation claim filed against the Daily News; a Departmental
Disciplinary Committee complaint filed against the attorney representing the Daily News; and other state court actions,
including a state court action against the attorneys who represented her former husband. (Compi. at 27-45.) Petitioner has
a long, tired history of vexatious litigation in this court. See Uzamere v. State of New York, No. 09-cv-2703 (E.D.N.Y.
July 9, 2009).”
Respondent Garaufis' judgment
regarding Petitioner's civil rights action was biased. It did not address the acts of fraud, identity theft or aggravated
theft perpetrated by corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein that Petitioner proved in
her civil rights action Nor did Respondent Garaufis' address Petitioner's contentions regarding the Court's discrimination
against Petitioner based on her having a mental illness. Respondent Garaufis' judicial commentary did not address most of
the issues Petitioner discussed in her civil rights action (“. . .a unanimous Supreme Court has admonished that pro
se in forma pauperis complaints must be read with tolerance: Dismissal is impermissible unless the court can
say “with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears 'beyond doubt that the Petitioner can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594,
595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
(1957), reaffirmed in Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292.) The judgment condemned the Verified Complaint's number
of pages and the numbers of complaints Petitioner filed with the Court (“. . .but a complaint filed in forma
pauperis is not subject to dismissal simply because the Petitioner is litigious. The number of complaints a poor person
files does not alone justify peremptory dismissal. In each instance, the substance of the impoverished person's claim is
the appropriate measure. Crisafi v. Holland, et al, 655 F2d 1305) Respondent Garaufis admits that he has difficulty
in understanding the substance of Petitioner's complaint based on his statement: “The substance of Petitioner's Complaint
– if one can be discerned. . .” Respondent Garaufis' displayed even more mean-spirited bias with regard to all
of Petitioner's actions when he said in his statement: “Petitioner has a long, tired history of vexatious litigation
in this court. Respondent Garaufis engaged in an act of racketeering, obstruction of justice and criminal facilitation of
aggravated identity theft by rendering an FRCP-lacking, memorandum-lacking decision regarding Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et
al, 11-CV-2831 for the sole purpose of: 1) advancing the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser; 2) not filing
a criminal complaint against corrupt, dishonest, lying, racketeering, racist Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye,
Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein for their fraudulent commission of 3) trick Petitioner into believing that a res
judicata determination – a purely civil adjudicative function – was a permanent and final determination
to nullify and render harmless corrupt Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's, and Mortimer
Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of aggravated identity theft – a wrongful act for which the correct criminal
adjudicative function of double jeopardy was never attached because the crime was never tried; and, 4) Respondent Bloom's
commission of misprision of felony racketeering, obstruction of justice, criminal facilitation of aggravated identity theft
and fraud upon the court as well.
251) Respondents owed Petitioner the duty, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, to provide Petitioner with
defense counsel and witnesses in Petitioner's favor, More importantly, Respondents owed Petitioner the right to confront
Respondents' adversarial witnesses in order to prevent Petitioner from being prosecuted based on what turned out to be the
falsified hearsay of the Respondents.
252) Respondents failed to meet the obligations as detailed in the Sixth Amendment. Respondents accused
Petitioner of the commission of 18 USC §111(a), simple assault and 18 USC §115, threatening federal employees
and then deprived Petitioner of her Sixth Amendment rights to notice of accusation, witnesses and appointment of defense
counsel even though Respondents' criminal accusation against the Petitioner required them to file a criminal complaint pursuant
to 18 USC §4, misprision of felony. Petitioner strongly alleges that Respondent Garaufis, in orchestrating the conspiracy
with Respondent U.S. Marshal Service, Respondent Denis P. McGowan of Respondent the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
and Respondents of the New York State and New York City mental health agencies, has opened the means by which, at any of
the Respondents can accuse Petitioner of any crime and prevent Petitioner from speaking to an attorney. Petitioner alleges
that the only way that Petitioner can avoid Respondents' intimidation, false criminal allegations and Respondents ' use
of psychiatric inpatient hospitalization as a substitute for prison is by keeping silent and not filing papers against corrupt
Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
253) Petitioner has suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the
Respondents, who, at the clandestine behest of Respondent Garaufis, have continued the same government-wide hostile environment
that Petitioner complained about in her prior lawsuit, Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv. Respondents
continue to wrongfully accused Petitioner of the commission of 18 USC §115, threatening federal employees; nor have
the Respondents sent correspondence apologizing for wrongfully accusing Petitioner of a crime she did not commit; however,
Respondents continue to deprive Petitioner of the right to be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the criminal
accusation Respondents raised against Petitioner, to allow Petitioner to confront adversarial witnesses and witnesses in
Petitioner's defense, and to have the assistance of counsel. In Petitioner's prior lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al
Case Nos. 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv, Petitioner provided Respondent Garaufis with proof that Respondent New York State conspired
with Respondent Daily News, by Respondent former staff writer Scott Shifrel to defame Petitioner as a “wacko”,
to hold Petitioner out at a violent criminal for a crime or which Petitioner was eventually declared not guilty –
as she was declared not guilty when Respondent McCarthy – a federal attorney – falsely accused Petitioner of
committing 18 USC §111(a), simple assault – while Petitioner was 260 miles away in Brooklyn, New York. Respondent
Garaufis and the other Respondents – most of whom are Jews, have revisited the same act of fraud for the same reason
– to enforce the Jewish religious doctrine Law of the Moser to prevent Petitioner from filing complaints against corrupt
Jewish attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein, who hid and continue to hide their aggravated identity
theft on behalf of their client, Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, thereby depriving Petitioner and her daughter Tara of the
right to bear Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's name.
254) The courts of Respondent United States of America recognizes a poor Respondent in a criminal case
that does not have counsel as an injury. proceeding In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court
ruled that in all federal cases, counsel would have to be appointed for Respondents who were too poor to hire their own.
255) The courts of Respondent
the United States of America recognize that a criminal Respondent not having been given a notice of accusation an injury.
Individuals who have been accused of a serious federal offense have the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1881) that “in
an indictment ... it is not sufficient to set forth the offense in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves
fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute
the offense intended to be punished.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court
increased the scope of the Confrontation Clause by ruling that “testimonial” out-of-court statements are inadmissible
if the accused did not have the opportunity to cross-examine that accuser and that accuser is unavailable at trial.
256) Petitioner submits that
Respondents' violation of the Sixth Amendment's mandate to provide the accused Petitioner with witnesses, and with an attorney
for her defense also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1985, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, such that Petitioner's Verified
Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural persons. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme
Court's application of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal to extend Bivens to agencies.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, §601
Nondiscrimination
in Federally Assisted Programs
257) Petitioner repeats and realleges the above paragraphs.
258) With regard to all natural Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their
official capacities.
259)
Petitioner is an American citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities.
260) Petitioner is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12131(2).
261) Petitioner is a descendant
victim of the African Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost
the ability to bear the correct paternal name of her African male forebears; having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere,
Petitioner now retains the right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere;
and that the aforesaid right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent
Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, and for her progeny to bear the correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere.
262)
Respondents owed Petitioner the duty, pursuant to the Civil Act of 1964, §601, to ensure that no person in the United
States, including the Petitioner, shall be excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against on the ground
of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
263) Respondents failed to meet the obligations as
detailed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondents discriminated and continue to discriminate against Petitioner based
on the Talmudic view of Gentiles in general, and blacks in particular. Petitioner's ethnicity as a gentile/African-American/schvartze.
See documentation regarding the Curse of Dark Skin and Law of the Moser attached as Exhibit
Q. In addition, while refusing to accept from the Petitioner irrefutable proof of Jews Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey
Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's, Mortimer Zuckerman's and Scott Shifrel's commission of misprision of felony, fraud, identity
theft, aggravated identity theft, racketeering, obstruction of justice and extortion/blackmail, Respondent Barack H. Obama,
Andrew Weissman, General Counsel for Respondent Federal Bureau of Investigation, James X. Dempsey, Respondent, Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Elisebeth Collins Cook, Respondent, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; David Medine,
Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Rachel L. Brand, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; and
Patricia M. Wald, Respondent, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board; Keith B. Alexander, General, National Security
Agency; Rajesh De, General Counsel, National Security Agency; Eric H. Holder; U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice;
Charles Schumer, Senate Judiciary Committee; Dianne Feinstein, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairperson; Senator
Saxby Chambliss, Patrick Leahy, Senator Judiciary Chairman, Hon. Goodlatte, Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary Chairman, Mike
Rogers, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Marshals Service Director Charles Dunne, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Federal Protection Service, Threat Assessment Branch employee Denis P. McGowan, FBI Assistant Director
in Charge, George Venizelos and Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis engaged in overseeing a criminal, unconstitutional system of government
that specifically discriminated against the law-abiding, psychiatric-treatment-compliant, mentally disabled Gentile/Schvartze/African
American Petitioner by allowing Respondent Judge Garaufis and other Jews to fraudulently use the PATRIOT Act to spy on non-criminal,
constitutionally-protected telephone calls regarding Petitioner's HIPAA-protected mental health and other HIPAA-protected
issues; that said telephone calls were spied on at the behest of Respondent Judge Garaufis and other Jews, not based on
the belief that the Petitioner had violated the law, but to enslave the Petitioner by extorting/blackmailing her; by using
Petitioner's confidential, non-content information regarding Petitioner's telephone calls to her outpatient psychiatric
care provider that maybe embarrassing or shameful if publicly disseminated; to fraudulently accuse the Petitioner of the
commission of a crime and to associate the fraudulent criminal allegation with Petitioner's confidential non-content information;
to frighten the Petitioner by publicizing embarrassing or shameful information associated with Petitioner's psychiatric
non-content information for the sole purpose of forcing the Petitioner not to petition the government for a redress of grievances
with regard to Petitioner's First Amendment right to report the activities of lawbreaking Jews to the secular/Gentile law
enforcement authorities; that those Jews' violation of Petitioner's and other Gentiles' right to privacy is based on the
Talmudic doctrine for Jews to enslave Gentiles, with an emphasis on the enslavement of people who are dark-skinned or considered
by Jews to be Africans, Cushites, Hamites and Canaanites. See Exhibit Q. In the meantime, Respondents
Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Mortimer Zuckerman and Scott Shifrel, who engaged in illegally obtaining
and publicly disseminating information regarding the crime (for which Petitioner was falsely accused, for which Respondents
never had any intention of confronting Petitioner in any court of laws and that was eventually dismissed), Petitioner's
mental illness and her marriage and who are still engaging in misprision of felony, fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity
theft, racketeering, obstruction of justice and extortion/blackmail have never been investigated for the continued commission
of their crimes.
264)
Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the Respondents, who, at the
clandestine behest of Respondent Garaufis, have continued the same government-wide hostile environment that Petitioner complained
about in her prior lawsuit, Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv. Respondents continue to deprive Petitioner
of her civil rights because Petitioner is a gentile/schvartze. In the case of disruptive Jewish litigant Rebecca Gloria Yohalem,
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Jewish judge Joanna Seybert accepted the Jewish litigant's virtually unintelligible lawsuit.
In Respondent Boyle's order regarding the disruptive, Jewish litigant, he said:
“The pro se Petitioner appeared in court today for an initial
conference, after having failed to appear at two prior initial conferences. Her action purports to be one under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, based on assault, kidnapping and other various general allegations that allegedly occurred at one or more mental
health facilities in New York. The pro se Petitioner is virtually deaf and it is therefore difficult for her to participate
in any meaningful way in this litigation - whether it involves interaction with opposing counsel or the Court. As a result
of this severe limitation, the Petitioner’s conduct was invariably nonresponsive, which undoubtedly led to her frustration
at the conference, which, in turn, led to her disruptive behavior in the courtroom after the initial conference was concluded.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court strongly recommends
that the pro se Petitioner seek counsel by contacting William M. Brooks, Professor of Law at the Touro College Jacob
D. Fuchsberg Law Center. Touro Law Center has been designated, along with other organizations, as an ombudsperson by the
State of New York, under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness program (“PAIMI”), to
represent patients and former patients at mental hospitals in the State of New York. These duties are apparently carried
out by the Law Center through the Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, which is primarily responsible for patients in the Long
Island area, and of which Professor Brooks is the director. He may be contacted by telephone at (631) 761-7086.”
265) Respondent Boyle was even
able to “purport” a cause of action from the mentally disabled Jewish Petitioner's difficult-to-read complaint.
In yet another act of pro-Jew favoritism, the court, at the behest of Respondent Jewish judge Joanna Seybert, the Jewish
litigant was allowed to appear – for the third initial conference after missing the first two. During the third initial
conference, the Jewish litigant became disruptive. See Complaint of Rebecca Gloria Yohalem attached as Exhibit
O.
266) However,
although the African-American Petitioner went to college to become a paralegal and made the Dean's List twice, has shown
the ability to teach herself federal procedural law (FRCP/FRAP/Rules of the Supreme Court), federal statutes, Constitutional
law, appellate case law and to apply them to her Verified Complaint on her own and in spite of her mental illness, the only
reactions that Petitioner has received from corrupt, racist Respondent Garaufis and the other Respondents is their mistreatment
of the Petitioner both as a Gentile and as the descendant of African slaves. See Petitioner's Dean's List certificates attached
as Exhibit P.
267) The courts of Respondent the United States of America recognize that discrimination based on race
is an injury. Discrimination based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Pub.L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, enacted July 2, 1964) was a landmark piece of legislation in the United States
that outlawed major forms of discrimination against racial, ethnic, national and religious minorities, and women. It ended
unequal application of voter registration requirements and racial segregation in schools, at the workplace and by facilities
that served the general public.
268)
Petitioner submits that Respondents' violation of Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, §601 because Petitioner's is an
“inferior” gentile/African-American/schvartze who continues to file complaints against corrupt “superior”
Jews immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1985, conspiracy against
civil rights such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural
persons only. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal to
extend Bivens to agencies.
Respondents are a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization
269) Petitioner repeats and realleges
the above paragraphs.
270)
With regard to all natural Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official capacities.
271) Petitioner is an American
citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.
272)
Petitioner is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12131(2).
273) Petitioner is a descendant victim of the African
Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the
correct paternal name of her African male forebears; and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the
right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; and that the aforesaid
right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere,
and for her progeny to bear the correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.
274) Respondents owed Petitioner
the duty not to engage in racketeering behavior for the purpose of making Petitioner a victim of honest services fraud at
the hands of the Respondents, thereby preventing Petitioner and her daughter, Tara from retaining the correct African name
that they should have received from Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, based on Respondent New York City's and the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security's recognition of Petitioner's and her daughter Tara's relationship with Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere
through marriage and bloodline.
275)
Respondents failed to meet their obligation by not engaging in those behaviors that are indicative of a racketeering-influenced,
corrupt organization as detailed in 18 USC 18 USC §§1961–1968. Respondents engaged in racketeering for the
sole purpose of 1) advancing the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser so as to prevent Petitioner from filing her complaint
against corrupt, Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein, thereby forever depriving
Petitioner and her daughter Tara of their right to bear the African name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. Petitioner
alleges that the only way that Petitioner can avoid Respondents' racketeering is by keeping silent and not filing papers
against corrupt Jewish Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
276) Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the Respondents,
who, at the clandestine behest of Respondent Garaufis, have continued the same government-wide hostile environment that
Petitioner complained about in her prior lawsuit, Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv. Petitioner holds
that Respondent Garaufis and rest of the Respondents engaged in racketeering by engaging in the following acts, to wit:
a) that Respondents Allen E.
Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and Osato Eugene Uzamere engaged in racketeering in that they committed 18 USC §1028,
thereby 1) knowingly and without lawful authority, produced a false identification document knowing that such document was
produced without lawful authority; 2) knowingly possessed a false identification document with the intent that such document
be used to defraud the United States; 3) knowingly transferred the fraudulent affirmations to Respondent the New York State
Unified Court System without lawful authority; 4) transferred a means of identification of another person with the intent
to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or
that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law; with all the Respondents' goal to complete their act
of racketeering by ensuring that Petitioner and her daughter Tara never be able to file her complaint against corrupt Jewish
immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein, and thereby forever be deprived of their right to
bear Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere's correct African name.
b) that Respondents Garaufis, Schack, Sunshine, Cutrona and Gerstein engaged in racketeering in that they
committed 18 USC §1512 in that they used physical force and the threat of physical force with the intent to: 1) prevent
Petitioner's testimony against corrupt Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein; 2)
that the aforesaid Respondents caused Petitioner to withhold her testimony against corrupt Jewish immigration attorneys
Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein; 3) that the aforesaid Respondent – especially Respondent Schack forced
Petitioner to be absent from an official proceeding to which that person has been summoned by legal process; 4) That the
aforementioned Respondents knowingly uses intimidation, threats, and corruptly persuaded the New York City Police Department
and the New York City Fire Department, with the intent to prevent Petitioner from giving testimony regarding the commission
of aggravated identity theft by corrupt Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein conspiracy.
c) that Respondent Osato E. Uzamere
engaged in racketeering in that he committed 18 USC §1543, false use of passport. Respondent Osato E. Uzamere falsely
made a copy of an instrument purporting to be the passport of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, with intent that the same
may be used in court by Respondent Sunshine as a means to pretend to identify Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. See copies
of passport bearing the number A0588053 but bearing no name is attached as Exhibit C;
d) that Respondent Osato E. Uzamere
engaged in racketeering in that he committed 18 USC 1028A, false use of a social security number. Respondent Osato E. Uzamere
falsely made a copy of an instrument bearing the number 129-64-1205 purporting to be the social security number of “Godwin
Uzamere”, a fictitious identity that was used to defraud the Petitioner. See copy of instrument bearing false social
security number attached as Exhibit C.
277) The courts of Respondent the United States of America recognize that obstruction of justice caused
by racketeering influenced, corrupt organizations as an injury. RICO laws were successfully cited in NOW v. Scheidler,
510 U.S. 249, 114 S. Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed. 2d 99 (1994), a suit in which certain parties, including the National Organization
for Women, sought damages and an injunction against pro-life activists who physically block access to abortion clinics.
Amazingly, the Court held that a RICO enterprise does not need an economic motive, and that the Pro-Life Action Network could
therefore qualify as a RICO enterprise. In the federal lawsuit against judges Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella, federal
grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania handed down a 48-count indictment against former Luzerne County Court of
Common Pleas Judges Michael Conahan and Mark Ciavarella. The judges were charged with RICO after allegedly committing acts
of wire fraud, mail fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, and honest services fraud. The judges were accused of taking kickbacks
for housing juveniles, that the judges convicted for mostly petty crimes, at a private detention center. The incident was
dubbed by many local and national newspapers as the “Kids for cash scandal”. On February 18, 2011, a federal
jury found Michael Ciavarella guilty of racketeering because of his involvement in accepting illegal payments from Robert
Mericle, the developer of PA Child Care, and Attorney Robert Powell, a co-owner of the facility. Ciavarella is facing 38
other counts in federal court.
278)
Petitioner submits that Respondents' commission of racketeering violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1985, conspiracy against civil rights
such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural persons only.
Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal to extend
Bivens to agencies.
Fraud upon the Court
279) Petitioner repeats and realleges
the above paragraphs.
280)
With regard to all natural Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official capacities.
281) Petitioner is an American
citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.
282)
Petitioner is a qualified individual with disabilities within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §12131(2).
283) Petitioner is a descendant victim of the African
Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the
correct paternal name of her African male forebears; and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the
right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; and that the aforesaid
right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, blood heir and the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere, and for her progeny to bear the correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie Edobor
Uzamere.
284) Respondents
owed Petitioner the duty to provide her with honest judicial services, free from fraud. Respondents owed Petitioner the
duty to render decisions in her lawsuits that were reflective of their recognition of the aggravated identity theft committed
by Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and Osato E. Uzamere. Respondents owed Petitioner the duty
to file a criminal instrument against the aforementioned attorney, and to not allow their own Talmudic bias to affect their
obligation to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; to take said obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and to well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which Respondents entered. Respondents owed Petitioner the
duty to establish a clear separation of church and state, and to distance themselves from the Talmudic Law of the Moser
in their application and enforcement of the law. Respondents owed Petitioner and her children the duty to give themselves
over to the transparency of U.S. law, and not the secrecy of the Talmudic Law of the Moser – a stupid law
that is stupid for Respondents to enforce since the Respondents actively keep said law secret from Gentiles. It is stupid
for Respondents to force Petitioner – and the public at large – to obey a law that they do not know they are
supposed to obey and is not transparently included in any normal law code.
285) Respondents failed to meet the obligations as detailed in Bulloch v. United States. Respondent
judges engaged rendering fraudulent decisions, and then commenced a extortionate shakedown from the judicial positions of
Respondents Garaufis, Schack, Sunshine and Gerstein for the sole purpose of advancing the Talmudic doctrine Law of the
Moser so as to prevent Petitioner from filing her complaint against corrupt, Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye,
Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein, thereby forever depriving Petitioner and her daughter Tara of their right to bear the
African name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere. Petitioner alleges that the only way that Petitioner can avoid Respondents'
intimidation, false criminal allegations and Respondents' racial discrimination against her is by keeping silent and not
filing papers against corrupt Jewish Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
286) Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury
because she is still under attack by all the Respondents judges has have rendered biased decisions designed to hide Respondent
judges' commission of misprision of felony with regard to Respondents Allen E. Kaye's, Harvey Shapiro's, Jack Gladstein's
and Osato E. Uzamere's commission of aggravated identity theft. Respondents, at the clandestine behest of Respondent Garaufis,
have continued the same government-wide hostile environment that Petitioner complained about in her prior lawsuit, Uzamere
vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv. In every single case in which Petitioner presented irrefutable proof that immigration
attorney Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein engaged in criminally facilitating the immigration fraud and identity
fraud of Petitioner's ex-husband, the Respondent judge in that case would render a decision that would ignore Respondent
attorneys of any criminal liability, or worse, they conspired with other Respondents to accuse Petitioner of being too mentally
disabled and violent to use the court system. The Respondent judges acted, not as judges, but as Talmudic attorneys for
the corrupt, Jewish immigration attorneys, leaving the position of judge unfilled by a U.S. Constitution-obeying, unbiased
judge. Their actions stink of fraud upon the court, which under the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Tenth Circuit,
renders any decision rendered by them null and void. Lastly, Respondent Jewish judges rendered fictitious decision to their
their true motive – to Talmud-based decisions against the Petitioner because she is Gentile, because she is black-skinned,
and because of the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser that prohibits the Respondents from directly or indirectly
filing complaints against corrupt Jewish immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein. See Respondent
Daily News article dated November 5, 2009, attached as Exhibit R.
287) The courts of Respondent the United States of
America recognize that fraud upon the court is an injury. In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1985), the court stated “Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and
is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. . .It is where the court or a member
is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus
where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.” Fraud upon the court is an injury because
it deprives a litigant of the court's most valuable “commodity” – justice.
288) Petitioner submits to this Court that Respondent
Judge Garaufis' commencement and orchestration to defame Petitioner as psychotic and violent to stop her from filing her
appeal against his FRCP-lacking, memorandum-lacking decision are irrefutable proof that his decision in Petitioner's lawsuit
Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al was biased, and is an act of fraud upon the court the violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1985, conspiracy
against civil rights such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are
natural persons only. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal
to extend Bivens to agencies.
Respondents' Blacklisting Of Petitioner
Violates 42 U.S.C. §1983, §1985
289) Petitioner repeats and realleges the above paragraphs.
290) With regard to all Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official
capacities.
291)
Petitioner is an American citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially
limits one of more major life activities.
292) Petitioner is a descendant victim of the African Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered
by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the correct paternal name of her African male forebears;
and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear
the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; and that the aforesaid right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, blood heir and
the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, and for her progeny to bear the
correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.
293) Respondents owed Petitioner the duty to not blacklist Petitioner in the Jewish Respondents' continued
attempts to stop filing criminal complaints against Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein. Respondents
owed Petitioner the duty to make their federally-financed outpatient mental health and other programs available to the Petitioner
program free from fraud. Respondents owed Petitioner the duty to recognize Petitioner's complaints against the aforementioned
attorneys as true, and not trick Petitioner into believing that Respondents' blacklisting were legitimate acts brought on
by wrongful acts by the Petitioner. Respondents owed Petitioner the duty not to render Petitioner persona non grata based
on the Jewish Respondents' desire to enforce the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser, that prohibits Jews from
indirectly or directly filing complaints against fellow Jews who have violated secular law.
294) Respondents failed to meet the obligations as
detailed in 42 USC §1983, 1985. Respondent judges engaged in blacklisting the Petitioner from the New York State courts,
from the federal courts, and from receiving outpatient mental health services, in order to engage in racketeering/obstruction
of justice for the sole purpose of advancing the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser, that prohibits Jews from indirectly
or directly reporting the wrongdoings of fellow Jews to the secular/gentile authorities. Petitioner alleges that the only
way that Petitioner can avoid Respondents' blacklisting, intimidation, false criminal allegations and Respondents' racial
discrimination against her is by keeping silent and not filing a criminal complaint against corrupt Jewish Respondents Allen
E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
295) Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the Respondents
like FEGS, Inc., who still have Petitioner listed as persona non grata for life. Respondent judges Eileen A. Rakower and
Nicholas Garaufis have come to Respondent FEGS aid, by allowing FEGS to blacklist Petitioner because Petitioner used Respondent
FEGS, Inc Services for complaining against Respondents Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein's commission of aggravated
identity theft. See Respondent Daily News article dated November 5, 2009, attached as Exhibit R.
296) The courts of Respondent
the United States of America recognize that blacklisting is an injury – and a constitutional tort as well. Mr. Justice
Black in his concurring opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court case Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 144-145, 71 S.Ct. 624, 634 (1951): stated: “Our basic law, however, wisely withheld authority for resort
to executive. . . condemnations and blacklists as a substitute for imposition of legal types of penalties by courts following
trial and conviction in accordance with procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights.”
297) Petitioner submits to this Court that the Respondents
– especially the Jewish Respondents' orchestration of a hostile environment to exclude Petitioner from government-financed
judicial, legal, and medical services to prevent Petitioner from reporting the aforesaid Jewish immigration attorneys' commission
of aggravated identity theft to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1983 and §1985,
conspiracy against civil rights such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents
who are natural persons only. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application of Bivens to natural persons
and its refusal to extend Bivens to agencies.
Respondents Invaded Petitioner's
Privacy Based on Intentional Misuse of NSL
or Based on Obtaining Non-NSL, Non-Content Information
Illegally
298)
Petitioner repeats and realleges the above paragraphs.
299) With regard to all Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official
capacities.
300)
Petitioner is an American citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially
limits one of more major life activities.
301) Petitioner is a descendant victim of the African Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered
by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the correct paternal name of her African male forebears;
and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear
the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; and that the aforesaid right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, blood heir and
the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, and for her progeny to bear the
correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.
302) Respondents owed Petitioner the duty not to invade Petitioner's privacy by using the non-content
information regarding Petitioner's telephone calls to psychiatric service providers and to government healthcare providers
to accuse Petitioner of crimes that were used to illegally rationalize Respondent Garaufis' dismissal of Petitioner's civil
rights action. Respondents owed Petitioner the duty not to invade Petitioner's privacy by using the non-content information
regarding Petitioner's telephone calls to psychiatric care providers and government healthcare providers to illegally rationalize
extortionate/threatening telephone calls and visits to Petitioner's home. Respondents owed Petitioner the duty not to invade
Petitioner's privacy by using the non-content information regarding Petitioner's telephone calls to psychiatric service
providers and government healthcare providers to accuse Petitioner of crimes that were used to kidnap Petitioner and unlawfully
imprison/illegally misdiagnose Petitioner for crimes that she never commit.
303) Respondents failed to meet the obligations as detailed in 18 USC §2709 and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Respondents, in their haste to libel Petitioner as a violent, lawbreaking “wacko”
to make Petitioner's complaint against them appear to be unbelievable, Respondent judges conspired with Respondents Jewish
billionaire Mortimer Zuckerman and Jewish staff writer Scott Shifrel of the Daily News, LP to disseminate confidential, nonpublic
information regarding Petitioner's mental illness and her marriage on paper and in the internet – with the internet
still disseminating the false story regarding the Petitioner. Petitioner is still being attacked by several members of the
Jewish community to prevent her from successfully filing her complaint against the original lawbreaking attorneys, corrupt
immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
304) Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the Respondents.
See Respondent Daily News article dated November 5, 2009, attached as Exhibit R.
305) The courts of Respondent the United States of
America recognize the intentional misuse of an NSL as an injury – and a constitutional tort as well. Mr. Justice Black
in his concurring opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court case Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 144-145, 71 S.Ct. 624, 634 (1951): stated: “Our basic law, however, wisely withheld authority for resort to executive.
. .condemnations and blacklists as a substitute for imposition of legal types of penalties by courts following trial and
conviction in accordance with procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights.”
306) Petitioner submits to this Court that the Respondents – especially the Jewish Respondents'
orchestration of a hostile environment to exclude Petitioner from government-financed judicial, legal, and psychiatric services
to prevent Petitioner from reporting the aforesaid Jewish immigration attorneys' commission of fraud, identity theft and
aggravated identity theft to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 USC §1983 and §1985, conspiracy
against civil rights such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises to the level of an action in the manner of Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural
persons only. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application of Bivens to natural persons and its
refusal to extend Bivens to agencies.
Congressional Respondents
Engaged in Campaign Bribery to Advance the Talmudic Law of the Moser;
Congressional Respondents
Deprived Petitioner and Gentiles of Honest Services
307) Petitioner repeats and realleges the above paragraphs.
308) With regard to all Respondents, this claim is brought against them individually and in their official
capacities.
309)
Petitioner is an American citizen with a serious and persistent mental illness. Petitioner has a mental impairment that substantially
limits one of more major life activities.
310) Petitioner is a descendant victim of the African Holocaust in which Africans, whose sale was brokered
by Jews and kidnapped by whites, forever lost the ability to bear the correct paternal name of her African male forebears;
and having married Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, now retains the right from now to eternity to have borne and to bear
the name of Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; and that the aforesaid right is retained by Tara A. Uzamere, blood heir and
the adult child of the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, and for her progeny to bear the
correct Edo/Bini name and culture associated with Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere.
311) Respondent Jeffries and his congressional staff, owed Petitioner the duty, pursuant to 18 USC §4,
to report the crimes that Petitioner reported to him to the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and other Respondents. Petitioner alleges that Respondent Jeffries and his congressional staff had, in de
jure, than a de facto22 responsibility to the Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner's criminal complaint would be investigated or
would be presented to Respondents U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for investigation.
312) Respondent Jeffries, his
congressional staff and Jews who contributed financially to Respondent Jeffries' congressional campaign owed Petitioner
the duty to ensure that they not engage in quid pro quo campaign contributions that were provided/accepted
with the understanding that the aforementioned were bribes used to require Respondent Jeffries and his staff to engage in
activities that would advance Jewish religion and culture, including the Talmudic doctrine Law of the Moser, at
the expense of violating the civil rights of Gentile constituents, especially the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses
of the U.S. Constitution.
313)
Respondent Jeffries, his congressional staff and Jews who contributed financially to Respondent Jeffries' congressional campaign
owed Petitioner the duty to allow her the same type of free access to to call and visit Respondent Jeffries' offices as
the Jews who contributed money to Respondent Jeffries' congressional campaign, and to not conspire to blacklist the Petitioner
based on her insistence to obtain help from Respondent Jeffries to report those Respondents – especially those Respondents
who are Jewish, for Respondents' commission of misprision of felony, fraud, deprivation of rights under color of law, conspiracy
to interfere with civil rights, racketeering, obstruction of justice, extortion/blackmail, blacklisting and violation of
the PATRIOT Act.
314)
Respondent Jeffries and his congressional staff, failed in their duty, pursuant to 18 USC §4, to report the crimes
that Petitioner reported to him, to the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and other Respondents.
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Jeffries and his congressional staff failed in their in de jure, or de facto
responsibility to the Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner criminal complaint would be investigated or would be presented
to Respondents U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for investigation.
315) Respondent Jeffries, his congressional staff and
Jews who contributed financially failed in their duty to ensure that they not engage in qui pro quo campaign contributions
that were provided/accepted with the understanding that the aforementioned were bribes used to require Respondent Jeffries
and his staff to engage in activities that would advance Jewish religion and culture, including the Talmudic doctrine Law
of the Moser, the prohibits Jews from reporting crimes of fellow Jews to the secular/Gentile authorities, at the expense
of violating the civil rights of Gentile constituents, especially the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.
316)
Respondent Jeffries, his congressional staff and Jews who contributed financially to Respondent Jeffries' congressional campaign
failed in their duty to allow Petitioner the same type of free access to to call and visit Respondent Jeffries' offices
as the Jews who contributed money to Respondent Jeffries' congressional campaign; that Respondent Jeffries, his congressional
staff and Jews who contributed financially to Respondent Jeffries' congressional campaign failed in their duty not to conspire
to blacklist the Petitioner based on her insistence to obtain help against those Jews whom Petitioner has proven committed
misprision of felony, fraud, deprivation of rights under color of law, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, racketeering,
obstruction of justice, extortion/blackmail and blacklisting.
317) Petitioner suffered and continues to suffer injury because she is still under attack by all the Respondents.
See Respondent Daily News article dated November 5, 2009, attached as Exhibit R.
318) The courts of Respondent the United States of
America recognize the acceptance of a bribe by a public servant as a injury cognizable in law.
319) Petitioner submits to this Court that the Respondents
– especially the Jewish Respondents' orchestration of a hostile environment to exclude Petitioner from government-financed
judicial, legal, and psychiatric services to prevent Petitioner from reporting the aforesaid Jewish immigration attorneys'
commission of fraud, identity theft and aggravated identity theft to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
42 USC §1983 and §1985, conspiracy against civil rights such that Petitioner's Verified Complaint rises to the
level of an action in the manner of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 with regard to those Respondents who are natural persons only. Petitioner understands the U.S. Supreme Court's application
of Bivens to natural persons and its refusal to extend Bivens to agencies.
320) As stated earlier, Petitioner wishes this honourable
Commission to understand that although the following federal procedural laws do not operate in the United Nations' jurisdiction,
what does operate in the United Nations's jurisdiction is Article Eight which says: “Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution
or by law require the courts of members nations to provide.” By showing that the Respondents violated national legal
mandates, Petitioner clearly establishes that Respondents also violated the international legal mandates.
This Court Must Enforce 28 USC §455, 28 USC §1404, 28 USC §1654 and 28 USC §144
to Protect Pro Se Petitioner's Right to Self-Representation
321) 28 USC §144 says: “Whenever a party
to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter
is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed
no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.”
322) 28 USC §455 says: “(a) Any justice,
judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (5) He or his spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person.”
323) 28 USC §1404(a) says: “For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”
324) 28 USC §1654 says:
“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as,
by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”
325) Petitioner alleges that if any judge in the Eastern
District or Southern District of New York gets his/her hands on Petitioner's lawsuit, even though he/she is a Respondent,
he/she will violate 28 USC §455, 28 USC §1404, 28 USC §1654 and 28 USC §144, and make a ruling dismissing
Petitioner's case based on: 1) halachic law's mandate not to report the crimes of corrupt Jews Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro,
Jack Gladstein, Mortimer Zuckerman and Scott Shifrel to the secular authorities, 2) judicial nepotism based on their desire
to save Respondent Garaufis from being prosecuted; and, 3) their ability to hide any act of fraud upon the court on Petitioner's
being an inexperienced, mentally disabled pro se litigant. If Petitioner appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals to
the Second Circuit, even though its judges are also Respondents presently engaged in the commission of several federal offenses,
they will violate 28 USC §455, 28 USC §1404, 28 USC §1654 and 28 USC §144, and make an unexplained ruling
dismissing Petitioner's case based on: 1) halachic law's mandate not to report the crimes of corrupt Jews Allen E. Kaye, Harvey
Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Mortimer Zuckerman and Scott Shifrel to the secular authorities; judicial nepotism based on their
desire to save Respondent Garaufis from being prosecuted; and, 3) their ability to hide any act of fraud upon the court on
Petitioner's being an inexperienced, mentally disabled pro se litigant. Respondent Garaufis will also depend on
law enforcement agencies like the FBI to illegally monitor Petitioner and to hospitalize Petitioner for any action that can
be misconstrued as warranting long-term psychiatric hospitalization so that Petitioner can be “jailed” for having
a mental illness without the benefits of a notice of accusation, a defense attorney and a chance to confront adversarial
witnesses. When Petitioner last checked, an employee of Respondent FBI contacted Petitioner's psychiatric treatment provider
to tell them that Petitioner had an argument with them about her rights to file criminal complaints against Jewish persons
who violated federal law, treating Petitioner's insistence as mental instability. Respondent Garaufis also set in motion
Petitioner's being falsely accused of committing 115, threatening Respondent Garaufis with bodily harm, other federal judges,
and employees of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services call center with death. Respondent Garaufis instigated the
violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights (Petitioner was able to confront the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. They confirmed that Petitioner did not threaten anyone). Lastly, Respondent Garaufis set in motion the kidnapping
and unlawful imprisonment of Petitioner in a mental institution for a federal offense/psychiatric diagnosis which Petitioner
did not commit. This Court, pursuant to 18 USC §4, misprision of felony owes both the Petitioner and the Constitution
of the United States to enforce the law.
326) Respondent United States' statutes have justly made arrangements to ensure that any justice, judge,
or magistrate judge of the United States disqualifies himself/herself in any proceeding in which a judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. In the interest of justice and mercy, federal statutes, along with case law, have arranged
that a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or
to any district or division to which all parties have consented – in the best interest of justice. However, while U.S.
Constitutional law ensures that any decision in any court of the U.S. States reflect that the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are incorporated in all U.S. judges' decisions, sometimes
dishonest federal judges can intentionally misconstrue federal statutes in a way that allows the meritless dismissal of
a pro se litigant's cases, simply because a pro se litigant's cases are automatically viewed as lacking merit,
or worse, because the pro se litigant's case has merit but addresses legal issues against which the judge has a
bias.
327)
In the case of the pro se Petitioner, Petitioner alleges that any Respondent judge against whom her action is
filed has already conspired with Respondents' attorneys not to enter into any stipulation with the Petitioner to transfer
her lawsuit to an unbiased venue/venue that does not have a Jewish majority. Furthermore, none of the Respondents have reported
or will report attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Osato Eugene Uzamere and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere for
their commission of aggravated identity theft. Petitioner alleges that a disproportionate percentage of the second district's
federal judges will adjudicate Petitioner's lawsuit in favor of those members of the judiciary and Respondents who are adherents
of Talmudic doctrines such as: 1) Law of the Moser;232) Curse of Dark Skin; 24 3) Judaism, American's New Government Religion; 25 4) Only a Jew Can Rule Over Jews;26 5) Gentiles, rightful slaves of Jews;27 6) Use of Subterfuge to Trick Goyim During Lawsuits;28 and, 7) A Gentile's Lost Item Must Not Be Returned if Based on Compassion. 29 Because of the Second Circuit's religious imbalance of power, non-adherent judges,
who Judaic law does not benefit, in attempts to keep their jobs and social standing, participate in rendering decisions
that honor and due obeisance to Judaism. In the Second Circuit, Petitioner's attempts to have the court enforce 28 USC §455,
28 USC §1404, 28 USC §1654 and 28 USC §144 are a death knell for Petitioner's lawsuit. Most of the judges
are Jews. Petitioner does not understand how the Second Circuit was able to hire in such a manner as to hire a Jewish majority,
or at least a disproportionately high percentage of Jews.
328) This court must display the legal, moral and constitutional fortitude to assist the pro se
Petitioner to enforce 28 USC §455, 28 USC §1404, 28 USC §1654 and 28 USC §144. Judicial Respondents'
district – essentially a beth din where pro se litigants are concerned, must not be allowed to secretly
enforce halachic doctrines by relying on the presumed naivéte of pro se litigants who have meritorious
claims that corrupt, federal and New York State judges ignore because of judges' own personal, unconstitutional biases. Decisions
rendered by the Second Circuit's Talmud-biased federal judges, which have been discarded by such terms as “not for
publication” or “mandate”, but make absolutely no mention of the meritorious issues in the pro se litigant's
appeal should be noticed by a trained and unbiased judicial eye as an act of fraud upon the court. This Court must ensure
that the pro se Petitioner can rely on its unbiased services to enforce 28 USC §455, 28 USC §1404, 28
USC §1654 and 28 USC §144. See Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994); Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988); (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice
but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) “is directed
against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.”) (“Section 455(a) of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”); “Section 455(a)” requires a judge
to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Taylor v. O'Grady,
888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), “It is important that
the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice.” “Justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954); United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d
842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) “The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on
the Due Process Clause.”
Federal Judges Are Required to Construe
Pro Se Litigant's Pleadings Liberally
329) In the U.S. Supreme Court case Haines V. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), Petitioner Menard,
a person convicted by the State of Illinois as a felon – and an individual deemed by the State of Illinois to be unworthy
of living with law-abiding citizens of Illinois, commenced an action against the Governor of Illinois and other state officers
and prison officials under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and 28 U.S.C. §1343(3),
seeking to recover damages for claimed injuries and deprivation of rights while incarcerated. The dismissed Mr. Menard's
complaint and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
decided against the Federal District's and U.S. Court of Appeals' decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in its decision
that “Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, allegations
such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting
evidence. . .Accordingly, although we intimate no view whatever on the merits of petitioner's allegations, we conclude that
he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof.”
There Is No Constitutional
Or Statutory Rationale To Dismiss Petitioner’s Complaint
330) In the past, Petitioner alleges that Respondent Garaufis has fraudulently misused reasons in the
Federal Rules of Civil Practice to illegally dismiss Petitioner's Verified Complaint. Petitioner alleges that Respondent
Garaufis' primarily relies on the religious doctrine Law of the Moser to prevent Petitioner from reporting corrupt Jewish
immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein. Petitioner believes that the following FRCP reasons
for dismissal do not apply to Petitioner's Verified Complaint: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of personal
jurisdiction; (4) insufficient process; (5) insufficient service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted; and (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19. Petitioner advises this Court that if Respondent Garaufis
receives this case, even though he is a Respondent, he will rule on it. If the judges of the Second Circuit gets it, they
will rule on it, even though they are also Respondents. Petitioner asks this Court to place her lawsuit in abeyance until
such time that the Respondents stipulates this court as the venue for Petitioner's action pursuant to 28 USC §455 and
28 USC §1404, and if not, to be courageous and make new law that the Petitioner can proudly present to the Supreme Court
of the United States.
331)
Petitioner reminds this Court that even if Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Petitioner
would still have the legal right to require this Court to point out Petitioner's mistakes and allow Petitioner to make necessary
changes to ensure that Petitioner’s amended Verified Complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted. Petitioner
reminds this Court of the inartfully drawn, virtually incomprehensible complaint of the disruptive, mentally disabled Jewish
litigant Rebecca Gloria Yohalem and demands the same wide literal latitude – especially since Petitioner's Verified
Complaint is a lot easier for this Court to read and understand. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) page
138.
Petitioner's Request for Review of Her Allegations Satisfies
the “Good Faith” Requirement of Coppedge v. United States
332) According to Coppedge v. United States,
“The requirement that an appeal be taken "in good faith" is satisfied when the Respondent seeks. . . review
of any issue that is not frivolous. Pp. 369 U. S. 444-445.
333) According to Coppedge vs. United States, “If, with such aid, the applicant then presents
any issue for the court's consideration which is not clearly frivolous, leave to proceed in forma pauperis must
be granted. P. 369 U. S. 446. . .P. 369 U. S. 448.”
334) Farley V. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 77 S.Ct. 1371, 1 L.Ed.2d 1529 defines how the U.S.
Supreme Court applies the “good faith” standard. It states that “In the absence of some evident improper
motive, the applicant's good faith is established by the presentation of any issue that is not plainly frivolous. The good-faith
test must not be converted into a requirement of a preliminary showing of any particular degree of merit. Unless the issues
raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a nonindigent litigant . . .the request of an indigent
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed.
335) Petitioner's alleges that her Verified Complaint addresses issues that are not frivolous issues.
At the very least, it questions the judicial Respondents' refusal to treat the Petitioner and her daughter fairly in the
face of allegations that Petitioner has established are irrefutable. It demands a final answer to the question of the identity
of Petitioner's former husband and father of Tara A. Uzamere, the adult child of the marriage. It accuses the Respondents
– especially the judicial Respondents of criminal behavior, beginning with 18 USC §4, misprision of felony, up
to and including 18 USC §1962, RICO/racketeering, based upon judicial Respondents obstruction of justice with regard
to commencing a criminal investigation against immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and Osato
E. Uzamere for their commission of fraud, identity theft, and aggravated identity theft. Petitioner's Verified Complaint
is well-written, well-researched and well-documented. Petitioner is legally entitled to be enveloped by the gossamer wings
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection extension intended for people who are disabled –– Title II of
the Americans With Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), which states that “[u]njustified
isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability,” observing that “institutional placement
of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated
are incapable of or unworthy of participating in community life.” 527 U.S. at 597, 600. The “integration mandate”
of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. §791 et seq., as expressed in federal regulations and Olmstead, requires that when a state provides services
to individuals with disabilities, it must do so “in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.”
The “most integrated setting,” according to the federal regulations, is “a setting that enables individuals
with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. §35.130(d);
28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A.
UNITED NATION'S JURISDICTION
336) Petitioner respectfully
holds before this honourable Commission that it exercises jurisdiction over the Petitioner and her children based on its
statement at the web page http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx#whocan. The web page says: “Human Rights Treaty Bodies - Individual Communications. . .Procedure for
complaints by individuals under the human rights treaties. . .Anyone may bring a human rights problem to the attention of
the United Nations and thousands of people around the world do so every year. This page explains the procedures open to
individuals who claim that they are a victim of a violation of rights contained in international human rights treaties. It
is through individual complaints that human rights are given concrete meaning. In the adjudication of individual cases,
international norms that may otherwise seem general and abstract are put into practical effect. When applied to a person’s
real-life situation, the standards contained in international human rights treaties find their most direct application.
The resulting body of decisions may guide States, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals in interpreting the
contemporary meaning of the treaties concerned.” Petitioner believes that she and her children can be considered “anyone”
based on the way that said word is used. Petitioner also believes that she has sufficiently established that the Respondents
committed human rights violations against Petitioner and her children.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following:
A) Contingent on the judicial power of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights:
1) Petitioner prays that her
complaint be adjudicated in its entirety by the Office of the High Commissioner, and that if the Commissioner find in Petitioner’s
favor, that the Commission requires the Respondents to assess damages against Plaintiff, her family in the amount of
$2,000,000,016 ($568,824 per year for every year that Respondents withheld Petitioner’s African/Nigerian/Edo/Bini
name from Plaintiff and from Tara A. Uzamere, biological child of the marriage, from November 20, 1979 to November 20, 2013,
for a total of 34 years).
2) Petitioner prays that if the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights possesses the power to
do so, that she recommend the arrest and prosecution of the following defendants: Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; Judge Garaufis;
Judge William E. Smith; Judge Patricia A. Sullivan; New York State Justice Arthur M. Schack; New York State Justice Jeffrey
S. Sunshine; immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein and Osato E. Uzamere for their commission
of aggravated identity theft; Denis P. McGowan;
3) Petitioner prays that if the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights posseses the power to
do so, that it allow one of Respondent United State of America's federal district to court to be monitored by United Nations
monitors who are learned, and if possible, practiced in U.S. Federal law;
B) If Petitioner's lawsuit is successfully transferred to one of Defendant United States of America's
district courts, that Petitioner be allowed to do the following:
1) to proceed in forma pauperis;
2) to upload all of Petitioner's lawsuit to PACER – including the exhibits; and to NOT upload or
assign Petitioner's lawsuit a number until the Court can determine if Petitioner's 250 pages of exhibits can be uploaded
in their entirety. Petitioner will not accept partial uploading of her documents because of Respondent Mortimer Zuckerman's
use of the media to commit fraud, identity theft and aggravated identity theft. Plaintiff wishes to the public to see that
she is telling the truth, and to see what the Defendants did to her and to her family.
3) to
assign Petitioner her daughter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) 30
4) to not accept bribes
or acts of extortion from the Respondents – especially Jewish billionaire Mortimer Zuckerman. He will attempt to pay
you off or extort your cooperation. If Petitioner believes that the court has become criminally biased, the Petitioner will
report it to the FBI. The Petitioner will not wait for proof.
5) rapid adjudication of Petitioner's Emergency Motion for Expedited Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. Rule 201 and for Conversion to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
Rule 56.
6) for a
jury trial if the above request is not granted;
7) to hold adjudication of Petitioner's lawsuit in abeyance until Respondents' attorneys stipulate to
change venue to the District of Rhode Island;
8) for the presiding judge to commence a criminal investigation with the goal of arrest for the following
Respondents: Ehigie Edobor Uzamere; Judge Garaufis; Judge Leonard Sand; New York State Justice Arthur M. Schack; New York
State Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine; New York State Justice Eileen A. Rakower; New York State Justice Paul Wooten; New York
State Justice Donna Mills for their refusal to report immigration attorneys Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein
and Osato E. Uzamere for their commission of aggravated identity theft; Denis P. McGowan, Regional Director, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; “John Doe” #1, U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York; “John
Doe” #2, U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York; “Jane Doe”, U.S. Marshals Service
for the Eastern District of New York;
9) for an order restraining the Respondents from engaging in any form of S.L.A.P.P. litigation;
10) for Respondents Garaufis to established
his innocence by holding the U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York criminally liable and Denis P. McGowan
for racketeering/obstruction of justice;
11) to declare Respondents Garaufis's decision in Petitioner's lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al an act
of fraud upon the court and render said decision null and void, and to allow Petitioner to reopen her lawsuit based on Respondent
Garaufis' prior act of fraud upon the court;
12) an injunction permanently barring Respondent Garaufis from presiding over any of Petitioner's lawsuits
in the future;
13)
to ensure that if no federal judge ever again makes any statement that questions Petitioner's mental state;
14) to establish proof that Plaintiff's
appeal with regard to her lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al, 11-cv-2831/11-2713-cv was actually reviewed by appellate judges;
to reveal the names of the appellate judges who rendered their decision in Plaintiff's appeal Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al if
Plaintiff's appeal was actually reviewed; and to determine if judges for the 2nd circuit treated lawsuits Uzamere vs. State
of New York, et al and Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al as one and the same lawsuit.
15) for an award of monetary damages in the amount of $58,824 for each of the 34 years that the Defendants
withheld Plaintiff African/Nigerian/Edo/Bini name Mrs. Ehigie Edobor Uzamere for a grand total of $2,000,000,016 (Jewish litigant
Rebecca Gloria Yohalem requested $1,000,000,000 in her complaint).
16) to toll the statute of limitations to give Plaintiff the opportunity to appeal the issue regarding
change of venue based upon a corrupt venue to the United States Supreme Court.
17) Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to obtain the immigration records of Defendant Ehigie Edobor Uzamere
so as to put to an end to questions regarding his identity;
18) Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to obtain the national security letter(s) that was sent to Cablevision.
19) for this Court, based on
Defendants' prior discovery of Petitioner's psychiatric records as disseminated to Respondents Daily News and made public
to the New York State Office of Mental Health, to the New York State Department of Health and to the New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation, do not allow them any further discovery.
20) Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to obtain any and all NSLs, orders or other demands to obtain non-content
information regarding Petitioner's telephone calls.
21) Issuance of a subpoena duces for records containing copies of current U.S. or Nigerian identification
documents for “Godwin Uzamere” from the individuals: Allen E. Kaye, Esq; Harvey Shapiro, Esq.; Jack Gladstein,
Esq.; Osato Eugene Uzamere, Esq., NYS Judge Jeffrey S. Sunshine; NYS Justice Arthur M. Schack; Federal District Judge Nicholas
G. Garaufis; Charles Dunne of the U.S. Marshals Service for the Eastern District of New York; Denis P. McGowan; Agnes Flores;
Martin Bolton; Bridget Davis; Samuel Sarpong, Mortimer Zuckerman and Scott Shifrel.
22) Issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for records of all individuals who contributed money to Respondents
Jeffries' congressional campaign and the amount of money each individual contributed.
23) to dismiss action without prejudice in the event
that the Court does not approve Petitioner's motion to hold in abeyance;
24) commence a criminal investigation against the Defendants for refusal to report the crimes committed
by Allen E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro, Jack Gladstein, Scott Shifrel, Mortimer Zuckerman, Judge Sunshine, Judge Schack, Judge
Gerstein, Osato Eugene Uzamere and Ehigie Edobor Uzamere;
25) to ensure that if Respondent Ehigie Edobor Uzamere does not appear (as in file an answer) that the
Court takes expedited judicial notice of his failure to identify himself and render summary judgment.
26) a public apology;
and for such other and further relief as to this honorable Court deems just and proper.
Dated: October 30, 2013
Brooklyn,
New York
CHERYL D. UZAMERE
APPEARING PRO SE
_______________________
Cheryl D. Uzamere
1209 Loring Avenue
Apt. 6B
Brooklyn, NY 11208
Tel.: (718) 235-6836
Fax: (718) 235-1290
E-mail:
cuzamere@netzero.net
STATEMENT OF
VERIFICATION AND GOOD FAITH CERTIFICATION
I, Cheryl D. Uzamere, certify that I have read the above Verified Petition and it is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. I certify that I have provided tangible, irrefutable proof of my allegations before this Court; that I researched
both facts and relevant law to the best of my ability to ensure truth and accuracy so that my Verified Petition is presented
to this Court in good faith. I certify before this Court that while this lawsuit will embarrass the Defendants when it goes
public, I do not present this Verified Petition to embarrass, annoy or defame the Defendants.
I certify the foregoing pursuant to the laws for perjury.
CHERYL D. UZAMERE
APPEARING
PRO SE
_________________
Cheryl D. Uzamere
1209 Loring Avenue
Apt. 6B
Brooklyn, NY 11208
Tel.: (718) 235-6836
Fax: (718) 235-1290
E-mail:
cuzamere@netzero.net
Washington Post,
by Robert Barnes, August 12, 2012
18 USC §1001.
New York State Penal Law §210.15 Perjury in the first degree. A person is guilty of perjury
in the first degree when he swears falsely and when his false statement (a) consists of testimony, and (b) is material to
the action, proceeding or matter in which it is made. Perjury in the first degree is a class D felony.
22 CFR §92.65 - Depositions to prove genuineness of foreign documents – (a) Authority
to execute commission. Under the provisions of section 1 of the act of June 25, 1948, as amended (sec. 1, 62 Stat. 834, sec.
53, 63 Stat. 96; 18 U.S.C. 3492), a diplomatic or consular officer may be commissioned by an United States court to take the
testimony of a witness in a foreign country either on oral or written interrogatories, or partly on oral and partly on written
interrogatories, for the purpose of determining the genuineness of any foreign document. . .”
22 NYCRR 100.3(8)(11): “. . .a judge shall not make any public comment about a pending
or impending proceeding in any court within the United States or its territories. The judge shall require similar abstention
on the part of court personnel...” and that “a judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial
duties, nonpublic information acquired in a judicial capacity.” New York State Civil Rights Law §79-h (Shield Laws)
affords members of the media to keep their news sources confidential. According to Wikipedia.org (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shield_laws_in_the_United_States), however, “currently the federal government has not enacted any national shield laws. . .”
Please refer to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which reporter Paul Branzburg of the Louisville Courier-Journal,
in the course of his reporting duties, witnessed people manufacturing and using hashish. He was ordered to name his sources.
Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, interviewed leaders of the Black Panthers, and Paul Pappas, a Massachusetts
television reporter who also reported on the Black Panthers, were called to testify before separate grand juries about illegal
actions they might have witnessed. They refused, citing privilege under the Press Clause, and were held in contempt. In a
fiercely split decision, the Court ruled 5-4 against the existence of reportorial privilege in the Press Clause of the First
Amendment.
Plaintiff respectfully reminds this court of the continuing
violations doctrine. In tort law, if a defendant commits a series of illegal acts against another person, or, in criminal
law, if someone commits a continuing crime (which can be charged as a single offense), the period of limitation begins to
run from the last act in the series. In the case of Treanor v. MCI Telecommunications, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit explained that the continuing violations doctrine "tolls the statute of limitations in situations
where a continuing pattern forms due to [illegal] acts occurring over a period of time, as long as at least one incident .
. . occurred within the limitations period. Please see paragraphs 46 and 47.
Law
of Agency, Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_agency: The common law principle in operation is usually represented in the Latin phrase, qui facit per alium, facit per se,
i.e. the one who acts through another, acts in his or her own interests and it is a parallel concept to vicarious liability
and strict liability in which one person is held liable in criminal law or tort for the acts or omissions of another. Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985): “As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they
seem all to proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his command,
either expressly given, or implied: “nam qui facit per alium, facit per se.”
18 USC § 2709(e) - Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and Transactional Records, Requirement That
Certain Congressional Bodies Be Informed.— On a semiannual basis the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate, concerning all requests made under subsection (b) of this section. Hobbs Act Violation: Some courts
have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official have de jure power to perform any
official act paid for as long as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto power to perform the requested
act. See United States v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably believed state senator had
the ability to impact a local business.
“It’s
called protecting America,” said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, California Democrat, saying that the secret court order which
Britain’s Guardian newspaper posted online Wednesday night is a routine three-month renewal and proves that the program
is carefully overseen by federal judges. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/6/white-house-defends-phone-snooping/#ixzz2VcmQgulO.
Sen. Saxby Chambliss, Georgia
Republican, said the surveillance has “proved meritorious, because we have gathered significant information on bad guys,
but only on bad guys, over the years.” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/6/white-house-defends-phone-snooping/#ixzz2VcmQgulO.
Plaintiff alleges LifeNet suicide/mental health hotline
was fraudulently contacted by Defendant U.S. Marshal Service for the Eastern District of New York and told that Plaintiff
threatened Defendant Nicholas with bodily harm. That Defendant USMS knew that Plaintiff committed no crime is a clear violation
of 18 USC §1001.
Plaintiff's lawsuit Cheryl D. Uzamere vs. The
State of New York, The City of New York, The Metropolitan Police Department and the New York City Transit Authority Case
Nos. 09-cv-2703/09-3197-cv dealt with issues pertaining to defendants' refusal to provide Plaintiff with a half fare Metrocard.
The issues raised in that lawsuit had nothing to do with Plaintiff's lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al Case Nos. 1:2011-cv-02831/11-2713-cv,
which dealt with, inter alia, Plaintiff's being blacklisted from more integrated psychiatric service providers in
violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Defendant Wolfe should have been able to see the glaring differences
between the two cases. Plaintiff therefore alleges that Defendant Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe's return of Plaintiff's appeal was
an act of fraud upon the court done solely to prevent Plaintiff from filing her appeal against Defendant Judge Nicholas G.
Garaufis' FRCP-lacking, memorandum-lacking decision in Plaintiff's lawsuit Uzamere vs. Cuomo, et al.
New York Wiretapping Law: New York's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law.
New York makes it a crime to record or eavesdrop on an in-person or telephone conversation unless one party to the conversation
consents. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00, 250.05. Thus, if you operate in New York, you may record a conversation or phone
call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. This serves
as a reminder to any defendant that wants to nullify Plaintiff's recorded conversation with Defendant Davis based on the delusion
that Plaintiff's doesn't know N.Y. Penal Law §250.00 and §250.05.
18
USC §2709(c): “If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. . .certifies that otherwise there may result
a danger. . .to the life or physical safety or any person, no wire or electronic communications service provider, or officer,
employee, or agent thereof, shall disclose to any person. . .that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained
access to information or records under this section.” This law does not state that a telecommunications or internet
service provide cannot disclose that a consumer does not have a national security letter filed against him/her with the consumer's
telephone company and/or internet provider. The nondisclosure agreement only prohibits disclosure if a consumer has a national
security letter filed against him/her with the consumer's telephone company and/or internet service provider.
The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise
the law's effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods. The inducement from the official is criminal if it is express
or if it is implied from his words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so interprets it.” Evan
v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 504 U.S. 255, 119 L.Ed.2d 57.
Wikipedia.org
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_hands) Unclean hands, sometimes called the clean hands doctrine or the dirty hands doctrine, is an equitable defense in which the
defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to obtain an equitable remedy on account of the fact that the plaintiff
is acting unethically or has acted in bad faith with respect to the subject of the complaint—that is, with “unclean
hands. The defendant has the burden of proof to show the plaintiff is not acting in good faith. The doctrine is often stated
as “those seeking equity must do equity” or “equity must come with clean hands.” 2. The maxim "he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands" closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness
or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.
P. 324 U. S. 814. 3. The "clean hands" doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of a court of equity as a vehicle
for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. P. 324 U.S. 814. 4. While equity does not require
that its suitors shall have led blameless lives as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted without fraud
or deceit as to the matter in issue. P. 324 U. S. 814. Where a suit in equity concerns the public interest as well as the
private interests of the litigants, the “clean hands” doctrine assumes greater significance, for if the equity
court in such case properly applies the maxim to withhold its assistance, it not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the
fruits of his transgression, but averts an injury to the public. P. 324 U. S. 815. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive
Co. 324 U.S. 806 (1945)
When Defendant Ehigie E. Uzamere's brother
Nosayaba and his wife Ethel sponsored Defendant Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, Nosayaba and Ethel applied as his father and mother-in-law.
Sponsorship as a beneficiary's parents takes less time than sponsorship as a beneficiary's brother and sister-in-law (IR2
sponsorship). Sponsorship as a spouse of a U.S. citizen takes even less time (IR1 sponsorship).
Daily News article dated November 5, 2009.
See pages from attorneys'
fraudulent affirmations falsifying Plaintiff's ex-husband's identity as “Godwin Uzamere”; fraudulent 1-130 that
was falsified by attorneys Allen E. Kaye and Harvey Shapiro, documents from Rachel McCarthy, Bar Counsel and T. Diane Cejka,
Director, FOIA/PA, U.S. Department of Citizenship and Immigration Services and Daily News article dated November 5, 2009.
22 NYCRR §50.1(D) Court employees shall not disclose any confidential information received
in the course of their official duties, except as required in the performance of such duties, nor use such information for
personal gain or advantage. 22 NYCRR §100.3(B)(8) – A judge shall not make any public comment about a pending or
impending proceeding in any court within the United States or its territories. The judge shall require similar abstention
on the part of court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This paragraph does not prohibit judges from
making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of
the court. This paragraph does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. 22 NYCRR
§100.3(B)(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties, nonpublic information
acquired in a judicial capacity.
Some courts have held that a Hobbs Act
violation does not require that the public official have de jure power to perform any official act paid for as long
as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto power to perform the requested act. See United States
v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably believed state senator had the ability to impact a local
business); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sorrow, 732
F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (public official can
extort money for permit beyond control of his office, so long as victim has a reasonable belief that he could affect issuance);
United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v.
Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d
364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United
States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521
F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th
Cir. 1974).
http://www.come-and-hear.com/editor/moser-broyde/index.html.
http://www.ottmall.com/mj_ht_arch/v15/mj_v15i20.html#CDX.
http://www.come-and-hear.com/editor/america_1.html.
http://www.come-and-hear.com/supplement/so-daat-emet/index.html.
http://www.come-and-hear.com/editor/capunish_4.html.
http://www.come-and-hear.com/babakamma/babakamma_113.html.
http://www.come-and-hear.com/supplement/so-daat-emet/index.html.
Minor or incompetent person. Without a Representative.
A minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian
ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or
incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.
