On Appeal from the United States District Court
for
the Eastern District of New York
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ORAL ARGUMENT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENTS
POINT I: The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Certify Its Reasons in Writing Pursuant to Coppedge vs. United States
POINT II: Appellant's Request for Review
of Her Allegations Satisfies the "Good Faith" Requirement of Coppedge
v. United States
CONCLUSION
TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
Due Process
(Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments)
U.S.
SUPREME COURT CASES
Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)
Burford
v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315
Connally
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 77, S.Ct. Il. Ed.2d 1529
, 541, U.S. 504 (2004) 17
., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) 16, 17
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS CASES
Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595, F2d 948, 951 (4th Cir. 1979) 13
Crisafi v. Holland, et al, 655 F.2d 1305
12, 13, 14
McTeague v. Sosnowski,
617, F2d 1016, 1019 (3rd Circuit, 1980) 13
U.S. DISTRICT COURT CASES
New York City Housing Authority, Managed by Louis
H. Pink Houses v. Uzamere, 1:07-cv-01194-NGG-LB
Uzamere v. John Doe, et al 1:07-cv-02471-NGG-LB
Uzamere v. State of New York, 1:09-cv-02703-NGG-LB
Uzamere vs. Bush, et al, 1:08-cv-00891-NGG-LB
Uzamere vs. United States Postal Service,
1:09-cv-03709-NGG-LB 11
FEDERAL
STATUTES
28 C.F.R. §35.130(d)
17
28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A. 17
28 U.S.C. §1291 2
28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) 9
28 U.S.C. §1915(d) 13, 14
28 U.S.C. 1331 2
29 U.S.C.
§791 1, 16
29 U.S.C. 794a 18
42 U.S.C. §1983 vi, 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 20
42 U.S.C. §1985 vi, 1, 2, 3, 10, 12, 20
42 U.S.C.§12101 1, 16
42 U.S.C. §12131(1) 17
42
U.S.C. §12131(2) 18
42 U.S.C.
§12131-12134 17
42 U.S.C. §12133
18
92 Stat. 2982 18
F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) 2
F.R.A.P. Rule 24(a)
Section 504, Rehabilitation Act
Section 505, Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Title II, ADA
NEW YORK STATE CASE COURT CASES
Uzamere vs. Uzamere, 2009, NY Slip Op 09214 [68 AD3d 855]
Cheryl D. Uzamere, Appellant, v Ehigie E. Uzamere, Respondent
NEW YORK STATE STATUTES
22 NYCRR §50.1 19
22 NYCRR §100.3(B)(8) 19
22 NYCRR §100.3(B)(11) 19
OTHER
AUTHORITIES
National Alliance
for the Mentally Ill,
NAMI Challenger, Spring 18
STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ORAL ARGUMENT
Cheryl D. Uzamere, appearing on her own behalf, requests oral
argument. Oral argument will help the Appellant personalize the trauma she continues to suffer as a results of the Defendants'
violation of her rights relating to Title II, ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C.
§1985 in ways that an appellate brief never could.
The District Court abused its discretion in determining that Appellant's Complaint had no arguable basis in either fact or
law because it did not certify in writing the reasons for its dismissal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's
standard of review, and by exacerbating its indiscretion by having the memorandum-lacking order filed as a Memorandum and
Order. By committing such act the District Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.
In Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962), it states that if a litigant who wishes to proceed pro se has not yet received the plenary review
of her action, she is entitled to the benefits of presenting either oral argument to the Court of Appeals.
APPELLANT’S
BRIEF
Appellant
Cheryl D. Uzamere, appearing on her own behalf, submits this brief in support of her appeal from so much of a final judgment
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Hon. Nicholas G. Garaufis, U.S.D.J.), dismissing Appellant's
Complaint as lacking any arguable basis in fact or law.
Appellant asserts that this Court should reverse so much of the district court’s order and judgment because the District
Court failed to supply the required memorandum and standard of review upon which a district court's decision must be based
pursuant to FRCP Rule 12.
In addition, this Court should hold that Appellant has established ample proof of her allegations that Defendants violated
Title II, ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1985 that she has satisfied
the “good faith” requirement of Coppedge v. United States States sufficiently to proceed in forma pauperis.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an action for violation of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq., and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §791, 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1985. The District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. Jurisdiction in this Court is based upon 28 U.S.C. §1291, in that this
is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court disposing of all claims by all parties. The final judgment was entered
on June 22, 2011 and the notice of appeal was filed on June 29, 2011. This appeal is thus timely, F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)(A).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1) Whether the District Court
abused its discretion by failing to certify its reasons in writing for dismissing Appellant Complaint.
2) Whether Appellant's request to
proceed in forma pauperis for review of her allegations of Defendants' violations of Title II, ADA, section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act and 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985 satisfies the "good faith" requirement of Coppedge v. United states.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal has its basis in Defendants' violations of Appellant's Fourteenth-Amendment right to equal protection under the
law, and Defendants' violation of Appellant's right to protection as a mentally-disabled American pursuant to Title II of
the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Appellant asserts that said constitutional
and statutory violations arose during Appellant's litigation of the case Uzamere vs. Uzamere, 2009, NY Slip Op 09214
[68 AD3d 855]1 a year after the Appellant filed her divorce action that identified Defendant law firm Allen E. Kaye PC as
the law firm that facilitated her ex-husband's commission of immigration fraud and identity fraud. Appellant asserts that
after she filed her divorce action that identified Allen E. Kaye, Esq. and Harvey Shapiro as facilitating Ehigie Uzamere's
commission of immigration fraud and identity fraud, Defendants, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1985
engaged in a criminal conspiracy designed to blacklist the Appellant to prevent her from filing complaints against Allen E.
Kaye and Harvey Shapiro and later Jack Gladstein so as to prevent the Appellant from receiving honest services from Title
II, ADA-covered State courts and Title II, ADA-covered not-for-profit outpatient psychiatric facilities based on Defendant
Daily News' public “diagnosis” of Appellant as an “anti-Semitic wacko”; to deprive Appellant of more
integrated outpatient psychiatric programs first, by arresting Appellant as a criminally-minded, insane anti-Semite so as
to railroad Appellant into an inpatient psychiatric setting. Appellant asserts that Defendants' goal was and still is to use
the media, government Defendants' judicial system, and government Defendants' mental health system to illegally disclose Appellant's
Title II, ADA-protected psychiatric information to misdiagnose Appellant as an “anti-Semitic wacko” as a legal
substitute for filing an action for defamation against the Appellant to disprove Appellant's allegations, and to discredit
the truth of Appellant's allegations based solely on the existence of Appellant's mental illness.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 21, 1979, Ehigie Edobor Uzamere used the fraudulent name “Godwin Ehigie Uzamere” and fraudulent birthday
“June 1, 1955” to enter into a fraudulent marriage the Appellant. A-1-3.
On or around November 30, 1979, Allen E. Kaye, PC represented
as true and correct Appellant's ex-husband as “Godwin Ehigie” on the I-130 immediate relative sponsorship forms.
A-4-5.
In October 2007, Appellant asserts that she correctly refiled her action for divorce, holding that someone in the law firm's
employ presented the marriage license as true and correct. A-6-12.
In September 2008, Nigerian new-gathering agency Point Blank News published an article in which Defendant law firm Uzamere
and Associate's held Appellant to be crazy. A-13-14.
On October 8, 2008, while defending Appellant's ex-husband in government Defendant's court, Osato Uzamere asked the State
court to dismiss Appellant's case as “delusional.” A-15-18.
By January 2009, Appellant received proof of her ex-husband's
identity from Rachel McCarthy, Bar Counsel for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service. Correspondence from Rachel McCarthy
is reported at A-19-20.
By January 12, 2009, Defendant New York State Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine held that “. . .the opposition submitted by
defendant raises a genuine issues as to whether or not plaintiff and defendant were married in the first instance.”
A-21.
On January 20, 2009, the Appellant e-mailed a complaint to the former U.S. Embassy regarding Justice Sunshine's attempt to
facilitate Appellant's ex-husband's act of identity fraud. A-22-23.
On May 12, 2009, Justice Sunshine rendered his Decision and Order holding Senator Ehigie Edobor Uzamere to be Appellant's
husband. A-24-25.
On or near June 12, 2009, Appellant received additional information from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service establishing
Ehigie Edobor Uzamere as her husband and the father of their daughter, Tara A. Uzamere. A-26-36.
On or around July 17, 2009, with proof
of Appellant's ex-husband's and Defendant law firms' act of identity, Appellant filed Index No. 18012/2009, action for fraud
against her ex-husband and employees of Defendant law firms Allen E. Kaye, PC, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein.
On October 28, 2009, attorneys Allen
E. Kaye, Harvey Shapiro and Jack Gladstein filed affirmations holding “Godwin Uzamere”, to be Appellant's husband.
B-1-28.
On November 3, 2009, Appellant was arrested by the New York City Police Department for threatening Justice Sunshine. B-29.
On November 5, 2009, Defendant Daily News, LP, published a news article in print and on the internet that publicly disclosed
Appellant's Title II, ADA-protected, confidential psychiatric information including Appellant's name, age, town of residence,
psychiatric treatment facility, diagnosis, symptoms associated with Appellant's “psychosis”, and Judge Gerstein's
declaration that Appellant is mentally unfit with in a manner that held the Appellant to be psychotic based upon, inter alia,
Appellant's “stripping and screaming about her 'senator' husband”, that “Godwin Uzamere” is Appellant's
real husband, and that Appellant is an “anti-Semitic wacko.” B-30.
On November 30, 2009, Federation Employment and Guidance Service
terminated its mental health services to the Appellant. B-31-32.
On December 7, 2009, the Appellant was placed with Defendant New York State Office of Mental Health's Kingsboro Psychiatric
Facility.
On December 8,
2009, pursuant to Judiciary Law §431, New York State Reporting Bureau published 2009 NY Slip Op 09214 [68 AD3d 855].
The caption of the case is entitled Cheryl D. Uzamere, Appellant, v Ehigie Edobor Uzamere, Respondent. The term “also
known as Godwin Uzamere” was removed.
On December 24, 2009, Appellant was seen by Honorable Anthony Cutrona of Kings County Supreme Court's Mental Hygiene Court.
B-33.
On January 15, 2010, Defendant NYSUCS' judicial employee Justice Arthur M. Schack contacted Defendant OMH's psychiatrist Dr.
Marie Bauduy of the Kingsboro Psychiatric Facility and ordered her not to produce the Appellant for court, holding that Appellant
to be unfit to proceed. B-34-36.
During the beginning of February, 2010, Appellant was discharged by Kingsboro Psychiatric Facility.
On February 23, 2010, Appellant was taken out of her apartment
by force and later hospitalized by Defendant OMH'S Kingsboro Psychiatric Center. During Appellant's last week as an inpatient,
Kingsboro social worker Laurie Velcimé informed the Appellant that virtually all the not-for-profit outpatient mental
health facilities that Ms. Velcimé contacted rejected her request to provide Appellant with outpatient psychiatric
services. C-1-4.
On March 15, 2010, Justice Matthew D'Emic rendered his Decision and Order holding Ehigie E. Uzamere to be Appellant's husband
and father of Tara A. Uzamere, the child of the marriage. Exhibit C-5-8.
On April 18,
2010, Appellant was seen by Honorable Anthony Cutrona of Kings County Supreme Court's Mental Hygiene Court. C-9.
On May 14, 2010, the Appellant appeared
before Justice Arthur M. Schack. During the motion hearing, Appellant complained that the court would not allow her to speak.
Appellant also complained about Defendant Daily News. Justice Arthur M. Schack told Appellant to sue the Daily News, and the
one of the Zuckerman's has money. C-10-26.
On July 13, 2010, Justice Arthur M. Schack rendered his decision, fraudulently holding “Godwin Uzamere” to be
Appellant's husband. Decision and Order of the Honorable Arthur M. Schack's is reported at C-27-34.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellant formally requests this Court to review the District Court's finding that her Complaint lacks any arguable basis
in fact or law. The District Court cites 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) and it case law application, Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) as the sole basis of it decision. It incorporates no procedural law to guide its decision. The
question then, is whether Appellant's allegations are frivolous or not frivolous. Appellant's causes of action are based in
substantive issues regarding her assertions that Defendants blacklisted her by withholding outpatient psychiatric rehabilitative
services and honest judicial services in violation of Title II, ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983
and 42 U.S.C. §1985. The District Court bound both itself and this Court by referencing Coppedge v. United States,
which says in part that “If the claims made or the issues sought to be raised by the applicant are such that their substance
cannot adequately be ascertained from the face of the application, the Court of Appeals must provide the . . . to attempt
to make a showing that the District Court's certificate of lack of good faith is erroneous. P. 369 U. S. 446.”
The District Court abused its discretion
by failing to certify in writing its basis for stating that that Appellant's Complaint lacks any arguable basis in fact or
law because it failed to supply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's standard of review as it did in Appellant's prior lawsuits.
Without Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's standard of review, the District Court's claim that Appellant's complaint lacks
an arguable basis in act of law is vague, and in violation of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385
(1926), which says that “A . . . statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application lacks the first essential of due process
of law. P. 269 U. S. 391.” The Appellant also finds that the District Court's abused its discretion, not only because
it failed to provide a memorandum explaining Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's standard of review, but also because on the
P.A.C.E.R. website, the District Court's memorandum-lacking order is reported as a memorandum and order.
The District Court made vague inferences to “Plaintiff's
long, tired history of vexatious litigation in this court”, essentially asking this Court to find that “Plaintiff's
most recent Complaint . . . must be dismissed as frivolous and malicious because . . . Plaintiff's Complaint's lacks any arguable
basis in fact or law.” This statement is erroneous. Irrespective of any personal view regarding Appellant's prior action,
the prior cases to which the District Court made reference have memoranda that utilize Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard
of review upon which the District Court's dismissal is based. The District Court did not dismiss them solely because they
were “long”, “tired” and “vexatious.”2
The District Court further abused
its discretion by making no attempt to address Appellant's specific allegations that clearly establish that Defendants blacklisted
her by withholding not-for-profit, outpatient psychiatric services and honest judicial services based on Appellant's having
been diagnosed an “anti-Semitic wacko” in violation of Title II, ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42
U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1985. Instead of making specific reference to Appellant's allegations in its memorandum-lacking
order, it opted instead to relegate those unmentioned causes of action into the the phrase “other things. . .”
Appellant invokes the power of this Court to review those issues that the District Court chose not mention in its memorandum-lacking
order.
For the reasons
set forth, the Appellant ask this Court to allow her to proceed in forma pauperis to allow her to present proof that her Complaint
was made in good faith.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The
District Court Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Certify Its Reasons for Dismissing Appellant's Complaint in Writing
In Crisafi, v. Holland, et al, 655 F.2d 1305 (1981), Salvatore Crisafi, asserted, inter alia, that correction
officials arbitrarily curtailed his use of a law library, and denied his requests for writing paper, envelopes, and stamps.
The district court granted him leave to file his pro se complaint without prepayment of costs. Simultaneously, the court dismissed
the complaint, endorsing on the pleading "Dismissed 28 USC 1915(d)." The court noted in the margin the civil action
numbers of six cases Crisafi had filed in the past three years. No further explanation was provided. The district court then
denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis, certifying without a statement of reasons that Crisafi's challenge was "frivolous
and not taken in good faith.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that “Congress stipulated
that a court may dismiss an in forma pauperis proceeding if satisfied that the action is "frivolous or malicious."
28 U.S.C. §1915(d). Section 1915(d), however, provides no basis for “cursory treatment of meritorious complaints.”
McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 1980). Discretion to dismiss “may not be exercised arbitrarily
and is limited . . . in every case by the language of the statute itself which restricts its application to complaints found
to be 'frivolous or malicious.” Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951 (4th Cir. 1979) . . . The district court
did not state on what basis it found Crisafi's complaint frivolous or malicious and did not supply the statement of reasons
required by Rule 24(a), Fed.R.App.P., in denying leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. We therefore set out below
illustrative situations in which an in forma pauperis pleading properly may be dismissed as "frivolous or malicious,"
and state why immediate dismissal of Crisafi's complaint was unwarranted . . . a complaint filed in forma pauperis is not
subject to dismissal simply because the plaintiff is litigious. The number of complaints a poor person files does not alone
justify peremptory dismissal. In each instance, the substance of the impoverished person's claim is the appropriate measure.
The Court of Appeals ends its legal rationale by stating that “This case illustrates the value of a clear statement
of reasons by the district court when dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915(d). Such a statement serves twin purposes:
it ensures that the district court has fully considered the complaint and the applicable law, and it informs the court of
appeals and the parties of the grounds on which an action was found 'frivolous or malicious' . . . We do expect . . . that
district court judges will endeavor to avoid unnecessary remands by supplying a cogent statement of reasons when the basis
for a section 1915(d) dismissal is not evident on the face of the complaint . . . when denying leave to proceed on appeal
in forma pauperis.”
Based on the standards set in Coppedge v. United States – standards which the District Court invoked when it cited the
U.S. Supreme Court case, this Court must remand Appellant's case for review.
POINT
TWO
Appellant's Request for Review of Her Allegations Satisfies
the “Good Faith” Requirement of Coppedge v. United States
According to Coppedge v. United
States, “The requirement that an appeal in forma pauperis be taken "in good faith" is satisfied when
the defendant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Pp. 369 U. S. 444-445.
According to Coppedge vs. United States, “If, with such aid, the applicant then presents any issue
for the court's consideration which is not clearly frivolous, leave to proceed in forma pauperis must be granted. P. 369 U.
S. 446. (k) If it is the practice of a Court of Appeals to defer rulings on motions to dismiss paid appeals until the court
has had the benefit of hearing argument and considering briefs and an adequate record, it must accord the same procedural
rights to a person applying for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. P. 369 U. S. 448.”
Farley V. United States, 354 U.S. 521, 77
S.Ct. 1371, 1 L.Ed.2d 1529 defines how the U.S. Supreme Court applies the “good faith” standard. It states that
“In the absence of some evident improper motive, the applicant's good faith is established by the presentation of any
issue that is not plainly frivolous. The good-faith test must not be converted into a requirement of a preliminary showing
of any particular degree of merit. Unless the issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case
of a nonindigent litigant . . . the request of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed.
Is government Defendants' violation
of Title II, ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act considered by the District Court to be a non-frivolous issue? It
certainly does. In the case Disability Advocates, Inc., v. David A. Paterson, et al, the District Court stated: “The
Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), that “[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability,” observing that “institutional placement of persons who can handle
and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable of or unworthy
of participating in community life.” 527 U.S. at 597, 600. The “integration mandate” of Title II of the
American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §791
et seq., as expressed in federal regulations and Olmstead, requires that when a state provides services to individuals
with disabilities, it must do so “in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.” The “most
integrated setting,” according to the federal regulations, is “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities
to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 C.F.R. §35.130(d); 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app.
A.
Not only does the U.S.
Supreme Court consider violation of Title II, ADA a non-frivolous matter, it allows private citizens to file suit for damages
against governmental agencies and instrumentalities that violate their rights. According to the U.S. Supreme Court case Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), “Title II, §§12131–12134, prohibits any public entity from discriminating
against “qualified” persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or activities.
The Act defines the term “public entity” to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies and
instrumentalities. §12131(1). Persons with disabilities are “qualified” if they, “with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or
the provision of auxiliary aids and services, mee[t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” §12131(2). Title II’s enforcement
provision incorporates by reference §505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, as added, 29 U.S.C. §794a,
which authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money damages. 42 U. S. C. §12133.”
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, an organization well-known
for its advocacy of mentally disabled individuals and mental health issues, publishes an article named NAMI Challenger. In
its article dated Spring 2005, under the subtitle “Words Can Hurt”, it stated that Words like “crazy”,
“cuckoo”, “psycho”, “wacko” and “nutso” are just a few examples of words that
keep the stigma of mental illness alive. These words belittle and offend people with mental health problems. Many of us use
them without intending any harm. Just as we wouldn’t mock someone for having a physical illness like cancer or heart
disease, it is cruel to make fun of someone with a mental illness.” In the section entitled “Mental Illness In
The Media” it says “People with mental disorders are, many times, not described accurately or realistically in
the media. Movies, television and books often present people with mental illnesses as dangerous or unstable. News stories
sometimes highlight mental illness to create a sensation in a news report, even if the mental illness is not relevant to the
story. You can help change the way mental illness is talked about in the media by speaking up.”
Appellant provided the District Court, and now this Court
with her exhibit of Defendant Daily New's article entitled “Hate-Spewing Wacko Goes Into Fit in Court.” Defendant's
staff writer Scott Shifrel openly admits obtaining the article from “one courthouse source, a clear violation of 22
NYCRR §§50.13, 100.3(B)(8)(11)4 identifies the hospital to which Appellant was sent to receive psychiatric treatment; identifies symptoms
of Appellant's illness that could only have been known by someone who was there; and lastly, Defendant Daily News' broadcasting
as true and correct a fraudulent counter-affidavit that held “Godwin Uzamere” to be Appellant's husband when the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization found that5 Defendant New York State Unified Court System Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine adjudicated that Senator Ehigie
Edobor Uzamere.
As stated
in Coppedge vs. United States, “If, with such aid, the applicant then presents any issue for the court's consideration
which is not clearly frivolous, leave to proceed in forma pauperis must be granted. Violation of Title II, ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act are more than non-frivolous. They are serious violations that the District Court is in the process
of adjudicating with corporate entities and some of the same governmental agencies Defendants that are the Appellant's adversaries.
Private citizens have the right to sue for violation of Title II of the Americans With Americans Act. Coppedge allows in forma
pauperis litigants to file suit for issues that are not frivolous. Since Appellant has satisfied both criteria, this Court
must allow the Appellant to proceed in forma pauperis.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the District Court’s dismissal and
remand the action for a determination of those issue raised pertaining to Defendants' violation of Title II, ADA, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1985.
Dated:
New York, New York
July 11,
2011
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Form 6
Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(a)
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation,
Typeface Requirements and Type Style Requirements
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 5,100
words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed.R.App.P.32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
This
brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(6)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 97/2000/XP in 14 point Times
New Roman font.
____________________
CHERYL D. UZAMERE
Appearing Pro Se
1209 Loring Avenue
Apt. 6B
Brooklyn, NY 11208
Tel.: (347)
985-2495
_________________________________________
1 Appellant's divorce is now a matter of New York State case law, Uzamere vs. Uzamere, 2009, NY Slip Op
90214 [68 AD3d 855]. Any mention of Appellant's divorce are only to establish those torts that arose during Appellant's litigation
of her divorce action. Appellant respectfully directs this Court's attention to Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689 (1992): “ . . . while it is not inconceivable that in certain circumstances the abstention principles developed
in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic relationship even
when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or child custody, such abstention is inappropriate here, where the status of
the domestic relationship has been determined as a matter of state law, and in any event has no bearing on the underlying
torts alleged. Pp. 15-16.”
